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Preface 
 
 
 
In July 2004 the Commission proposed the outline of the future sugar regime in the Euro-
pean Union. The proposal includes a significant reduction of the internal prices and 
production quota. Developing countries' export opportunities are affected by such a policy 
change. With high support prices maintained beyond 2006, the group of Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries would benefit from 
the present preferential trade agreements, as they can export to the EU against the high in-
ternal prices. When the internal EU prices are reduced to levels the Commission proposed 
in its July 2004 document, only the most competitive LDC/ACP producers would be able 
to maintain access to the EU market.  
 The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality in the Netherlands has re-
quested LEI to assess the potential impacts of the reform proposal on EU imports and on 
the export opportunities for developing countries. As many of the existing analyses, includ-
ing those of the Commission, are mainly based on static and sector analyses, this study 
aims to improve insights into the potential impact of EU policy changes on developing 
countries by taking into account dynamic sector and macroeconomic adjustment effects. 
 Siemen van Berkum, Pim Roza and Frank van Tongeren carried out the research. 
The research was supervised by a steering committee with the following staff members of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality: A. van Poppel (chair), G. Meester, 
R. Huige, A. Vermüe, M. Woldberg and J. Rummenie. LEI would like to sincerely thank 
the steering committee members for their generous contribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Doel en aanpak 
Het doel van deze studie is om een analyse te maken van de gevolgen van het voorstel van 
juli 2004 van de Europese Commissie ten aanzien van de hervorming van het EU-
suikerbeleid voor de EU-invoer uit en exportmogelijkheden van ontwikkelingslanden. De 
onderzoeksvragen laten zich als volgt samenvatten: 
- Wat zijn de gevolgen van de Europese beleidsveranderingen voor de in- en uitvoer 
van suiker door de EU?  
- Wat zijn de gevolgen voor de suikerexport en het nationaal inkomen van (groepen 
van en enkele geselecteerde) ontwikkelingslanden?  
 
 De studie hanteert drie benaderingen die elkaar aanvullen. Als eerste methode ge-
bruiken we modelsimulaties om de gevolgen te schetsen van verschillende 
beleidsscenario's voor de handelsstromen tussen de EU en diverse groepen ontwikkelings-
landen. Vervolgens trachten we de onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden aan de hand van 
een kritische bespreking van relevante literatuur. En ten derde presenteren we drie landen-
studies.  
 
Kenmerken van de internationale suikermarkt 
De suikerproductie in de wereld neemt gestaag toe. Deze groei doet zich hoofdzakelijk 
voor in de (meer ontwikkelde) ontwikkelingslanden, zoals Brazilië, India, Thailand en 
Mexico. Op dit moment is Brazilië veruit de belangrijkste exporteur van suiker, gevolgd 
door de EU, Thailand en Australië. Sedert het begin van de jaren negentig loopt het aan-
deel van de EU in de internationale suikerhandel terug, terwijl het volume van de 
wereldhandel wel is toegenomen. Internationale prijzen schommelen, met lange perioden 
van relatief lage prijzen. Dit is terug te voeren op een aantal basiskenmerken van het gewas 
en zijn verwerking, waardoor de suikerproductie zich niet soepel aan veranderende markt-
omstandigheden aanpast. Ook nationaal overheidsbeleid beïnvloedt de internationale 
suikerhandel en internationale prijzen. Overheidssteun aan de sector is niet beperkt tot al-
leen de OESO-landen; ook in Rusland, China, India en andere ontwikkelingslanden wordt 
de binnenlandse suikermarkt gereguleerd. 
 
Gevolgen EU-voorstel per ontwikkelingsland verschillend 
De EU verleent diverse landen preferentiële toegang tot de Europese markt. Hiervan is de 
groep van ondertekenaars van het ACP Suiker Protocol de belangrijkste. Deze voormalige 
koloniën van EU-lidstaten profiteren van markttoegang tot de Unie waarbij zij voor een 
quotum van 1,5 miljoen ton ruwe suiker EU-prijzen kunnen ontvangen. Het hervormings-
voorstel van de Commissie van juli 2004 betekent voor deze groep een verlies van 
exportopbrengsten uit de handel met de Unie. De gevolgen van dit voorstel verschillen 
echter per land om drie redenen. Ten eerste zijn de huidige voordelen van het EU-beleid 
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nogal ongelijk verdeeld tussen de betrokken landen; landen die er het meest van profiteren 
zullen waarschijnlijk de grootste verliezen aan exportopbrengsten hebben. Ten tweede ver-
schillen de productiekosten in de landen sterk. Sommige landen met relatief lage 
productiekosten zullen in staat zijn om ook in de nieuwe situatie hun export naar de EU 
voort te zetten of zelfs uit te breiden, en/of additionele markten in derde landen te vinden 
als de EU zich verder terugtrekt van de internationale markt. Ten derde, de gevolgen voor 
de landen verschillen omdat per land mogelijkheden voor economische diversificatie ver-
schillen. 
 
Gevolgen van EU-hervorming volgens modelsimulaties 
Om de gevolgen van de beleidsherziening van de EU voor ontwikkelingslanden te bereke-
nen, hebben we twee modelsimulaties uitgevoerd. Het eerste scenario is de toepassing van 
de EBA-regeling, waarbij vrije toegang tot de EU-markt aan EBA-landen wordt verleend 
en het huidige EU-suikerbeleid wordt voortgezet. Het tweede scenario is het Commissie-
voorstel van juli 2004. De belangrijkste conclusies van deze simulaties zijn: 
- De invoer van suiker vanuit EBA-landen neemt toe, maar de toename is niet bijzon-
der groot. De extra invoer in het EBA-scenario is 384.000 ton ruw suiker, waardoor 
de totale invoer van de EU-27 zou uitkomen op 2,9 miljoen ton. In het hervormings-
scenario (en dus bij lagere EU-prijzen) neemt de invoer toe met 'slechts' 211.000 ton. 
Deze invoertoename is veel lager dan de eigen inschatting van de Europese Commis-
sie. De Commissie stelt namelijk dat bij onveranderd EU-beleid en vrije toegang 
voor de minst-ontwikkelde landen de invoer uit deze landen met zo'n 2,8 miljoen ton 
zal toenemen (tot rond 3,0 miljoen ton) waardoor de totale invoer van de Unie zou 
verdubbelen. Als het EU-beleid wordt herzien, zal de extra invoer uit EBA-landen 
volgens de Commissie zo'n 0,5 miljoen ton bedragen; 
- EBA-landen behalen positieve welvaartsgevolgen als de handelsbarrières voor suiker 
wegvallen; zij kunnen immers meer suiker naar de EU exporteren. De grootste effec-
ten treden echter op bij het verdwijnen van handelsbarrières voor andere (niet-suiker) 
sectoren. Het nationaal inkomen van deze groep landen neemt naar schatting met 
USD382 miljoen toe onder het scenario van de EU-hervorming. Dit bedrag is gelijk 
aan 0,1% van het gezamenlijke inkomen in 2001; 
- ACP-landen die het Suiker Protocol hebben ondertekend, zijn in staat om het verlies 
aan exportopbrengsten uit de handel met de EU te compenseren: deze landen zien 
(als groep) een bescheiden groei van hun suikerexport onder het scenario van de Eu-
ropese suikerhervorming, omdat deze landen iets meer kunnen uitvoeren naar andere 
ontwikkelingslanden. Dit leidt echter niet tot een groei van het gezamenlijke natio-
naal inkomen omdat de gemiddelde prijs voor hun suikeruitvoer afneemt en men 
geen welvaartswinst boekt in andere sectoren; 
- Brazilië en een groep 'andere ontwikkelingslanden' zien hun export (vooral naar 'an-
dere ontwikkelingslanden') iets toenemen, maar de groei in volume is bescheiden. 
Zowel voor Brazilië als voor de groep 'andere ontwikkelingslanden' heeft het EU-
voorstel tot wijziging van de suikermarktordening nauwelijks gevolgen.  
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Suiker een (im)perfect substituut? 
De relatief bescheiden invoerstroom vanuit de minst ontwikkelde landen naar de EU heeft 
sterk te maken met de aanname dat suiker uit de EU en uit de minst ontwikkelde landen als 
imperfecte substituten worden beschouwd. Als we deze veronderstelling laten varen en 
suiker als een homogeen product (een perfect substituut) beschouwen, komen we uit op 
veel grotere invoerstromen: onder het EBA-scenario zullen de EBA-landen een extra 2,7 
miljoen ton suiker exporteren naar de EU, terwijl dat in het geval van de EU-hervorming 
zo'n 0,9 miljoen ton zal omvatten. Diverse studies over dit onderwerp nemen aan dat suiker 
een homogeen product is, maar dat is om drie redenen niet erg plausibel. Ten eerste onder-
steunen econometrische studies gebaseerd op lange termijn historische trends deze 
veronderstelling niet. Ten tweede, veel industriële gebruikers van suiker in de EU eisen 
een hoge kwaliteit geraffineerde suiker, iets wat maar enkele ontwikkelingslanden kunnen 
aanbieden. En ten derde, in de internationale handel is er het verschil tussen ruwe suiker en 
witte suiker. Het lijkt daarom veel realistischer suiker uit de EU en uit de minst ontwikkel-
de landen als imperfecte substituten te beschouwen. 
 
Uitkomsten van andere studies 
Andere studies, zoals die van LMC, wijzen uit dat bij een sterke prijsverlaging in de EU de 
productiekosten in veel ACP- en EBA-landen te hoog zullen zijn om suiker te kunnen ex-
porteren naar de EU. Dat geldt vooral voor de suikerindustrie in het Caribisch gebied. Daar 
staat tegenover dat sommige ACP Suiker Protocol (SP-)landen (zoals Malawi, Swaziland, 
Zambia en Zimbabwe) zo goedkoop suiker kunnen produceren dat zij in staat lijken te zijn 
hun productie en de uitvoer naar de EU uit te breiden. Daarbij kunnen zij ACP SP quota 
overnemen van landen die dat niet kunnen vullen bij de lage EU-prijzen van na de hervor-
ming. Om de productie-uitbreiding te realiseren zal in deze landen behoorlijk geïnvesteerd 
moeten worden in de rietsuikersector. Met uitzondering van Zimbabwe lijken echter de 
productiekosten in genoemde landen niet laag genoeg te zijn om bij de nu voorgestelde la-
ge EU-prijzen die investeringen in productie-uitbreiding rendabel te maken. Het staat dus 
nog maar te bezien of goedkoop producerende ACP-landen het hele ACP SP quotum zul-
len kunnen blijven leveren. Naast goedkoop producerende ACP SP landen maken een 
aantal efficiënt producerende EBA-landen een grote kans maken om suiker te exporteren 
naar de Unie. Het gaat dan om landen als Ethiopië, Soedan en Mozambique. Deze landen 
kunnen volgens LMC in 2015 mogelijk tussen de 0,6 en 1 miljoen ton suiker naar de Unie 
exporteren als in deze landen wordt geïnvesteerd in de suikerindustrie. Investeringen in de-
ze landen (met name Soedan en Mozambique) worden momenteel evenwel gehinderd door 
politieke instabiliteit. Bovendien heeft de Europese Commissie al aangegeven in 2008 het 
EBA-akkoord te willen evalueren en mogelijk haar beleid bij te stellen. Zo'n aankondiging 
betekent onzekerheid ten aanzien van het beleid op middellange termijn, waardoor het be-
drijfsleven terughoudend is met het doen van investeringen in de sector.  
 
Arbitrage of driehoekshandel 
Alhoewel de directe effecten van de EU-beleidshervorming op de invoer van de Unie be-
scheiden is, is er veel onzekerheid rond de mogelijkheid van arbitrage, ofwel de 
mogelijkheid dat een EBA-land zijn (hele) productie verkoopt aan de EU en goedkopere 
suiker voor eigen gebruik importeert. Zoiets kan zich voordoen als het verschil tussen de 
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EU-prijs aan de ene kant en de import(wereldmarkt)prijs plus transport-/transactiekosten 
aan de andere kant gunstig uitvalt voor het EBA-land. Bij het huidige prijsniveau op de in-
ternationale suikermarkt kan arbitrage aantrekkelijk zijn, ook bij een EU-prijs van 329 
euro/ton ruwe suiker. De mogelijke omvang van arbitrage is zeer moeilijk in te schatten. 
Onze eigen modelsimulaties geven aan dat arbitrage beperkt zal blijven. Dat komt omdat 
de huidige bescherming aan de grens van veel EBA-landen geen goedkope invoer van sui-
ker van de wereldmarkt toelaat en wij in onze berekeningen aannemen dat deze situatie zo 
blijft. Er bestaat echter wel degelijk de kans dat EBA-landen hun grensbescherming gaan 
verlagen om meer (goedkopere) suiker te kunnen importeren voor eigen gebruik en een 
groter deel van de eigen productie naar de Unie te exporteren. De EC komt met een in-
schatting dat als gevolg van arbitrage de extra importen na verloop van een aantal jaren 
kunnen oplopen tot 1,25 miljoen ton. LMC schat dat in een meest extreme situatie - als alle 
suikerproductie van EBA-landen naar de EU worden geëxporteerd - de invoer van de EU 
tussen de 4,7 en 6,2 miljoen ton kan liggen. 
 In de onderstaande tabel worden de gevolgen van de EBA-regeling voor de EU-
invoer volgens de in deze studie besproken analyses samengevat. Volgens onze eigen ana-
lyse zijn de gevolgen voor de EU-invoer (veel) geringer dan de Europese Commissie en 
LMC inschatten.  
 
Tabel 1 Additionele EU-invoer van ruwe suiker uit EBA-landen (in miljoen ton) a) 
 EC LEI LMC 
Status quo 2,8 0,4 (suiker is imperfect substituut) 
2,7 (suiker is perfect substituut) 
n.b. 
EU-hervorming: 33% 
prijsdaling 
0,5 0,2 (suiker is imperfect substituut) 
0,9 (suiker als perfect substituut) 
0,1 (korte termijn) 
0,6-1,0 (middellange 
termijn) 
EU-hervorming inclusief 
arbitrage-effect 
0,5 (2008/0) + 
0,75 (2013/4) 
0,2 (suiker is imperfect substituut) 
0,9 (suiker is perfect substituut) 
4,6-6,2 (meest extre-
me situatie) 
a) De ramingen van de EG voor EU-25, Ramingen LEI voor EU-27, Ramingen LMC voor (eenvoudig) de 
EU. 
 
 
Landenstudie Ethiopië 
Deze studie omvat ook drie case studies om inzicht te geven in enkele landenspecifieke 
gevolgen van de wijzigingen in het EU-beleid. De landenstudie over Ethiopië - een goed-
kope suikerproducent en een EBA-land - laat zien dat de overheid, als eigenaar van 
suikerplantages en -fabrieken, een aanzienlijke uitbreiding van de suikerproductie voor 
ogen heeft om daarmee zowel de groeiende binnenlandse vraag te kunnen bedienen als ook 
de exportkansen in de Europese markt te kunnen benutten. Ethiopische bronnen schatten 
dat het land binnen tien jaar zo'n 1 miljoen ton suiker zou kunnen exporteren. Deze om-
vang is tweemaal zo hoog als wat LMC mogelijk acht. De projecties zijn afhankelijk van 
de beschikbaarheid van investeringsmiddelen en van succesvolle marktpenetratie in de re-
gio, waar Ethiopië sterke concurrentie ondervindt van andere goedkope producenten zoals 
Malawi, Soedan, Zambia en ook Brazilië. 
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Landenstudie Mauritius 
De casestudie over Mauritius is een voorbeeld van een ACP SP-land waarin de suikersec-
tor van groot belang is voor 's land's agrarische economie en waar de industrie veel profijt 
heeft van de preferentiële toegang tot de Europese markt. De Europese beleidsveranderin-
gen zouden grote negatieve gevolgen hebben voor de suikerindustrie in Mauritius, die tot 
aanzienlijke herstructurering van de industrie nopen. Mauritius is al geruime tijd bezig om 
de kwetsbaarheid van de agrarische sector te verminderen door andere teelten dan suiker-
riet te stimuleren. Voorts anticipeert het eiland al op de suikerbeleidshervorming in de EU 
door al enige jaren een herstructurering van de suikerindustrie door te voeren en te trachten 
deze efficiënter te maken. De comparatieve voordelen van het eiland lijken echter veeleer 
buiten de suikersector te liggen: omdat de kosten van suikerproductie relatief hoog zijn, 
lijkt het onwaarschijnlijk dat het eiland een belangrijke rol zal kunnen blijven spelen in de 
internationale suikerhandel als de profijtelijke handel met de EU verdwijnt. 
 
Landenstudie Brazilië 
Brazilië is 's werelds grootste en meest competitieve producent van suiker en ethanol, en is 
in de jaren negentig de grootste exporteur van beide producenten geworden. De wijziging 
in het EU-beleid geeft Brazilië waarschijnlijk de mogelijkheid tot verdere expansie op der-
de markten als de EU zich terugtrekt van exportmarkten. Verdere herstructurering en 
uitbreiding van de Braziliaanse suikerindustrie zal de concurrentiekracht van de industrie 
versterken. Schattingen van de toekomstige Braziliaanse suikerproductie (door onder ande-
re de OESO en Cargill) voorspellen dat Brazilië in toenemende mate de internationale 
markt zal domineren. 
 
Slotbeschouwing 
De hervorming van het EU-suikerbeleid leidt tot verschuivingen in het systeem van han-
delspreferenties. Sommige landen verliezen, andere profiteren. De meeste analyses van de 
gevolgen van het EU-voorstel zijn alleen gericht op de directe effecten voor de suikersec-
tor, zonder voldoende aandacht voor aanpassingen in andere economische sectoren. 
Daardoor wordt niet een volledig beeld gegeven van de gevolgen van zo'n beleidsverande-
ring: kapitaal en arbeid kunnen goedbetaalde alternatieve aanwendingen vinden en de 
betrokken economieën kunnen diversifiëren, waardoor eventuele negatieve gevolgen voor 
de suikersector kunnen worden opgevangen. De uitkomsten van onze modelsimulaties ge-
ven aan dat de inkomenseffecten van de voorgestelde wijzigingen in het EU-suikerregime 
niet nadelig zijn voor zowel de ACP- als de EBA-landen als groep. Zoals deze studie ook 
benadrukt, verschillen landen onmiskenbaar van elkaar en daarmee ook de gevolgen van 
de veranderingen in de handelspreferenties met de EU, zowel voor de suikersector als voor 
de hele economie. Wanneer de EU steun overweegt aan landen die stellen nadelen te zullen 
ondervinden van de veranderingen in het Europees suikerbeleid, zullen deze landenspeci-
fieke situaties goed in beschouwing moeten worden genomen. Voor een compleet beeld 
van die landenspecifieke gevolgen zullen meer, en meer diepgravende landenstudies nodig 
zijn dan in het kader van deze studie mogelijk is geweest. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
The features of the international market indicate that sugar production growth has occurred 
largely in (advanced) developing countries, like Brazil, India, Thailand and Mexico. To-
day, Brazil is by far the largest exporter of sugar, followed by the EU, Thailand and 
Australia. Over the last decade, the EU has lost shares at an international market where in-
creasing volumes are traded. International prices are volatile with prolonged periods of low 
prices. This tendency is due to some basic features of the crop and its processing, which 
hinder sugar production to respond quickly to changing market conditions. Also govern-
ment interventions in national markets affect international sugar trade and prices 
significantly. Such government support policies are not only utilised by OECD countries; 
also countries like Russia, China, India and other (developing) countries regulate their do-
mestic industries. 
 The EU sugar trade regime provides preferential treatment to several groups of coun-
tries, of which the major one is the ACP Sugar Protocol signatories. This group of former 
colonies of EU Member States benefits from preferential access to EU markets where they 
receive high prices for their SP quota. The Commission's July 2004 reform proposal im-
plies a loss in sugar export revenues for all those countries presently benefiting from these 
EU preferences. However, effects of this proposal differ among the present beneficiaries 
for at least three reasons. First, present benefits are highly unevenly distributed among the 
ACP countries and countries benefiting most will lose most in terms of export revenues. 
Second, countries differ greatly in terms of production costs. Some countries with rela-
tively low production costs may be able to continue or even expand exports to the EU, 
others may find additional markets in third countries as the EU withdraws from the interna-
tional market. Third, the impacts on the economies differ as countries' opportunities for 
economic diversification differ.  
 In order to estimate the impact of EU policy changes for developing countries we 
have done two model simulations: an EBA agreement (and a continuation of the present 
EU sugar policy) and the July 2004 Commission reform proposal. The major conclusions 
from these experiments are that: 
- Sugar imports from EBA countries increase but there is no dramatic inflow of sugar 
under the two scenarios simulated. The extra EU imports under the EBA scenario 
will be 384,000 tonnes, resulting in total EU-27 imports of 2.9 million tonnes. In the 
EU reform scenario extra imports will add up to only 211,000 tonnes. These esti-
mates are much lower than what the EC indicates in its background notes to the 
Communication of July 2004. As reported, the EC projects an import increase of 
around 2.8 million tonnes (from 0.2 million tonnes to around 3.0 million tonnes) 
from EBA under a status quo scenario, while extra imports from EBA countries 
would be 500,000 tonnes under the reform scenario; 
- EBA countries achieve positive welfare effects from the elimination of sugar trade 
barriers, but mainly from the elimination of non-sugar trade barriers. National in-
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come of these countries is estimated to increase USD382 million under the EU re-
form scenario; 
- ACP SP countries are able to compensate for the loss of export revenues in the face 
of declining EU prices: these countries (as a group) will see a mild growth in their 
sugar export volumes under the July 2004 EU reform proposal, as these countries can 
export a bit more to other developing countries. However, this does not translate into 
income gains as prices received decline; 
- Brazil and other developing countries will increase their exports to other developing 
countries but these amounts are modest. Both Brazil and the group of other develop-
ing countries are hardly affected by the EU proposal. 
 
 The relatively modest import flow of LDC sugar into the EU is related to the fact that 
EU sugar and LDC sugar are imperfect substitutes. If we leave that assumption and assume 
instead that sugar is a homogenous good (a perfect substitute), we obtain a dramatically 
higher rise in EBA exports towards the EU27: under the EBA scenario imports from EBA 
countries change by an additional 2.7 million tonnes, while under the EU reform scenario 
with perfect substitutability EBA sugar imports rise by 'only' 915,000 tonnes. The homo-
geneity assumption is maintained in most other modelling studies on the sugar market, but 
its not very plausible for three reasons. One, the econometric studies, based on long-term 
historical trends, do not support it. Two, dominant industrial users of sugar in the EU are 
likely to insist on high quality refined sugar, which only a few LDC suppliers are able to 
supply. And three, there is the difference between raw and white sugar in the international 
trade. 
 Other studies, like those of LMC, show that under a scenario of strong (33%) EU 
price decrease, production costs in most ACP and EBA countries are too high for sugar ex-
ports to the Union. Especially high-cost producers in the Caribbean region would be 
seriously affected. However, some low cost ACP SP signatories such as Malawi, Swazi-
land, Zambia and Zimbabwe could be expected to expand their production and exports to 
the EU, taking over most of the SP quotas allocated to countries, which cannot fill these 
quotas at post-reform EU prices. In order to use all SP quotas as much as possible, the low 
cost countries mentioned will have to invest heavily in expanding sugar cane production. 
In this group of countries only Zimbabwe's production costs seem low enough to encour-
age substantial production expansion. Next to low-cost ACP SP countries, several efficient 
sugar producing non-ACP LDCs will have big export opportunities to the EU-market. 
Such LDCs are Ethiopia, Sudan and Mozambique. Once investments have been made, 
LMC expects these countries may increase exports to the EU to levels between 0.6 and 1.0 
million tonnes in 2015. Investments in capacity expansion are, however, hindered by po-
litical instability (as is presently the case in Sudan and Zimbabwe). Moreover, the 
Commission's proposal to review EU prices in 2008 following a first evaluation of the 
EBA agreement on the EU market creates great uncertainty and may lead to investments 
decisions being put on hold. 
 Although the direct effects of the EU trade reform on the Union's import flows are 
estimated modest, there is much uncertainty about the potential of arbitrage, which is that 
an EBA country sells its whole production to the EU and imports low(er) priced sugar for 
domestic purpose. This will occur when there is a positive gap between the EU and world 
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market price minus the trading/transaction costs this trade involves. Even at EU prices as 
low as EUR 329/ton raw sugar, arbitrage may prove to be attractive to some countries 
when international prices are as low as presently is the case. The potential for arbitrage is, 
therefore, very uncertain. Our model simulations indicate limited arbitrage. This is because 
we assume that EBA-countries will maintain their current relatively high protection rates. 
There is however a chance that EBA countries will reduce import protection to allow cheap 
sugar to come in for domestic use and to allow (a larger share of) domestic production to 
be exported to the Union. In the most dramatic case - i.e., all sugar production from LDCs 
would be exported to the EU - LMC estimates an inflow of 4.7-6.2 million tonnes. 
 Table 1 summarises and compares the main results of the analyses included in this 
study in terms of addition EU imports from EBA countries. According to our own analy-
ses, EU imports would be much more modest than EC and LMC estimates.  
 
Table 1 Additional EU raw sugar imports from EBA-countries (in million tonnes) a) 
 EC LEI LMC 
Status quo 2.8 0.4 (standard model) 
2.7 (perfect substitution) 
n.a. 
EU reform: 33% price 
cut 
0.5 0.2 (standard model) 
0.9 (perfect substitution) 
0.1  (short-run) 
0.6-1.0 (medium-run) 
EU reform including 
swap-effect  
0.5 (2008/9) + 
0.75 (2013/4) 
0.2 (standard model) 
0.9 (perfect substitution) 
(maximum) 4.6-6.2 
a) EC estimates for EU25, LEI estimates for EU27, LMC estimates for (simply) EU. 
 
 
This study includes three case studies, to indicate country specific consequences of the EU 
reform proposal. The case study on Ethiopia - a low cost sugar producer and LDC - shows 
that the government, as owner of the sugar estates and processing industry, plans signifi-
cant expansion of the industry's capacity in order to respond to increasing domestic 
demand and to benefit from increased market access to the EU. Ethiopian analysts estimate 
export surplus of around 1 million tonnes within ten years, which is double the LMC esti-
mates. These projections are conditional to investment programmes executed and 
successful market penetration in the region, where Ethiopia may find strong competition 
from other low-cost producers such as Malawi, Sudan, Zambia and also Brazil. 
 The Mauritian case is an example of an ACP SP country in which the sugar industry 
is very important for the country's agricultural sector and where the sugar industry is heav-
ily dependent on the EU market. EU sugar reforms would have significant negative effects 
on the industry, enforcing further restructuring. However, Mauritius has already antici-
pated the upcoming EU sugar reforms to some extent, both with sugar restructuring plans 
as well as to encourage further the diversification of its economy. Given its level of pro-
duction costs - even after further restructuring - Mauritius is not expected to play an 
important role at the international sugar market, even when world prices would rise con-
siderably. The country's comparative advantages are found outside the sugar sector. 
 Brazil is the world's largest and most competitive producer of sugar and ethanol, and 
has become the leading sugar and ethanol exporter in the 1990s. The EU sugar trade re-
form is expected to allow Brazil to expand on third country markets, as the EU retreats 
from export markets. Further restructuring and expansion of the Brazilian sugar industry 
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will enhance the competitiveness of Brazilian sugar industry. Estimations about future lev-
els of Brazilian sugar production (by OECD and Cargill) predict that Brazil will 
increasingly dominate the international sugar market. 
 The reform of EU's sugar trade regime induces shifts in the system of trade prefer-
ences. Some countries lose other benefit. Most analyses of the consequences of EU's 
proposals are only focused on the direct effects for the sugar sector, without proper atten-
tion to economy-wide adjustments. Capital and labour may find remunerative alternative 
uses and the respective economies may diversify. Research based on our own model in-
strument indicates that income effects of proposed trade regime changes are not 
detrimental for the ACP and EBA countries as a group. This study also underlines that 
country situations obviously differ and thus the impact of the trade reforms, on the sugar 
industry as well as on the economy. When the EU considers support to countries, which 
claim to lose from the Unions sugar trade regime, it should take such country differences 
into account. For more profound and complete insights into the country-specific conse-
quences of the EU sugar reform one needs more in-depth country case studies than what 
has been possible in the framework of this study. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
The EU common market organisation on sugar is often criticised for a lack of competition, 
distortions in the market, high prices for consumers, and its effects on world markets, es-
pecially in relation to developing countries. Yet, despite calls for reform, the regime has 
remained essentially unchanged for four decades. The orientation of the CAP, which has 
moved away from price and production support to farmers' income support policy through 
the single payment scheme, plus the 2001 Everything But Arms (EBA) trade agreement 
with the 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) added new dimensions to the need for 
sugar reform.  
 In 2003, the European Commission proposed several options for revisions of the 
sugar regime (CEC, 2003). The Commission's report indicates that the most suitable ap-
proach to fulfil the Commission's aims in promoting a more market-oriented, sustainable 
EU sugar sector is a gradual reduction of the internal EU market price combined with di-
rect aid payments and (eventually) the abolition of production quota. In July 2004, the 
Commission proposed the outline of the future sugar regime in the EU: a significant (33%) 
reduction, in two steps, of the institutional support price for EU sugar and a reduction of 
the EU production quota with 2.8 million ton by 2008 (CEC, 2004a). Sugar beet producers 
would be partially compensated for lower prices by the introduction of a direct decoupled 
payment, while transferability of quotas between member States and sugar factories would 
facilitate the necessary restructuring of the EU sugar sector.  
 Developing countries' export opportunities of (raw) sugar will be affected by such a 
policy change. With high support prices maintained beyond 2006, EBA countries and Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries would benefit from the present preferential 
trade agreements, as they can export to the EU against the high internal prices. When the 
internal EU prices are reduced to levels the Commission proposes in its July 2004 docu-
ment, only the most competitive EBA/ACP producers would be able to maintain access to 
the EU market. According to the Commission's own calculations, this would leave only a 
small number of developing countries to export to the Union (see CEC, 2003).  
 The consequences of the EU policy changes for developing countries as depicted by 
the Commission are mainly based on general assumptions and static analyses. There is 
clearly a need to study the potential impact on these developing countries more thoroughly 
to pick out the winners and losers of the expected changes in the EU sugar policy, taking 
into account dynamic sector and macroeconomic adjustment effects.  
 This insight is necessary for the EU in order to be able to better weigh the pros and 
cons of the new policy regime for developing countries, as the present EU policy is se-
verely criticised for being unfavourable for a large part of that group of countries, while the 
new policy has also negative consequences for some developing countries. Furthermore, 
the impact of the policy changes on EU imports from developing countries is an important 
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element of the overall impact assessment of the policy reform on the EU market balance. 
Therefore, it is critical to have a good understanding of the consequences of the proposed 
policy option for EU sugar imports from developing countries. At the same time, it is im-
portant for developing countries to have a thorough evaluation of the possible impact of the 
EU sugar policy reforms on sugar production, processing and export opportunities as it 
may affect the development of their agricultural sector. For instance, the consequences of 
the EU policy changes also depend on options for alternative crops within the agricultural 
sector and opportunities in the rest of the economy. Therefore, the evaluation of the conse-
quences of changes in the EU sugar market regime on developing countries should entail a 
macroeconomic component. 
 
 
1.2 Objective of the study and research questions 
 
The objective of this research is to analyse the impacts of the EU sugar policy reform on 
sugar production and export opportunities in developing countries and on EU sugar im-
ports from developing countries in order to support policy formulation of the Dutch 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. 
 
Research questions to be addressed are: 
- To what extent will the EU sugar policy reform result in a reduction in (subsidised) 
exports from and increased imports of sugar within the EU? What will be the effect 
of reduced production in and exports from the EU on world market prices for sugar? 
- Which (group of) countries will benefit from the increased market access to the EU 
and which (group of) countries will lose markets in the EU? 
- What are the macroeconomic effects of these EU sugar policy changes for (groups 
of) developing countries? 
- What are the consequences of the changes in EU trade preferences for (farms, proc-
essors and traders in) the sugar sector in (some selected) developing countries? 
 
 
1.3 Approach 
 
The study uses three different approaches that complement each other. First, we use model 
simulation to picture the consequences of several policy scenarios for trade flows of the 
European Union and groups of developing countries. Second, we review literature to ad-
dress the research questions and third, we further specify our analyses by country case 
studies. In a synthesis of the three approaches, conclusions are drawn on the consequences 
of the EU sugar policy reforms for developing countries.  
 To investigate and analyse the EU sugar policy reform effects on international prices 
and trade flows (trade levels and origin of imports) between the EU and (groups of) devel-
oping countries, a number of model simulations are conducted with help of a global 
computable general equilibrium model especially designed for our assessment of the sugar 
reforms (see appendix 1 for an overview and details of the model structure). Simulations 
focus on assumptions with respect to EU price cuts, increased market access and the possi-
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bilities for developing countries to use their sugar production potentials. These model 
simulations provide answers to the first three research questions of the study. 
 A review of literature follows, with the aim to compare what is found in other studies 
with the results of our model simulations. This will further specify the consequences of the 
policy changes for developing countries. Then, three country case studies are executed to 
focus on the impact of the EU policy changes for specific developing countries. Each se-
lected country represents a group of developing countries, which are the ACP-countries, 
the EBA countries and net-exporters of sugar without EU trade preferences. The selected 
countries are Mauritius - an ACP country with an export quota of almost 500,000 ton - 
Ethiopia - that is allowed to export 14,700 ton (in 2002/2003) to the EU under the EBA 
agreement - and Brazil, the biggest sugar exporter of the world. The country case studies 
provide a description of the sugar sector and stakeholders in the selected countries as well 
as an analysis of the consequences of the EU policy changes for the stakeholders in the de-
veloping country. LEI has executed these country analyses in close co-operation with 
partner researchers from the selected countries.  
 
 
1.4 Structure of the report 
 
This report is structured as follows. To picture the context of the study, the main features 
of the international sugar market are described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents an over-
view of present trade relations and agreements between the EU and (several groups of) 
developing countries. Then, the study turns its perspective to possible impacts of the policy 
reforms as proposed by the Commission, in trying to answer the above stated research 
questions. In chapter 4 own calculations are presented, using a modelling tool, which al-
lows for showing the impacts of several policy scenarios on international trade flows and 
welfare for a number of groups of developing countries. Chapter 5 reviews literature to in-
dicate the consequences of EU's sugar trade reforms for developing countries. Chapter 6, 7 
and 8 follow up by focusing on a number of case studies, identifying the impact of EU pol-
icy reforms. Chapter 9 concludes with a synthesis of the outcomes of previous chapters. 
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2. Features of the international sugar market  
 
 
 
2.1 Overview of world production and consumption developments 
 
Sugar is produced in many countries in the world, from either sugar cane or sugar beets. 
Sugar cane is the source of 75% of global sugar production. Asia is the leading cane grow-
ing area, followed by South America and the group of Central American and Caribbean 
countries. Sugar beet is produced mainly in Europe and North America. Brazil, India, the 
EU and China are the world's leading sugar producers (see table 2.1). These four countries 
collectively represent nearly 50% of world sugar production. India is the largest consumer 
of sugar at around 13% of world consumption, followed by the EU (10%), China (7%) and 
Brazil (7%).  
 
 
Table 2.1 Major sugar producers, exporters and importers, 2000-02 average 
Main Producers  
 
Main Consumers Main Importers Main Exporters 
Country/ 
region  
Mil. 
ton 
Country/ 
Region 
Mil. 
ton 
Country/ 
region 
Mil. 
ton 
Country/ 
Region 
Mil. 
ton 
Brazil 21.6 India 17.8 Russia 5.0 Brazil 11.9 
India 20.7 EU-15 14.4 EU-15 1.9 EU-15 5.5 
EU-15 17.3 China 9.8 Indonesia 1.8 Thailand 4.3 
China 9.2 Brazil 9.6 Japan 1.6 Australia 3.6 
United States  7.6 United States 9.1 Malaysia 1.5 Cuba 2.6 
Thailand 6.5 Russia 6.6 Korea 1.5 India 1.5 
Mexico  5.2 Mexico 4.9 Nigeria 1.5 South Africa 1.3 
Australia  5.1 Indonesia 3.7 United States 1.4 Columbia 1.3 
Pakistan  3.9 Pakistan 3.6 Canada 1.2 Guatemala 1.1 
Cuba  3.2 Japan 2.5 Algeria 1.2 Mauritius 0.5 
All other 39.5 All other 55.1 All other 27.1 All other 14.3 
World 139.8 World 137.1 World 45.7 World 47.9 
Note: Data is in raw sugar equivalents. 
Source: F.O. Licht's International Sugar and Sweetener Reports, as reported in OECD, 2005:12. 
 
 
 Sugar cane production has more than doubled over the last 40 years, while world 
sugar beet production has been rather stable over the whole period and shows a slight con-
traction in recent years. According to FAO data for 2000-2004 world sugar cane 
production is estimated to average 1,300 million tonnes and world sugar beets production 
some 240 million tonnes (FAOSTAT). World sugar production has increased over the pe-
riod but with a stepwise supply response to world price movements. That is, both acreage 
planted and sugar production have tended to increase in periods of higher prices and this 
expansion has been followed by prolonged periods of slower growth of production and 
lower world prices (OECD, 2005:10).  
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 A comparison of '2001' and '1991' production levels and shares for the Top 10 sugar 
suppliers reveals that major production increases have occurred in Brazil and India (see ta-
ble 2.2). While the EU has ranked first for several decades, from 1996 onwards India and 
Brazil have contested the first place (both around 15% of world total in '2001'). Compared 
to the sixties, sugar production has increased in each of the Top 10 countries, except in 
Cuba, where production dropped dramatically. However, the rate of growth is uneven. 
Over the last ten years, production has increased dramatically in Brazil (+121%), India 
(+54%) and Mexico (+50%), while for the EU-15 no significant trend can be found any-
more, with production fluctuating around an average of 17.6 million tonnes. 
 
Table 2.2 World Top 10 sugar producers, comparison '1991' - '2001' (in raw sugar equivalents) 
'1991' '2001'  C=Cane 
B=Beet million ton share in % million ton share in % 
2001/1991 
growth in % 
Brazil C 9.1 8 20.1 15 121 
India C 13.0 12 20.0 15 54 
European union (15)a) B(+C) 18 16 18.0 13 0 
China B+C 8.4 7 8.6 6 2 
USA B+C 6.7 6 7.4 6 10 
Thailand C 4.2 4 6.0 4 42 
Mexico C 3.4 3 5.1 4 50 
Australia C 3.4 3 4.6 3 33 
Cuba C 7.6 7 3.8 3 -50 
Pakistan C 2.2 2 2.7 2 20 
Top 10  76 67 96.2 72 26 
World  113 100 134.1 100 19 
a) includes sugar from cane. '2001' means average for the years 2000 to 2002. Note that '2001' production ac-
cording to this source differs from the source in table 2.1. 
Source: EU DG-AGRI, 2003: 11, table 1.1, based on FAOSTAT. 
 
 
 Global consumption of sugar has been increasing over time, mainly due to popula-
tion and income growth in the developing countries. These countries now account for 
about 70% of world sugar consumption, compared to less than 50% in 1980. Sugar con-
sumption in the developed countries has shown little or no growth. Overall, over the last 
decades global production growth has been faster than consumption growth, leading to an 
accumulation of sugar stocks. These stocks are estimated at 47.5% of the global sugar use 
in 2003-4 and depress international sugar prices (OECD, 2005:10). 
 
 
2.2 Features of international trade in sugar and world sugar prices 
 
Trade flows 
Sugar trade is dominated by Brazil and Russia, with Brazil accounting for about 25% of all 
exports and Russia accounting for 11% of world imports during 2000-2002 (see table 2.1). 
The EU is the second largest exporter, followed by Thailand, Australia and Cuba. The five 
largest exporters have a combined export share of over 60%, which implies high degree of 
market concentration on the supply side. Importers are widely dispersed after Russia, with 
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the EU being the next largest importer followed by several countries accounting each for 3-
4% of global sugar imports. 
 Brazil has been a significant exporter since the seventies. Exports have increased rap-
idly in line with production since the nineties. In 1999, exports reached an unprecedented 
level (13 million tonnes). This is mainly explained by the liberalisation in the ethanol sec-
tor. As guaranteed prices and direct subsidies have been phased out, there has been a 
significant shift from ethanol to sugar production and exports (see also our case study on 
Brazil in chapter 8). The EU is both a leading exporter and importer. It turned into a net 
exporter at the end of the 1970s, mainly due to increased production and stable consump-
tion. Exports increased in the years just before and after 1980. Since the mid-1990s EU-15 
sugar exports have fluctuated between 4.4 million tonnes and 6.4 million tonnes, the aver-
age being 5.1 tonnes over the period 1995-2002. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 World exports of raw and refined sugar (million tonnes), 1961-2001 
Source: EU DG AGRI, 2003: 23 
 
 
 Most trade (in volumes) is in raw sugar (see figure 2.1). In the 1960s and 1970s trade 
in raw sugar accounted for about 75% of all sugar trade. This share in trade has been on a 
declining trend from the mid-seventies up to the mid-nineties as the trade in refined sugar 
steadily increased. Since 1995, exports have been expanding for both types of sugar. Raw 
sugar remains the mainly traded form, but its share in total exports is declining (in refined 
equivalent, it is just slightly above 50%). The EU is the world's leading exporter of refined 
sugar, but the value has globally declined since the mid-nineties (EU DG-AGR, 2003:24). 
In addition to raw sugar, Brazil and Thailand also export refined sugar. India and Turkey 
appear in the Top 5 of exporters of refined sugar (in value), while their share in total ex-
ports remains limited. 
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 Trade in sugar has a strong regional character. Australia and Thailand are the major 
suppliers to the Asian market, whilst Brazil and the EU along with Cuba are the major 
suppliers to the East European and CIS market (OECD, 2005:13). Most trade - around 60% 
- takes place under long-term contracts, preferential and regional agreements, and with 
subsidies. A minor share - 40% - is traded at world market prices.  
 
World sugar prices 
As a relatively high share of world sugar production enters trade (around 30%, see table 
2.1), the world market price of sugar is of considerable importance to many countries, es-
pecially to those whose exports are not part of preferential agreements. World sugar prices 
have historically been characterised by a high degree of volatility compared to other agri-
cultural products. Figure 2.2 illustrates the volatility of world raw sugar prices, with price 
peaks in the 1970s and 1980s surpassing those of more recent years.1 LMC (2004b:A10) 
points at an average duration of world sugar price cycles of around 6 years. OECD (2005) 
concludes that price volatility is on a decreasing trend, with lower price peaks and more 
regular low price cycles in the last 20 years. Clearly, prices show a decreasing trend since 
1995. This is mainly explained by an overall excess of production over consumption, as 
measured by the rise in the stock to use rate. From their low point in 1999/2000 (€110/ton 
in April 1999), as a result of a shortfall in production in several leading suppliers, raw 
sugar prices shortly improved over the marketing year 2000/01, reaching an average 
€240/ton. By the following year they had declined again to €180/ton. The average for the 
first quarter 2003 was even lower, down to €170/ton. Largely due to the strengthening of 
the euro against the US dollar in 2004, the world market prices have further declined to 
around €140/ton of raw sugar in the last quarter of 2004 (oral information from meeting 
with LDC sugar group, 26/11/2004). 
 Why are world sugar prices volatile with prolonged periods of low prices? There is a 
number of arguments for this. As mentioned, production, following periods of high prices, 
tends to increase faster than consumption and is not responsive to downward price move-
ments. Some basic features of the crop and the processing contribute to this tendency. 
Sugar cane production will not respond to changing market conditions on short notice; it is 
a semi-perennial crop that allows consecutive harvests (normally 5-6 years) from an indi-
vidual planting (which explains a cyclical price pattern of around six years in duration). A 
lack of alternative crops may also contribute to slow production responses to lower sugar 
prices. Moreover, the sugar beet and cane processors (millers) are highly capital-intensive 
operations and tend to take a long-term view of the market. They will, therefore, continue 
to produce sugar during periods of low prices and delay adjustments in production capac-
ity. By contrast, supply is very sensitive to weather. Revisions in production estimates 
often cause significant adjustments in international prices. Another important factor in ex-
plaining the low responsiveness of sugar supplies is the role played by government support 
policies. As a consequence of government intervention in national sugar markets, the ma-
jority of global sugar production and trade takes place at subsidised or protected prices that 
bear little relation to international market levels. Such government support policies are not 
                                                 
1 As the share of international trade is higher for raw than for white sugar, prices for raw sugar are more ex-
posed to volatility than prices for white sugar. 
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only utilised by OECD countries; also many other (non-OECD) countries like Russia, 
China, Thailand and India protect and regulate their domestic sugar industries (see for in-
stance, OECD, 2005: 31-32). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Trends in world raw sugar price (ISA sugar price, yearly average, 1960-2002) 
Source: EU, DG-AGRI, 2003: 26. 
 
 
 A special role is attached to the oil price development: analyses show that the high 
prices of oil in the mid-seventies and beginning of the eighties have played a significant 
role in the formation of peak prices for sugar (EU DG-AGRI, 2003:228-29). Among the 
Top 10 sugar importers, there are leading oil exporters. They rely on sugar imports for 
meeting domestic demand, that is very income elastic. High oil prices can boost sugar 
prices for a second reason that cumulates the effect of the first one mentioned: it possibly 
limits Brazilian exports. A rise in oil prices is likely to stimulate ethanol uses in Brazil, al-
though this depends on relative prices of ethanol versus oil-products as well as on the 
minimum rate of blending set by the government.1 In the short run, an increase in the per-
centage of blending shifts uses of sugar cane towards ethanol, hence a decrease in export 
                                                 
1 As a reaction to the 1973 oil prices Brazil introduced guaranteed prices for ethanol, processed from sugar 
cane and controlled the distribution by the state-owned oil company.  Policies have been liberalised by the 
end-1990s but the Brazilian government still fixes the minimum rate of blending with petrol (see also our 
case study on Brazil in chapter 8). 
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availability of sugar and a possible rise in world prices. In the long run, however, the pros-
pect of enhanced ethanol uses in Brazil or elsewhere provides an incentive to expand the 
supply of sugar cane. If ethanol uses are not in line with expectations, the sugar market 
turns out to be the residual variable. This enhances the volatility on world markets. 
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3. EU's sugar trade system 
 
 
 
3.1 General features 
 
The EU Common Market Organisation (CMO) of sugar has established minimum support 
prices for sugar guaranteed by an intervention purchase system. Producer prices are at lev-
els above world market prices but price support is limited to the A and B quota sugar. Only 
quota-sugar can be sold in the EU. Sugar produced in excess of the A and B quotas - C-
sugar - has to be sold on the world market without the support of export refunds/export 
subsidies. As EU internal demand is less than the A+B sugar quotas, the EU is also export-
ing surpluses of sugar with export refunds. Consequently, the EU has been distorting 
international trade flows. 
 Although the CMO of sugar exhibits a high degree of protectionism, the EU has 
granted a whole array of bilateral trade concessions to certain developing countries. Over 
the years, the EU has established a complex system of trade arrangements, which is re-
flected in the complex network of discriminatory tariffs and through generalised, country-
specific or region-specific trade preferences. Thus, the EU sugar trade policy has deviated 
widely from the non-discrimination principle of the WTO, and it applies different policies 
to different regions and trading blocs. Currently, the EU is engaged in negotiating or im-
plementing trade agreements that are unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral in 
nature.  
 The complex hierarchy of trade arrangements between the EU and specific groups of 
countries vis-à-vis the EU sugar regime is summarised in figure 3.1. It presents the differ-
ent trade agreements that affect the EU sugar regime, including the WTO, EU enlargement, 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries, Least Developed Countries [LDCs], 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) and the Western Balkans. A feature of the trade 
concessions provided by the European Union is that these sugar imports receive the high 
EU price for sugar. Details of these preferential trade agreements are provided below, after 
having presented the GATT/WTO trade agreements on sugar. 
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Figure 3.1 The EU sugar regime and trade agreements  
Source: Huan-Niemi and Niemi, 2003:5. 
 
 
3.2 WTO  
 
Agricultural trade was submitted to the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for the first time on 1 January 1995, 
further to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations. The WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture was mainly concerned with rules and commitments in three areas: market ac-
cess, domestic support and export competition. The implementation period of the 
commitments was between 1995 and 2000 for developed countries and a further four years 
for developing countries (to 2004). The UR commitments for EU on sugar were to reduce 
import tariffs by 20% and to limit the volume of subsidised exports with 21% and the 
amount of money spent on export subsidies with 36%. However, the export commitments 
were made net of 1.6 million tonnes of imports from ACP countries and India: the EU did 
not make any reduction commitments on exports of sugar of ACP and Indian origin and 
this was accepted by the signatories of the Agreement. According to the agreement the EU 
faces a GATT ceiling on subsidised export volume of 1.273 million tonnes white sugar 
whereas the value of subsidised exports should remain below the limit of €499.1 million. 
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 The required reduction in the volume of exports and budgetary export outlays for ex-
port subsidies did not cause any difficulties for the EU at the beginning of the Uruguay 
Round. Yet, the export subsidy commitments became very binding by the end of the UR, 
leading to the 'temporary cut' in production quotas for sugar in the marketing year 
2000/2001. Actually, the EU is able to stay within the export subsidy commitments by cut-
ting the production quotas yearly, if necessary, when the EU is in danger of breaching the 
commitments for export subsidy.  
 In the present, ongoing WTO Doha Development Round stakeholders have submit-
ted various proposals for further reductions of export subsidies and import tariffs (see 
website www.wto.org for an overview). However, after three years of negotiations little 
progress had been made. In July 2004 the parties agreed on a framework for further liber-
alisation, yet without mentioning any concrete percentage of reduction commitment. In the 
framework agreement the EU agreed to phase out its export refunds on condition that its 
trading partners also got rid of their export subsidy programmes. On the issue of market 
access, the EU is committed to considerable market opening, but will also look for comfort 
for certain 'sensitive' products. The mini-Ministerial Meeting on Mombasa (Kenya) in 
March 2005 gave some impetus to the negotiations (see Europe Rapid, 2005). 
 Meanwhile Australia, Brazil and Thailand have formally complained at WTO about 
the EU's re-exports of ACP sugar with export subsidies, which is outside EU's UR export 
subsidy reduction commitments. The three major sugar-exporting countries claim that this 
'waiver' is illegal and against the UR trade agreements. Moreover, the three countries argue 
that EU exporters of 'C-sugar' are exporting that non-supported sugar at prices below their 
production costs because of the cross-subsidy from the main A and B quota sugar of the 
EU sugar regime. Therefore, these countries are challenging in the WTO that C-sugar ex-
ports are in contravention of the commitments made by the EU in the WTO on subsidised 
sugar exports. A WTO sugar panel has confirmed that EU sugar export subsidies used to 
re-export the preferential sugar imports from ACP countries are wrongfully excluded from 
the WTO commitments on reducing export support. The European Commission has lodged 
an appeal against the WTO report in January 2005.  
 
 
3.3 Preferential trade arrangements for sugar1
 
EU enlargement 
10 New member states from Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Repub-
lic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta) joined the EU-15 in 
2004. Romania and Bulgaria are expected to join in 2007. The accession of these countries 
is expected to result in a greater net contribution to EU sugar consumption than production 
and thus not overly burden the sugar regime. However, before their accession the new 
member states satisfied their sugar consumption deficits by imports from a group of third 
countries (e.g. Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico and Nicaragua) which will need 
to be compensated under WTO rules for any loss of access following the common market 
                                                 
1 This sub-section draws heavily on appendix C in a not yet declassified OECD report on sugar policy reform 
and trade liberalisation, March 2005. 
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enlargement. In this respect, access quotas for raw sugar are already allocated to a number 
of third country exporters (primarily Cuba and Brazil and amounting to 85.5 thousand ton-
nes) and are known as imports under Most Favoured Nation (MFN) as a result of the 
accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden in 1995. An import duty of €98 per ton is 
charged on MFN imports. Following the MFN import precedent, the European Union will 
either have to allocate additional 'current access' quotas to existing third country exporters 
to the new member states, based on historical access and estimated to be around 490,000 
tonnes, or compensate them in other ways (Huan-Niemi, 2003). 
 
The ACP sugar preferences 
The Sugar Protocol (SP) with 20 signatory countries within the group of 77 African, Car-
ibbean and Pacific Countries1, and India represents the largest volume of sugar imported 
by the European Union under preferential access arrangements. Under this protocol, the 
EU has a non-reciprocal obligation to the signatory countries to purchase a fixed amount of 
ACP raw cane sugar from them at the EU intervention price (see table 3.1). This protocol 
dates back to the time when the United Kingdom joined the common market in 1973. At 
that time, the United Kingdom imported annually around 2 million tonnes of raw sugar a 
year under the British Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. The ACP Sugar Protocol effec-
tively translated a UK commitment to the Commonwealth into an EU commitment to the 
ACP countries. The import commitment was reduced from about 2 million tonnes im-
ported by UK sugar refineries under the old agreement to 1.3 million tonnes of raw sugar 
(in white sugar equivalent) at the EU guaranteed price (€523.70 per ton, c.i.f. Europe for 
raw cane sugar) on a duty-free basis. The Sugar Protocol, based on unilateral, non-
reciprocal trade preferences granted by the EU, was initially embodied in the Lomé Con-
vention of 1975 and its subsequent extensions leading up to the Cotonou Convention of 
2000. Under this agreement, the EU and ACP countries have entered into negotiation of 
economic integration agreements, known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to 
progressively remove barriers to trade between them and which are to enter into force by 1 
January 2008. The unilateral trade preferences will continue to be applied during the period 
2000 to 2007.  
 Additional quantities of raw sugar for processing are also imported by the EU under 
the Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) arrangements. In 1995, as part of a new sugar import 
regime, the EU introduced the maximum supposed needs (MSN) concept for the four EU 
member states with raw sugar refining industries (the United Kingdom, France, Finland 
and Portugal). Currently the MSN is fixed at about 1.765 million tonnes, white sugar 
equivalent, and like production quotas can be reduced to meet WTO commitments. The 
current SPS agreement is for an initial period of six years to June 2006. The SPS amount is 
the difference between the MSN and sugar imports from French Overseas Departments 
(DOM), those under the ACP/India quotas, the MFN sugar quotas and, more recently, the 
EBA sugar import quota. No import duty is paid on the SPS sugar, which receives €496.8 
per ton (EU support price for raw sugar minus a refining aid of €26.9 per ton). Following 
the 'Everything But Arms' Initiative (discussed below), the volume of SPS sugar has been 
                                                 
1 ACP member states who are not party to the Sugar Protocol may apply to join it provided the existing 
members and the European Commission agree. In 1995, Zambia acceded on the basis of a zero quota but 
fully benefits from possible re-allocations of the quotas. 
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reduced to about 217,000 tonnes in 2002-03 (see table 3.1). Further reductions in the vol-
ume of SPS sugar are expected due to increases in EBA quotas and possible cuts in the 
MSN. 
 
 
Table 3.1 ACP SP and SPS sugar quotas and average production levels (in tonnes white sugar 
  equivalent) a) b) 
Countries SP quota allocation  
2003/04 
SPS quota allocation 
2002/03 
Production, average  
2001/03 
Barbados c) 32,097 0 40,000 
Belize 40,349 5,527 105,000 
Congo e) 10,186 2,249 41,000 
Cote d'Ivoire 10,186 9,704 144,000 
Fiji 165,348 21,060 304,000 
Guyana 159,410 17,111 282,000 
Jamaica c) 118,696 18,894 164,000 
Kenya 5,000 10,908 418,000 
Madagascar c) e) 10,760 0 36,000 
Malawi d) e) 20,824 9,897 222,000 
Mauritius 491.031 21,266 545,000 
Mozambique e) 6,000 0 140,000 
St. Kitts c) 15,591 0 19,000 
Swaziland d) 117,845 45,030 569,000 
Tanzania e) 10,186 2,183 159,000 
Trinidad c) 43,751 5,658 82,000 
Zambia d) e) 7,215 12,863 203,000 
Zimbabwe d) 30,225 29,948 489,000 
Total 1,294,700 217,298 3,962,000 
a) Surinam and Uganda are part of the SP but have no sugar quota agreed with the EU; b) Rounded figures.  
Source: www.acpsugar.org 
 
 
The Balkan Free Trade Agreement 
In 2000, the EU introduced several measures to encourage trade with the western Balkan 
region to shore up its stability and to promote association agreements with individual coun-
tries of the region. Duty free access for agricultural products, including sugar, was granted 
to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. The Balkan 
region has historically been a sugar deficit region requiring significant amounts of sugar 
imports, traditionally from the EU. However, high EU prices have been attractive to Bal-
kan producers and encouraged a sharp increase in exports to the Union, which are 
estimated at over 228,000 tonnes in 2002. Concerns within the European Commission that 
part of the export growth was the result of fraud lead to the temporary suspension of duty-
free access to the EU for exports from some countries in the region. Special rules of origin 
apply to imports from the Balkan countries. These restrict imports to sugar manufactured 
from beet or cane harvested in the exporting country concerned. Under standard EU rules 
of origin, the country of manufacture of the sugar is the country of origin. As part of the re-
form of the CMO for sugar, the EU agreed with Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Albania a future ceiling on zero-tariff shipments of domestically produced sugar to the 
Union of 180,000 tonnes, 12,000 tonnes and 1,000 tonnes respectively. The quota system 
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will enter into force on July 1 2005 replacing the current provisions. Quotas for Croatia 
and Macedonia will be negotiated separately and later (Agra Europe, 11 February 2005).  
 
 
Everything But Arms Initiative 
In March 2001 the European Union extended its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
to give duty-free access to all exports, except arms from least developed countries (LDCs) 
with the exception of three sensitive products that included sugar. For sugar, free access to 
the EU market is being phased-in with the implementation of the duty reductions delayed 
until 2006 through to free access in 2009 (see table 3.2). Duties on sugar are to be reduced 
by 20% on 1 July 2006, by 50% on the 1 July 2007, by 80% on the 1 July 2008 and elimi-
nated on 1 July 2009. Until 2009, annual duty-free quotas allocated to applicant LDCs are 
being increased each year by 15% from 74,000 tonnes in 2001-02 to 197,000 tonnes, white 
value, in 2008-09. From 2009 imports of sugar from the LDCs will not be subject to quan-
titative restrictions, but to rules of origin. That is, sugar originating from outside the LDCs 
will not be eligible for duty-free status. However, the EBA trade concession allows cumu-
lation between the least developed countries and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and 
the European Union. The increase in LDC sugar imports during the transition period will 
have no effect on the EU market, as these imports will be directly offset by reduced im-
ports of the same amount of SPS sugar from the ACP countries.1 The EU Commission 
estimates a (maximum) potential import of about 3 million tonnes of sugar entering the EU 
market in 2010 as a result of the EBA Initiative (CEC, 2004b). Imports of this volume are 
likely to cause serious disturbance to the EU market and, thus, trigger built-in safeguard 
measures, unless the sugar support system is modified. 
 
Table 3.2 Phasing in of duty free access for sugar under the EBA 
Year Raw sugar quota (tonnes) Duty reduction 
2001/02 74,185  
2002/03 85,313  
2003/04 98,110  
2004/05 112,826  
2005/06 129,750  
2006/07 149, 213 20% 
2007/08 171,594 50% 
2008/009 197,334 80% 
2009/10 No quantity limit Duty free access 
Source: European Commission, (2004b). 
 
 
Overseas Countries and Territories 
The overseas countries and territories (OCT) are those that have a special relationship with 
one of the member states of the European Union and provide for associate status of these 
countries and territories. The OCT benefit from preferential market access to the EU mar-
                                                 
1 The SPS 2002/03 basic allocation to ACP Sugar Protocol signatories was 217,000 ton (white sugar equiva-
lents).  
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ket. Products originating from OCT are not subject to import duties or quantitative restric-
tions. These arrangements are non-reciprocal and the OCT gain from the cumulation of 
origin with the ACP countries: i.e. a product exported to the EU from an OCT, but com-
posed of products from an ACP country (or another OCT or the EU) may benefit from the 
preferential access arrangements. In the 2001 review of the OCT arrangements, an annual 
import quota of 28,000 tonnes has been imposed on sugar coming from the OCT. This 
quota is phased-out over three years, so that on 1 January 2011 it is eliminated. Imports 
above the quota are subject to normal duties unless the sugar is processed into a product 
not under the sugar tariff heading.  
 
 
3.4 The impact of trade arrangements on EU domestic market equilibrium 
 
The EU sugar CMO strongly affects the EU trade in raw and refined sugar. EU exports of 
sugar consist of a surplus on A- and B-quota, plus what is additionally produced as C-
sugar. Over the period 1995-2003 exports fluctuated between 4.1 and 5.9 million tonnes 
(see figure 3.2). The sugar produced under quota A and B can be exported with subsidies 
but only within the limits agreed in the WTO at 1.3 million tonnes for the EU15.1 In 
2001/02 the EU exported 1.1 million tonnes of 'A' and 'B' sugar with an average export res-
titution of €459 /ton (CEC, 2004b). Including 1.6 million tonnes of re-exported ACP, India 
and EBA sugar - which exports are exempted from the WTO export support reduction 
commitments by special concession - total EU exports with subsidies amounted to 2.7 mil-
lion tonnes. The EU15 also exported a large share of 'C' sugar - 1.4 million tonnes - 
without subsidies.  
 The EU exports only refined white sugar. Exports are to a wide range of countries in 
Africa, (East) Europe, Middle East and some Southeast Asian countries. Major destinations 
- countries to which the Union has exported over 100,000 tonnes annually in the most re-
cent years, 2001-2003 - were Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, 
Norway, Persian Gulf, Switzerland and Syria. 
 EU-15 sugar imports have been rather stable over the period 1995-2003 (see figure 
3.2), fluctuating between 1.8 and 2.1 million tonnes annually.2 Compared to the level of 
2000, the years 2002 and 2003 show a significant increase in the volume of imports, due to 
increased imports from Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia as part of the Balkan Free 
Trade Agreement and due to imports from some LDC's that benefited from the EBA 
agreement. Annual imports in 2000/03 from the Balkan countries were (on average) 
160,000 tonnes of white sugar. Brazil and Cuba benefit from a MFN tariff quota (imports 
of 82,000 tonnes of raw sugar at MFN tariff of €98/ton). The bulk of the EU imports are 
from ACP countries and India: 1.6 million tonnes of raw sugar under the Sugar Protocol 
                                                 
1 The 10 new member states have to comply with a WTO ceiling of 145,000 tonnes subsidised exports. In 
2001/2002, the 10 new Member States exported 108,000 tonnes with subsidies. On their side, the 10 new 
member states had in the same period about half of a million ton of sugar exported without subsidies. 
2 These imports are largely raw sugar. Until 2001 the percentage of white sugar imports was only about 10% 
of the total sugar imports. In 2002 and 2003 the EU imported significant volumes of white sugar from Serbia 
and Montenegro and from Croatia and the share of with sugar imports increased to around 20% in those 
years. 
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and SPS. Only 60,000 tonnes (in raw sugar) came from LDCs/EBA countries in these first 
years the EBA agreement was implemented.  
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Figure 3.2 EU exports and imports in raw and refined sugar, 1995-2003, in tonnes 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 In a background note no. 4 to the sugar policy reforms the Commission (CEC, 
2004c) provides an overview of the actual sugar trade flows in which the EU is involved 
and explains its expectations with respect to potential trade flows involved in the interna-
tional agreements that may upset the domestic equilibrium of the sugar market in the near 
future. The low cost of production and potential to increase sugar production in a number 
of EBA countries like Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique, and the possibility to implement 
SWAP practices (three-way-trade or arbitrage, see section 5.6 for a discussion on this is-
sue) are the base for Commission estimates of a potential import of about 3 million tonnes 
from LDCs in 2010 under the status quo scenario. This is significantly higher than total 
current (2004) imports of the EU-25.  
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4. Impact of the EU sugar reform policy reform on trade 
and welfare in developing countries: a modelling  
 approach 
 
4.1 EU policy reforms and implications for the international sugar market 
 
The Commission's proposal for a sugar policy reform is laid down in the July 2004 Com-
munication (CEC, 2004). Important elements for this study are that the Commission 
proposes to reduce EU support prices for sugar by one third over 3 years and aims at re-
ducing EU production quotas by 2.8 million tonnes over 4 years. As regards trade 
implications, the Commission estimates that the current levels of around 2.5 million tonnes 
of subsidised exports (including ACP re-export) will be reduced to just 0.4 million tonnes, 
due to the drop in production and unchanged consumption in the EU-25. The Commission 
wants to convert the Western Balkan arrangement into a Tariff Rate Quota in order to pre-
serve their present export levels to the Union. For imports from ACP - and from LDCs 
under the EBA agreement - the existing preferential duty arrangements will be continued. 
This implies that ACP import quota will not be touched, yet the developing countries will 
face lower EU prices for these imports making the EU market less attractive. The Commis-
sion estimates that the reduced attractiveness of the EU market will mean that preferential 
imports will only rise from 1.9 million tonnes to 2.4 million tonnes in 2008/9 (for EU-25). 
The main driver of the increased level of the imports would be the impact of free market 
access for LDC under EBA agreement (see CEC, 2004b), which will lead to an extra 
500,000 tonnes of imports from LDCs.1 Given the uncertainty of the real effects of the 
EBA agreement and the outcome of the ongoing WTO round, the Commission calls for a 
review of price and quota levels in 2008. 
 
 
4.2 Impact analysis of EU sugar policy reform by model simulation 
 
In order to quantify the effects of the proposed changes in the EU sugar trade regime our-
selves, LEI has developed a sugar model (see box 4.1 for features of the model and its 
database). With this model, we are able to simulate global trade effects of EU reforms in a 
consistent framework, yet under the technical conditions (and limitations) of the model 
used.  
 
4.2.1 Scenarios 
 
We have done two simulation scenarios. The first one is the 'Everything but Arms' (EBA) 
scenario, simulating free market access of LDCs to the EU. This scenario is designed to as-
                                                 
1 Projecting a sugar market balance for 2013/14, the EC foresees imports of 1-1.5 million tonnes from LDCs. 
The Commission estimates that LDC will export 0.5 million tonnes because of increased production and 
shifting third market exports to the EU market, and indicates to expect that these exports might be accompa-
nies by swap trade flows at a level of around 750,000 tonnes (CEC, 2004d).  
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sess the effects of the EBA initiative, including free market access in all the other sectors 
besides sugar, and keeps constant all other policies (including the EU sugar policy). The 
second scenario is the Fischler (EU) scenario, simulating the Commission's July 2004 re-
form proposal. The Fischler scenario is additive on top of the EBA scenario and is used to 
assess the effects of the reform proposals in the situation when EBA is implemented. The 
details of the two scenarios are given below. 
 It turns out that the results for the EU sugar market depend crucially on the degree of 
substitutability between domestic EU sugar and imported sugar. Most other models1 as-
sume perfect substitutability between the different varieties of sugar, which leads to high 
estimates of changes in imports if the EU changes its trade and domestic policies. How-
ever, sugar may in fact not be such a homogenous commodity, and additional cost must be 
incurred to refine imported raw sugar into an equivalent quality of EU white sugar. Hence, 
a relatively larger price drop for imported sugar is required to induce EU refineries to 
switch to the imported variety. If imported (raw) sugar is imperfectly substitutable for do-
mestic (raw) sugar than the estimated markets effects will be smaller compared to other 
simulation exercises. Our econometrically estimated trade elasticities show in fact less than 
full substitutability. In order to provide insight into the sensitivity of our results with re-
spect to degree of product differentiation, we present additional calculations in which sugar 
is (almost) perfectly substitutable between domestic and foreign sources. In this way, we 
obtain two benchmarks, and a bandwidth, for the sugar market effects.  
 Features of the simulation model are described in box 4.1. More (technical) details 
on the model are provided in appendix 1.  
 The details of the two scenarios are as follows: 
 
Scenario 1. The EBA agreement (EBA): 
- elimination of sugar tariffs and quota for EBA imports into EU27; 
- elimination of EU27 tariffs on other products from EBA countries. 
 
Scenario 2. Fischler's sugar reform proposal (EU): 
a. Trade reform: 
- elimination of sugar tariffs and quota for EBA imports into EU27; 
- elimination of EU27 tariffs on other products from EBA countries; 
- 193,000 tonnes sugar import quota under the Balkan agreement, such that total 
SP/SPS and MFN imports amount to 1.96 million tonnes; 
- no changes to ACP quota and import regime vis-à-vis other suppliers. Trade 
remains essentially regulated. We capture this trade regulation through model-
ling of prohibitive tariffs (or alternatively as a quota with quota rents). 
b. Internal reforms: 
- sugar beet quota down by 16% (from 17.4 million tonnes to 14.6 million ton-
nes); 
- compensation payments: €9.45 per tonne quota (modelled as transfer payment 
to value added in beet production); 
                                                 
1 E.g. OECD (2005), Borrell and Pearce (1999), Devadoss and Kropf (1996) (the latter two discussed in Van 
Tongeren et al., 2001).  
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- reference price white sugar down from €631.9/tonne to €421/tonne. This 33% 
decline is modelled through an explicit reduction of the reference price, which 
transmits partially to declines in market prices. The price transmission is gov-
erned by the net export position of the EU: if net exports decrease, the market 
price fall is dampened; 
- in addition, we match the drop in market prices with reduction of the rate of 
export subsidies. 
 
 
 
Our sugar model is distinct from most other models used to assess sugar reforms in that it is a general equilib-
rium model. This type of model provides a picture of the entire economy and of the inter-linkages between the
various sectors. The choice for this type of modelling approach is motivated by two critical considerations.
First, the interaction between sugar and other crops in land allocation is important inside the EU and in other
regions. Second, for developing countries where sugar represents a sizeable portion of the domestic economy, it
is important to come to grips with the opportunities to diversify in alternative activities if sugar becomes a less
attractive crop. Our model, which is called GULA (the Bahasa Indonesia word for sugar), inherits many fea-
tures from the modelling framework of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), and it adds specific features
that are relevant for the sugar market. Being a so-called Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, the
model solves simultaneously for prices and quantities such that all markets are cleared. The model has the fol-
lowing distinguishing features: 
- an elaborated model of land allocation over alternative crops. The 'land tree' follows the approach taken
in OECD work (see Huang et al., 2004) and allows for better land market modelling. The key idea is
that land can move across alternatives uses in response to relative returns. The ease of re-allocation is
determined by agronomic features. For example, grains and oilseeds can easily be grown on the same
land (but not at the same time) while it is more difficult to move land from grains production into horti-
culture. The parameters of the land markets model are calibrated to econometric evidence on land
supply; 
- factor market segmentation between agriculture and non-agriculture. Wage differentials and differences
in returns to assets are modelled through segmented factor markets for labour and capital. The parame-
ters are calibrated to fit estimates of the elasticity of labour and capital supply reported in OECD
(2001a); 
- modelling of sugar (beet) production quota in the EU in such a way that we allow for endogenous re-
gime switches from a state when the output quota is binding to a state when the quota becomes non-
binding. In addition, changes in the value of the quota rent are endogenously determined; 
- similarly, we model the sugar import regime of the EU as a system of bilaterally allocated import quota;
- the sugar sector in the EU is modelled as a vertically integrated chain consisting of beet producers and
sugar processors. The integrated sugar complex uses internal transfer prices that allow for sharing of
quota rents between the two parties; 
- the sugar processing activity in the EU is characterised by increasing returns to scale. The sector re-
sponds to lower sugar prices (and hence lower profit margins) by contracting its scale of operations. See
Francois et al. (2005) for technical details; 
- an explicit price transmission system for sugar is modelled that allows market prices fall to a reference
price level set by the European Commission. See Van Meijl and Van Tongeren (2000) for technical de-
tails. 
Database 
- GTAP 6.05 pre-release (November 2004), amended with ISO Yearbook 2002 data on sugar production,
consumption and trade in physical units (tonnes) and expressed in raw sugar equivalent.  
- The world is divided into 12 regions and each regional economy has 7 traded commodities. We include
an European Union with 27 member states in the model, hence we already anticipate that the sugar re-
forms will be effectuated in a future situation with Bulgaria and Romania included in the Union.  
- New parameters for trade elasticities are taken from Hertel et al., (2003). 
Box 4.1 Features of the simulation model 
 38
 
4.2.2 Results 
 
The simulation results have to be interpreted as medium term outcomes in the following 
sense: there is no additional investment in e.g. processing capacity and changes in sugar 
production have to come from reallocation of land between other crops and sugar crops. It 
is assumed that no additional land will be taken into production. The allocation of land is 
driven by relative returns of land in alternative uses. For example, if opening of the EU 
sugar markets makes it more profitable to export and grow sugar in EBA countries, land is 
moved from (for instance) grains towards sugar cane.  
 
The EBA scenario 
This is the most straightforward experiment: tariffs and quota for EBA imports into the 
EU-27 are eliminated and everything else is kept constant at pre-simulation levels.  
 The model results show how trade and production patterns are influenced under this 
unilateral move by the EU-27. The duty free access for EBA countries is simulated to lead 
to an increase of 384,000 tonnes of sugar exports to the EU-27 to reach a total of 444,000 
tonnes, see Table 4.1.This almost six-fold increase of sugar exports to the EU is achieved 
from four sources: 
1. expansion of EBA sugar production by about 142,000 tonnes (2.4% of its base vol-
ume, see table 4.5); 
2. expansion of imports of sugar from non-EBA countries, to the tune of 133,000  
tonnes (= 118,000 + 15,000. See column 'EBA non-ACP countries' in the second half 
of Table 4.1, indicating the changes of the experiment with respect to the base situa-
tion). For example, Brazilian imports are simulated to increase with 34,000 tonnes. 
This 'triangular' trade patterns arises because non-EBA countries continue to be re-
stricted in their EU exports, and find it profitable to channel additional exports 
through EBA countries. These EBA imports will be re-exported to the EU. However, 
imports in many EBA countries are subject to import protection measures at the bor-
ders, which are significant in many cases. This mechanism restricts the amount of 
imports from non-EBA countries and therefore also the exports from EBA countries 
to the EU from this source; 
3. diversion of trade away from other export destinations, including intra-EBA trade, 
totalling 41,000 tonnes (= 384,000 - 343,000); 
4. A decline of domestic sugar consumption in EBA countries by -83,000 tonnes, 
mainly arising from a decline of consumers demand for EBA sugar (and a substitu-
tion towards imported sugar). 
 
 The overall trade and production effects appear limited and would give little rise to 
concerns about dramatically rising imports into the EU: total imports increase by 384,000 
to 2.8 million tonnes. Import from EBA countries increase to 384,000, which is beyond the 
bounds of EBA agreement, which speaks about a quota of 197,000 tonnes by 2008/9, but 
allows free imports thereafter. 
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Table 4.1 Bilateral trade effects of the EBA scenario (in 1000 tonnes) 
EBA-scenario 
TOTAL 
exports of which to:  
   EU27 
ACP 
sugar  
protocol 
countries
EBA 
(non ACP) 
countries Brazil 
Sugar dev 
countries 
no prefs 
Thailand 
&  
Australia 
All other 
countries
European Union 27 6,631 0 107 910 64 150 171 5,229 
ACP SP countries 2,283 1,574 56 79 0 181 0 393 
EBA (non-ACP) 
countries 
1,217 444 25 433 9 34 0 272 
Brazil 11,209 656 39 860 0 54 0 9,601 
Sugar dev. countries 
with no preferences 
5,417 50 102 1,003 0 59 5 4,198 
Thailand & Australia 6,913 0 70 117 0 5 0 6,720 
All other countries 7,908 141 265 459 38 38 59 6,909 
Total 41,577 2,865 665 3,861 110 520 235 33,322 
CHANGE 
EXPERIMENT - 
BASE 
TOTAL 
exports of which to: 
   EU27 
ACP 
sugar  
protocol 
countries
EBA  
(non 
ACP) 
countries Brazil 
Sugar dev 
countries no 
prefs 
Thailand & 
Australia 
All other 
countries
European Union 27 44 0 0 36 0 0 0 7 
ACP SP countries 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
EBA (non-ACP) 
countries 
343 384 -2 -15 -1 -2 0 -20 
Brazil 40 0 0 34 0 0 0 6 
Sugar dev. countries 
with no preferences 
33 0 0 38 0 0 0 -5 
Thailand & Australia 4 0 0 5 0 0 0 -1 
All other countries 22 0 0 18 0 0 0 4 
Total 490 384 -1 118 0 -1 0 -9 
 
 
 The income effects of this scenario are decomposed in table 4.2 into effects of elimi-
nating sugar tariffs and eliminating non-sugar tariffs for EBA countries. The EBA 
countries as a group would gain USD443 million in this experiment; the largest part of 
USD354 million is due to the elimination of non-sugar trade barriers. Although the addi-
tional sugar export revenues are substantial, and the export growth leads to rising factor 
returns in agriculture, the share of sugar in the EBA economy is too low (about 10% of 
GDP) to boost the EBA economies. Hence, potential allocation gains from liberalisation of 
non-sugar sectors are much higher. Note also that the unilateral policy change towards the 
EBA countries also leads to some losses in other developing countries, due to trade diver-
sion effects.  
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Table 4.2 Decomposition of national income effects, EBA scenario 
 
National income million USD Base 2001 Sugar effect Non-sugar effect Total 
European Union 27 8344,291 -465 -389 -854 
ACP sugar protocol countries 185,490 0 -2 -1 
EBA (non-ACP) countries 363,799 89 354 443 
Brazil 502,503 1 -7 -6 
Sugar dev countries no prefs 629,987 -1 -12 -13 
Thailand &Australia 472,046 2 1 3 
All other countries 20780,518 -16 -71 -87 
Total 31278,634 -390 -126 -515 
Source: LEI, own calculations. 
 
EU scenario 
This is a substantially more complex scenario than the previous EBA experiment. The in-
tricate interaction between domestic reforms and trade reforms leads to various production 
and trade responses. The European Commission proposes to reduce sugar reference prices, 
which will also lead to a drop in market prices. This lower EU price makes it less attractive 
for other suppliers to import into the EU market, but as long as the EU price remains (sub-
stantially) above their marginal cost it will still be necessary to control trade in order to 
prevent a large influx of sugar. This is exactly what the EU proposal attempts to achieve: 
just free market access for EBA and a limited rise of import quota for Balkan countries. 
 At the same time, the EU attempts to reduce domestic sugar production by constrain-
ing sugar beet production through a tightening of beet quota by 16%, or 2.8 million tonnes 
of white sugar. Part of that lower domestic production should lead to lower (subsidized) 
exports from the EU and a part can potentially be covered from LDC (i.e. EBA) imports.  
 A 37% drop of EU exports to 4.2 million tonnes accommodates EU's production cut. 
(The year 2000 WTO bound for the EU15 is 1.3 million tonnes of subsidised sugar ex-
ports). On the import side, we observe additional imports of 211,000 tonnes (see Table 
4.3). These additional imports stem from EBA countries (196,000), the Balkan countries 
(Croatia and Serbia, included in 'All other countries') import additional 15,000 tonnes to 
the EU markets. As in the previous EBA experiment the additional export from EBA coun-
tries to the EU is partly made possible by 'triangular' trade: sugar from Brazil and other 
countries is channelled through LDCs with preferential import opportunities into the EU 
market. The own sugar production in EBA countries expands by just 2.4%, to 3.1 million 
tonnes (see table 4.5).  
 In this experiment, all other potential importers to the EU are restricted in their trade 
through the remaining import barriers, although the value of their quota rents are reduced 
by the drop in EU prices. Despite the reduction of intervention prices in the EU, the market 
thus remains attractive for low-cost LDC sugar suppliers.  
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Table 4.3 Bilateral trade effects of the EU reform scenario (in 1,000 tonnes) 
 
EU 
TOTAL 
exports of which to: 
   EU27 
ACP  
sugar  
protocol 
countries
EBA  
(non-ACP) 
countries Brazil 
Sugar  
dev  
countries  
no prefs 
Thailand 
&  
Australia 
All other 
countries
European Union 27 4162 0 66 564 42 95 112 3,283 
ACP SP countries 2291 1,574 57 79 0 184 0 397 
EBA (non-ACP) coun-
tries 1057 257 26 446 9 35 0 283 
Brazil 11330 656 39 865 0 55 0 9,715 
Sugar dev. countries 
with no preferences 5459 50 103 1,008 0 59 5 4,233 
Thailand &Australia 6998 0 71 118 0 5 0 6,804 
All other countries 8020 155 268 462 40 38 63 6,994 
Total 39317 2,692 629 3,543 90 473 180 31,709 
CHANGE Experiment - 
BASE 
TOTAL 
exports of which to:  
   EU 27
ACP 
sugar 
protocol 
countries
EBA 
(non-ACP) 
countries Brazil 
Sugar dev 
countries 
no prefs 
Thailand 
& 
Australia 
All other
countries
European Union 27 -2,425 0 -41 -310 -22 -54 -59 -1,939 
ACP SP countries 12 0 1 4 0 4 0 4 
EBA (non-ACP) coun-
tries 184 196 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -10 
Brazil 162 0 0 39 0 1 0 121 
Sugar dev. countries 
with no preferences 75 0 1 43 0 1 0 30 
Thailand &Australia 89 0 1 5 0 0 0 83 
All other countries 134 15 3 21 2 1 4 89 
Total -1,771 211 -36 -199 -20 -49 -54 -1,622 
 
 
 Figure 4.1 illustrates the worldwide changes in sugar output under the two scenarios. 
While the EU output contracts only under the EU reform proposal, as quota are shrinking, 
the EBA sugar output shows the strongest growth under an unreformed EU sugar regime. 
Once the EU engages in reforms, price drops in the EU and in their wake reduced export 
subsidies make the EU a less attractive market. 
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Figure 4.1 Output effects, per cent change relative to base 2001 
 
 
 Income effects are a bit less, but positive for the group of EBA countries as a whole. 
This EU reform scenario also indicates stronger trade diversion effects than the EBA sce-
nario. The reduced EU output opens the possibility for more imports, but only from (low-
cost) EBA countries; other suppliers - also ACP SP countries - seize the 'triangular' trade 
opportunities, and are hence able to compensate for the loss of export revenues in the face 
of declining EU prices.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Decomposition of national income effects, EU reform scenario 
National income million USD (a) Simulation  
Base 2001 
EBA sugar 
import effect 
EBA  
non-sugar 
effect 
EU  
domestic 
sugar  
policy  
effect 
Total 
European Union 27 8344,291 -463 -145 5,255 4,647
ACP sugar protocol countries 185,490 1 -2 1 -1
EBA (non-ACP) countries 363,799 103 307 -28 382
Brazil 502,503 -1 -7 -16 -24
Sugar dev countries no prefs 629,987 -1 -12 4 -9
Thailand &Australia 472,046 -16 -44 77 17
All other countries 20780,518 -5 -5 108 98
Total 31278,634 -381 92 5,401 5,112
a) Measured from Equivalent Variation 
Source: LEI, own calculations. 
 
 Table 4.4 decomposes the national income effects. It is noteworthy that the income 
loss for the EU under the EBA scenario is turned into a gain once the EU rationalises its 
 43
policy. The effect of domestic reforms on EU welfare is significant, and stems from three 
main sources: (1) lower prices for EU sugar imply lower cost for sugar using industries and 
consumers; (2) the contraction of the sugar sector reduces deadweight losses in the form of 
rents associated with the current policy regime; (3) reduced expenditures on export subsi-
dies. Note, however, that the sugar reform by itself entails small income losses to Brazil 
and EBA countries. This is due to the fact that they receive a lower price for their exports. 
At the same time Thailand and Australia are able to channel increased amounts of sugar 
through Balkan countries, that receive new import opportunities to the protected EU mar-
ket, leading to small positive policy spill-over effects for them.  
 Table 4.5 below summarises the results of the base and the two simulation scenarios. 
 
Table 4.5 Summary of simulation results (tonnes x 1,000 in raw sugar equivalent)  
 Base 2001 EBA scenario EU July 2004  
reform proposal + EBA 
Exports to EU27 
ACP sugar protocol countries 1,574 1574 1,574
EBA (non-ACP) countries 60 444 257
Brazil a) 656 656 656
Sugar dev countries no prefs 50 50 50
Thailand & Australia 0 0 0
All other countries 141 141 155
Total 2,481 2865 2,692
 
Export from EU27 6,587 6631 4,162
 
Output (raw sugar equivalents) 
European Union 27 18,233 18233 15,316
ACP sugar protocol countries 3,428 3428 3,429
EBA (non-ACP) countries 3,023 3165 3,097
Brazil 20,336 20348 20,385
Sugar dev countries no prefs 25,965 25974 25,989
Thailand & Australia 10,139 10139 10,174
All other countries 34,781 34781 37,345
WORLD 115,904 115735 115,735
 
Income (USD million) GDP (Base 2001) Additional national income, EV 
European Union 27 8344,291 -854 4,647
ACP sugar protocol countries 185,490 -1 -1
EBA (non-ACP) countries 363,799 443 382
Brazil 502,503 -6 -24
Sugar dev countries no prefs 629,987 -13 -9
Thailand & Australia 472,046 3 17
All other countries 20780,518 -87 98
WORLD 20780,518 -87 98
a) Brazil exports around 60,000 tonnes to EU-15 and some 600,000 tonnes to Rumania and Bulgaria. The lat-
ter two countries are assumed EU member by 2007. We assume that the EU will have to allocate 'current 
access' quota to Brazil as current exporter to the new member states. 
Source: LEI, own calculations 
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The major conclusions from these experiments are that: 
1. Sugar imports from EBA countries increase but there is no dramatic inflow of sugar 
under the two scenarios simulated. The extra EU imports under the EBA scenario 
will be 384,000 tonnes, while in the EU reform scenario extra imports will add up to 
only 211,000 tonnes. These estimates are much less than what the EC indicates in its 
background notes to the Communication of July 20043. As reported, the EC projects 
an import increase of around 2.8 million tonnes (from 0.2 million tonnes to around 
3.0 million tonnes) from EBA under a status quo scenario, while extra imports from 
EBA countries would be 500,000 tonnes under the reform scenario; 
2. EBA countries achieve positive welfare effects from the elimination of sugar trade 
barriers, but mainly from the elimination of non-sugar trade barriers. National in-
come of these countries is estimated to increase USD382 million under the EU 
reform scenario; 
3. ACP SP countries are able to compensate for the loss of export revenues in the face 
of declining EU prices: these countries (as a group) will see a mild growth in sugar 
export volumes under the July 2004 EU reform proposal, as these countries can ex-
port a bit more to other developing countries. However, this does not translate into 
income gains as prices received decline; 
4. Brazil and other developing countries will increase their exports to other developing 
countries but these amounts are modest. Both Brazil and the group of other develop-
ing countries are hardly affected by the EU proposal.  
 
4.2.3 Sensitivity 
 
The relatively modest import flow of LDC sugar into the EU is related to the fact that EU 
sugar and LDC sugar are imperfect substitutes. Table 4.6 reports on the sensitivity of re-
sults with respect to the modelling of the international sugar markets. In the standard 
version, sugar is an internationally differentiated good: sugar from different sources is im-
perfectly substitutable and the respective elasticities have been obtained from detailed 
econometric studies (Hertel et al., 2003). If we leave that assumption and assume instead 
that sugar is a homogenous good (a perfect substitute), we obtain a dramatically higher rise 
in EBA exports towards the EU-27. Under the most 'elastic' specification of sugar trade 
(elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported sources equals 10), imports from 
EBA countries change by an additional 2.7 million tonnes. There is nothing that prevents 
such an inflow: EU prices remain high through the intervention price system, and re-
exports of EBA sugar (at subsidised prices) is not prevented. Naturally, income effects also 
multiply under the homogeneity assumption. This simulation indicates the upper limit of 
possible imports into the EU from EBA suppliers.  
 Under the EU reform scenario with perfect substitutability the trade effects are 
dampened and EBA sugar imports rise by 'only' 915,000 tonnes. This is due to lower EU 
prices, precluding less competitive EBA exporters from increasing their exports to the EU, 
and it is due to reduced export subsidies, which limits re-exports from the EU-27.  
 The homogeneity assumption is maintained in most other modelling studies on the 
sugar market, but it's not very plausible for three reasons. One, the econometric studies, 
based on long-term historical trends, do not support it. Two, dominant industrial users of 
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sugar in the EU are likely to insist on high quality refined sugar, as they are accustomed to 
EU beet sugar processors to supply high quality refined sugar (of 45 ICUMSA, a measure 
of colour of the sugar crystal) and only a few LDC suppliers are able to supply refined 
sugar of this grade (LMC, 2004b:13). And three, there is the difference between raw and 
white sugar in the international trade.  
 
Table 4.6 Summary of sensitivity results 
 
  EBA  
scenario 
  EU  
reform 
scenario 
 
Change relative to base 2001 
 
low 
elasticity
sigma = 
2.7 
medium 
elasticity
sigma 
= 5 
high 
elasticity
sigma 
=10 
low 
elasticity 
sigma 
= 2.7 
medium 
elasticity 
sigma 
= 5 
high 
elasticity
sigma 
=10 
Change total imports to EU-27, tonnes X 
1000 
384 1,285 2,717 211 466 915 
of which additional imports from EBA 
countries 
384 1,285 2,717 196 452 901 
National income, million USD       
ACP sugar protocol countries -1 0 10 -1 1 4 
EBA (non ACP) countries 443 675 1,588 382 478 669 
Brazil -6 -3 16 -24 -17 -13 
Sugar dev countries no prefs -13 -12 10 -9 -8 -4 
Note: Sigma indicates the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported sources for sugar. 
 
 
 The model's database allows detail up to 87 countries and/or regions (see appendix 
4). Therefore, results from these model simulations are not very detailed for individual 
countries and hence, it is not known which countries may benefit (most) from the increased 
market access to the Union and who would lose (most). In the following chapters we pro-
vide more detail about the consequences of the EU reform proposals for individual 
developing countries, based on literature review and country case studies. 
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5. Consequences of EU sugar policy reforms for  
 developing countries: literature review 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The impact of the EU's sugar trade policy on international markets has received much at-
tention ever since the early years of its establishment (see, e.g. Abbott, 1990 for an 
overview). In the preparatory stage of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations - in the 
1980s - and during the negotiations, many studies on the impact of global trade liberalisa-
tion on international agricultural markets have estimated the consequences of EU sugar 
trade policy for international trade positions, including those of several groups of develop-
ing countries.1 This chapter focuses on the possible consequences of the most recent EU 
policy reform proposals for the group of developing countries. LMC has done several in-
depth studies to indicate the possible impacts of changes in the EU policy on ACP and 
LDC sugar suppliers.2 These studies are reviewed, commented on and supplemented with 
other relevant literature. 
 
 
5.2 EU imports from developing countries after reform 
 
LMC has released several studies estimating the possible impact of EU sugar policy re-
forms on ACP and LDC sugar suppliers (LMC, 2002; 2004a; 2004b). In its 2002 report, 
LMC estimates the effects by assuming a number of scenarios with respect to EU sugar 
price falls, import tariff and export subsidy reductions (see table 5.1). LMC estimates the 
possible future third country supply of sugar to the EU under the Sugar protocol, the MFN 
and the EBA access arrangements. The outcomes are summarised in table 4.1 below. This 
table reveals total imports of between 1.5 million tonnes and 3.4 million tonnes depending 
on the magnitude of price cuts in the EU: the lower the EU price, the less attractive the EU 
market and the less imports from developing countries. 
 Table 5.1 reveals that LMC assumes no change in the level of imports under the 
Sugar Protocol or MFN access arrangements. This is despite the fact that several ACP 
countries are unlikely to be able to cover their cash (i.c. variable) costs of production, even 
when the price cuts in the EU would be modest. Given the uncertainty surrounding post-
Lomé access arrangements, LMC has assumed very straightforward that any quota short-
falls from one country will in some way be reallocated to other, low cost countries. 
According to its estimations, low cost countries in the ACP group would be able to fill the 
quota even under the most extreme price cut of 33%.  
                                                 
1 To mention just a few: Valdès and Zietz, 1980; Tyers and Anderson, 1986; Sturgiss et al, 1987; Parikh et 
al., 1988; Roningen and Dixit, 1990 
2 LMC, 2002; LMC, 2004a; LMC, 2004b. 
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Table 5.1 Third country imports to EU in 2010/11 under different scenarios 
Assumptions 
Fall in intervention price 2001/02  
to 2010/11 
- In % 
- White sugar intervention price 
- Raw sugar intervention price 
 
 
7 
589 
489 
 
 
22 
492 
408 
 
 
17 
522 
433 
 
 
33 
425 
352 
Third country imports to EU ('000 tonnes, white sugar equivalent) 
Protocol 1,315 1,315 1,315 1,315 
MFN 79 79 79 79 
EBA 2,025 592 784 112 
Total 3,418 1,985 2,177 1,505 
Source: LMC, 2002:143, table A4.1 and table A4.5. 
 
 
 LMC projections indicate an increase in EBA sugar supply to the EU market. The 
EBA supply to the EU is projected to increase for three reasons, namely: 
1. diversion of current world market exports to the EU market; this amount is estimated 
around 130,000 tonnes and will largely come from Sudan and Ethiopia; 
2. diversion of domestic sales to the EU (and meet domestic consumption through im-
ports); on the basis of average world market sugar prices, this amount could exceed 
1.0 million tonnes as long as EU sugar prices fall by just 7% (this implies a raw 
sugar intervention price of €489/ton, see LMC, 2002:151). If price differentials (be-
tween EU price and import price of world market sugar to domestic market) 
diminish, opportunities for LDCs to exploit arbitrage disappear; price cuts of 17% or 
more are likely to deter this trade. However, at very low levels of the world price this 
trade could continue even if prices in the EU are cut by 33%. This makes it very dif-
ficult to project import levels from one year to the next; 
3. expansion of domestic sugar output - this could exceed 1.0 million tonnes depending 
on the extent to which prices are cut in the EU. This increase is likely to come from 
just six low cost LDCs: Sudan, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal and Zam-
bia. Under a 33% price cut, the countries that could be expected to expand their 
supply to the EU are Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia. However, the im-
ports into the EU under such a scenario is very modest. This conclusion is very 
similar to our conclusion in the previous chapter.  
 
 
5.3 Cost of production in developing countries 
 
Important element in the analysis of identifying which third countries would have a realis-
tic chance of adapting to the changes in the EU market access conditions is the current and 
future cost of production. Sugar production costs in each ACP and EBA country are de-
rived using LMC's cane sugar production cost model, which estimated the cost of growing 
sugar cane (including transport to the mill) and the cost of processing sugar cane to pro-
duce raw sugar, on a bulk ex-factory basis. Figure 5.1 presents the present (2000/2001) EU 
third country suppliers subject to ACP SP and EBA agreements according to three cost 
categories. 
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Low (full) cost (< €300/ton) Medium (full) cost  
(€301-500/ton) 
High (full) cost  
(> €501/ton) 
ACP SP country:  
Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia b), 
Zimbabwe; 
EBA producers:  
Ethiopia, Sudan 
ACP SP country:  
Belize, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Fiji, 
Guyana, Mauritius, Tanzania 
EBA producers:  
Burkina Faso, Mozambique 
ACP SP country: 
 Barbados, Jamaica, Madagascar, 
St. Kits, Trinidad. 
Figure 5.1 Cost of production in EU sugar suppliers from ACP SP signatories and LDCs a)  
a) ACP SP signatories that are LDCs too and thus may benefit from the EBA agreement are: Congo, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia; b) Zambia has a EU export quota under the SPS agreement and a zero 
quota under the SP agreement. 
Source: LMC, 2002: 145, Table A4.21. 
 
 
 Next to production costs, the price for which the sugar can be offered at the EU bor-
der should also cover costs for transport and duties. For most countries costs for freight and 
fobbing plus duty range between €50 and €100 per ton. For some countries this is higher: 
for instance, Brazil and Cuba pay €98/ton MFN duty plus €50-60 per ton transport costs. 
Some landlocked countries experience particularly high transport costs. Examples are 
Zambia and Malawi, two low cost production countries, but landlocked and therefore they 
face high trade costs estimated €135/ton and €112/ton respectively (LMC, 2002:145).  
 LMC projected costs of production in EU sugar suppliers from 2009/10 are based on 
an analysis and judgment of productivity increases and cost developments (LMC, 
2002:150). Figure 5.2 present countries with costs of production including costs of trans-
port and duty that would be lower than the raw sugar price in the EU of €329/ton, that 
implies from the reduction of the guaranteed price for white sugar (CEC, 2004a:9-10). 
Countries with supplying prices up to €450/ton are also included in the table. The sugar in-
dustries in the eight low-cost production countries seem to have the most favourable 
perspectives to gain from the expected changes in the EU sugar trade regime. To what ex-
tent that might be possible, is discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
Full cost of production CIF duty paid < EU inter-
vention price of €329/ton raw sugar  
Full costs of production CIF duty paid between 
€329/ton and 450/ton  
ACP countries: Fiji, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe 
ACP countries: Belize, Guyana, 
EBA countries: Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan EBA countries: Senegal 
Figure 5.2 Projected costs of supplying raw sugar by country in 2009/10 (EUR/ton) 
Source: LMC, 2002: 150, Table A4.4. 
 
 
                                                 
1 LMC differentiates between cash and non-cash costs (for the field and factory sector). Cash costs are vari-
able costs including costs of labour, fuel, fertilisers, seeds and chemicals, repairs and maintenance, and 
administration. Non-cash costs of production are depreciation and return on capital. Full costs include both 
cash and non-cash production costs. 
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5.4 Potential levels of sugar production in developing countries 
 
The Commission's July 2004 proposal to reform the Union's sugar policy implies a price 
reduction for raw sugar to €329/ton. Assuming that ACP exporters will receive this price at 
the EU-border (while they also have to cover the costs of insurance and freight by this 
price), many ACP sugar industries currently exporting to the EU under the ACP/EU Sugar 
Protocol will face a loss in their exports to the EU market. Some countries, such as Barba-
dos, Jamaica, Madagascar, St. Kits, Trinidad - the high cost producers - would have to 
cease exports to the EU and, consequently have to fear that their sugar industries will col-
lapse as costs are so high that restructuring of the industry makes no sense (see also box 
5.1 in section 5.6). LMC assumes that the total SP quota (1.3 million tonnes in white sugar 
equivalents) will remain in the new arrangements under EBA with ACP countries and that 
quota shortfalls from one country will be reallocated to other lower cost ACP countries. 
This implies that the lower cost ACP countries would fill the full SP quota, most notably 
the five countries with the lowest estimated costs - Fiji, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. These five countries normally produce 1.925 million tonnes sugar per annum 
(ISO, 2004) and have currently a SP export quota of 335,000 tonnes (26% of ACP quota 
under SP).  
 In order to replace exports from high-cost ACP countries that are part of the SP, the 
five above-mentioned low cost ACP countries have to expand their production of almost 2 
million tonnes with an additional one million tonnes. LMC assumes that the future EU 
market price would be attractive enough to encourage such significant production increases 
in the low-cost countries. However, this may appear rather optimistic as the projected ex-
port (EU import c.i.f.) prices for Fiji, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia will be about the 
same as the EU intervention price for raw sugar (LMC, 2002:150); for these countries the 
opportunity to export sugar to the Union may not trigger extra production as the financial 
gains are (too) low. The industry in these countries may invest in efficiency improvements 
and cost reduction measures, or expand and benefit from scale economies. Yet, uncertain-
ties around prices - will EU price level remain or will it drop further due to WTO or other 
developments? - makes the industry reluctant to invest. Only in Zimbabwe raw sugar pro-
duction costs for 2010 are projected far below EU intervention price, namely €230/ton 
(LMC, 2002:150). Consequently, Zimbabwe's sugar sector may benefit greatly from the 
EU sugar reform implying a 33% price reduction. Zimbabwe's normal production level is 
around 600,000 tonnes per annum (ISO, 2004). Being the ACP SP signatory with the low-
est production costs, Zimbabwe would be the country to fill a large part of the SP quota, 
when inefficient suppliers have to cease their exports to the Union. For this Zimbabwe's 
sugar industry needs significant investment in expansion. Yet, the present political situa-
tion in the country is not very favourable to investments.  
 Non-ACP LDCs may benefit from unlimited access under the EBA initiative, but 
also have to cope with the EU price reductions. The low cost EBA countries - Ethiopia, 
Mozambique and Sudan - normally produce around 1.15 million tonnes (mainly in Sudan 
[700,000 tonnes] and Ethiopia [300,000 tonnes]). The opportunity to export to the EU will 
stimulate sugar production in these countries, but to what extent depends on the EU price 
cut. According to LMC's initial estimates, a 33% EU price cut will result in 240,000 tonnes 
extra that the EBA countries will be able to ship to the EU in 2010/11. Furthermore, in its 
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2004 report LMC indicates that once investments in sugar production expansion have been 
made in these countries, supply to the EU market may increase to levels between 0.6 and 
1.0 million tonnes in 2015 (LMC, 2004b: 49). This again assumes that investments in the 
sugar sector in these countries will occur. Besides domestic factors affecting potential in-
vestments in the sector - capital availability, opportunity costs, general investment climate, 
etc. - potential investors may be deterred by the Commission's call for an evaluation of the 
EBA agreement in 2008, which may lead to a review of price levels. This uncertainty is 
likely to reduce the propensity of investors to invest their money in expanding the sugar 
industry in LDCs. 
 Will other countries benefit from increased access to EU markets, due to the price 
and import tariff reductions projected? Brazil is often considered as the most competitive 
sugar exporter in the world. According to LMC projections for 2009/10, Brazil may pro-
duce raw sugar in the northwest region of the country against EUR 271/ton (full) 
production costs. Even if as a result of a new WTO agreement tariffs would be reduced by 
another 36% (same as in the URAA), import tariffs would be too high to compete with 
countries, which have free access to the EU market. There is, however, an other way for 
Brazil to enter the EU-market and that through the EU member states to be, Rumania and 
Bulgaria. As explained in section 3.3, Brazil (and Cuba) has been compensated under 
WTO rules for the loss of access to Finland that joined the EU common market in 1995. 
Following the MFN import precedent, the EU will have to allocate 'current access' quota to 
Brazil as current exporter to Bulgaria and Rumania (of some 600,000 tonnes in 2003), 
based on historical access.  
 
 
5.5 Trade diversion 
 
Next to the direct impact on trade flows between developing countries on the one hand and 
the EU on the other, the changes in the EU trade regime may have impact on trade through 
trade diversion: there could be significant scope for arbitrage business between non-LDC 
low cost sugar producers (e.g. Brazil, Thailand, Australia) and EBA countries, as well as 
between surplus sugar producing non-LDCs that could divert their world market sugar ex-
ports to EBA beneficiaries.  
 In the first case, an EBA country may profit from arbitrage by selling its production 
to the EU market and purchasing lower priced world market sugar (from Brazil or Thai-
land) for domestic purpose. The profit is the difference between the two prices minus the 
trading (importing and exporting transactions) costs. Assuming an average world market 
price of USD350/ton white sugar, LMC shows that most arbitrage operations will lose their 
interest if the EU sugar price is cut by 33%. However, as the world market price is very 
volatile, arbitrage may be profitable from year to year, even under this 33% price cut. For 
example, in an interview traders revealed that the world market price for sugar ranged be-
tween USD160-200/ton at the end of 2004. 1 At such low prices arbitrage would be 
profitable, even for countries with relatively high trade costs. Moreover, also the dollar-
                                                 
1 Meeting with LDC Sugar Group, 26-11-2004. A price range of USD160-200/ton equals €125-155/ton in 
December 2004 (1 €= 1.3 USD). 
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euro exchange rate is important: when the dollar loses value against the euro (as it did 
since 2002), the world market price in euro terms declines even at a constant dollar price. 
Thus, assuming everything else equal, exchange rate variations also have an impact on ar-
bitrage trade and the extent it may occur. The potential for arbitrage is therefore very 
uncertain. In the most dramatic case - i.e. that all sugar production from LDCs would be 
exported to the EU, LMC estimates an inflow of 4.7-6.2 million tonnes (LMC, 2004b: 41).  
 Similar magnitudes of trade volumes fuelled by arbitrage are claimed by ASSUC - 
the Association of Sugar Traders in the EU. ASSUC (2001) points at considerable scope 
for the LDC's to substitute domestic sales with world market sugars and to export own 
produced sugar to the EU market. The Traders claim that infrastructure to move sugar to 
suitable ports is available and, just as importantly, it is easy to reverse this flow to allow 
(cheaper) imports of sugar (significantly reducing the overall per unit costs). Further poten-
tial substitution is likely, ASSUC claims, given the planned increases in capacity in certain 
countries. ASSUC estimates that capacity utilisation amounts to 2.4 million tonnes in 
2002/1, yet that production given full and planned capacity utilisation would amount to 4.3 
million tonnes. Indicating that total consumption is around 3.7 million tonnes, these figures 
imply that supply to EU markets under free access could be 0.6 million tonnes at minimum 
(assuming no diversion of domestic sales to the EU) to 4.3 million tonnes maximum (as-
suming all production will be sold at EU markets and imports meet domestic 
consumption). Especially in Mozambique and Sudan capacity is much larger than actual 
production, according to ASSUC. 
 LMC illustrates the second option of arbitrage indicated in the first paragraph of this 
section by discussing the impact of five free trade areas on the African continent (2002: 
161-174). LMC's analysis suggest that if free trade in sugar within each of the regions is 
assumed, arbitrage would become profitable for many countries at long run average world 
sugar prices even with price cuts in the EU up to 22%. However, this analysis is based on 
the assumption that non-LDCs would be willing to supply sugar to their neighbouring 
country at the world sugar price. In theory, this would be the case if the country was a sur-
plus sugar producer and the only other outlet for their sugar was the world market. Given 
that most national sugar industries are supported by levels of at USD400-500 per ton, intra-
FTA trade between non-LDCs and LDCs will only tend to enhance this arbitrage if one or 
more of the non-LDC members is a large exporter of sugar to the world market. The only 
country in the African region that complies with these features is South Africa, who is 
member of SADC (Southern African Development Community). However, sugar is treated 
a sensitive product within SADC and free trade is not envisaged this decade. Therefore, 
LMC concludes that 'the scope for intra-FTA trade to boost the volume of sales to the EU 
is non-existent' (LMC, 2002:168).  
 
 
5.6 Winners and losers 
 
Obviously, ACP SP countries will lose from the EU sugar trade reform, as they will re-
ceive lower prices than before for their sugar exported to the Union, which implies lower 
export revenues, lower income and declining employment. The EU has stated that it is 
willing to continue to guarantee the volume of sugar imports outlined in the Lomé Agree-
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ment at 1.3 million tonnes, but it will only buy these exports at the new (lower) interven-
tion price. It is clear from the previous sections that only a few countries will be able to 
export to the EU market when prices are reduced to reach the level of €329/ton raw 
sugar/€421/ton white sugar. Such a low price will not cover sugar production costs in the 
ACP Sugar Protocol countries but Zimbabwe. Ethiopia, Sudan and Mozambique are non-
ACP LDCs with low production costs and are expected to benefit from the EBA agreement 
providing unrestricted access to the EU sugar market after 2009. Other ACP Sugar Proto-
col countries will lose when the present EU proposal on sugar policy reform is accepted, 
unless they can benefit from arbitrage. As indicated above, arbitrage is difficult to project, 
subject to world market price and exchange rate fluctuations. For instance, at December 
2004 world market prices arbitrage would have been attractive to many countries if they 
would have free access to the EU sugar market, even at the 'low' price of €329/ton raw 
sugar. Countries that can deliver sugar at the prevailing low world market prices - Brazil, 
Thailand, Australia - will benefit from such arbitrage opportunities. 
 Within the group of ACP countries that will lose because of the changes in the EU 
sugar trade regime, there are great differences in terms of lost export revenues and subse-
quent impact on the economies of these countries. Milner et al. (2004) show this by 
estimating income transfer to ACP sugar protocol exporters associated with the prevailing 
regime for 2001. This income transfer is estimated at USD490 million (export volume to 
the EU times difference between EU and international ISA price), of which Mauritius re-
ceives by far the largest share (36.9%). Mauritius, plus Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica and 
Swaziland receive about 80% of the total transfer as these countries have a relative high 
share of the total SP quota. Furthermore, sugar production in these countries is quite heav-
ily export-oriented and some export largely to the EU (see table 5.2). This concentration 
indicates that any EU sugar reform, which lowers the EU import price to the ACP protocol 
exporters, is likely to have very uneven adjustment implications across the countries in-
volved. Moreover, in terms of percentage of GDP income transfers show to be most 
important for Belize (1.9%), Fiji (2.9%), Guyana (8.7%), Mauritius (4.0%) and Swaziland 
(4.3%) (Milner et al., 2004:797).  
 For a more complete impact analysis of the proposed EU sugar trade reform, Milner 
et al., take into account the impact of such a change on international prices. Studies on this 
topic differ widely in approach and effect on international prices. Milner et al., consider an 
intermediate value (of studies they review) of 38% undervaluation of the world sugar price 
relative to the fully liberated world market price. This would in turn correspond to a 48% 
fall in the EU intervention price in order to equalize EU and world price. By taking into 
account the assumed change in world market price, the figures of the first calculations are 
affected downward; since, part of the gross transfers directly associated with export in-
come on sugar exports to the EU is inflated by the too low set world market price and 
indirect effects on the non-EU export earnings are ignored. The revised estimate of the 
gross transfer is consistently lower than the earlier estimates (USD377.2 million). The par-
ticular interesting difference in these estimates is the variation in the sign on the net 
transfers. There are now five countries for which the current net income transfer is nega-
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tive, namely Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, St. Kitts, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 1 These are countries - 
mainly low-income African countries - that are potential gainers from sugar liberalisation.2 
On the other hand, Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana and Jamaica account for over 80% of the total 
net transfer and would gain most from a status quo. 
 
Table 5.2 ACP SP and SPS sugar quotas, production, export orientation and dependency on EU market 
(tonnes w.s.e.) a) b) 
Countries SP quota 
allocation 
2003/04 
SPS  
quota  
allocation 
2002/03 
Production 
average 
2001/03 
Exports 
average  
2001/03 
Exports  
as share  
of prod.  
(%) 
Exports  
to EU 
average 
2001/03 
Exports  
to EU as 
share of 
total ex-
ports 
(%) 
Barbados c) 32,097 0 40,000 39,000 98 39,000 100 
Belize 40,349 5,527 105,000 92,000 88 47,000 51 
Congo e) 10,186 2,249 41,000 34,000 83 6,000 18 
Cote d'Ivoire 10,186 9,704 144,000 32,000 22 20,000 63 
Fiji 165,348 21,060 304,000 248,000 82 151,000 61 
Guyana 159,410 17,111 282,000 244,000 87 180,000 74 
Jamaica c) 118,696 18,894 164,000 131,000 80 131,000 100 
Kenya 5,000 10,908 418,000 8,000 2 8,000 100 
Madagascar c) e) 10,760 0 36,000 9,000 25 8,000 89 
Malawi d) e) 20,824 9,897 222,000 83,000 37 49,000 59 
Mauritius 491.031 21,266 545,000 540,000 99 490,000 91 
Mozambique e) 6,000 0 140,000 51,000 36 9,000 18 
St. Kitts c) 15,591 0 19,000 15,000 79 5,000 33 
Swaziland d) 117,845 45,030 569,000 456,000 80 146,000 32 
Tanzania e) 10,186 2,183 159,000 18,000 11 18,000 100 
Trinidad c) 43,751 5,658 82,000 55,000 67 44,000 80 
Zambia d) e) 7,215 12,863 203,000 108,000 53 21,000 19 
Zimbabwe d) 30,225 29,948 489,000 172,000 35 49,000 28 
Total 1,294,700 217,298 3,962,000 2,335,000 59 1,534,000 68 
a) Surinam and Uganda are part of the SP but have no sugar quota agreed with the EU; b) Rounded figures; 
c) Countries with high production costs (> €500/tonne); d) Countries with low production costs (< 
€300/tonne); e) Least Developed Country. Sources: www.acpsugar.org for sugar quota; ISO 2004, Yearbook 
2003 for production and export figures. 
 
 
 The Milner et al., study shows that, if the current transfer is measured for a prospec-
tive rather than actual world price, the cross-country pattern of gainers and losers from the 
current EU sugar regime is more obvious, and that not all protocol countries necessarily 
have strong incentive for the protection of the benefits they gained under the Sugar Proto-
col. However, the study can be criticised on several grounds. The study has only looked at 
ACP countries and admits that, with full implementation of the EBA arrangement, the least 
                                                 
1 It is very strange to have St. Kitts in the group of potential beneficiaries of liberalisation. LMC estimates 
relatively high sugar production costs in that country and labels the country as one of the losers of EU policy 
reform. Furthermore, St. Kitts has not been able to export sugar to the EU in 2001, the year used in Milner et 
al. calculations, while ISO does not report sugar exports to other countries. 
2 If world market price would increase less than the assumed 38%, the number of countries with negative net 
transfers will tend to decrease. Milner et al. indicates that increases up to 20% would leave only Congo, St. 
Kitts and Zambia with negative transfers (and thus would benefit from liberalisation). 
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developed protocol countries would face a more complex balance of interest between 
higher world prices from EU liberalisation and higher EU prices through the EU not liber-
alising. Furthermore, Milner et al., probably estimate the world market price effect of these 
changes much too high, because of two reasons. The present stocks have accumulated to 
almost half the sugar use in the world (OECD, 2005:10). Moreover, production potentials 
in Brazil, Thailand and some other developing countries are enormous, which implies that 
these countries can probably rather easily take over markets left by the EU. This would 
mean that the impact of EU reforms on international sugar prices is probably small and that 
longer-term world prices are actually driven down. Another critical remark on this study is 
that the analysis shows the impact on the sugar industry but does not indicate to what ex-
tent the economies might be able to adjust. 
 Potential welfare losses may be dampened if a country is able to diversify its econ-
omy and if capital and labour find remunerative alternative uses. LMC makes several 
calculations showing the potential welfare loss in terms of industry and export revenues, 
employment and government budget for ACP countries (LMC, 2004a) and LDCs (LMC, 
2004b). LMC shows that the countries most affected will be the high cost producers in the 
Caribbean region, which are Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Trinidad (see also box 5.1). 
At present these countries together have ACP Sugar Protocol export quota of 220,000 ton-
nes of raw sugar, representing export earnings of €115 million (against EU 2003/2004). 
And although sugar does not command macroeconomic importance in the Caribbean that it 
once did, it still represents an important contributor to national levels and livelihoods. At 
the same time, however, a quick scan of the economies indicates that there are alternative 
industries (oil, tourism, financial services) in the countries, which may absorb at least some 
of those displaced by the closure of the sugar industry (see also LMC, 2004a:52). How-
ever, also these LMC analyses lack the general economic framework necessary to indicate 
the macroeconomic implications of the policy.  
 
 
A reform of the EU sugar regime would have major implications for the Caribbean members of the ACP 
Sugar Protocol. Currently, the four Caribbean islands Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Trinidad & Tobago 
possess 16% of the SP quota. Jamaica has the largest quota (118,696 tonnes), while Barbados (32,097 ton-
nes), St. Kitts (15,591 tonnes) and Trinidad and Tobago (43,751 tonnes) have smaller quotas.a) Next to these 
four ACP countries, a fifth Caribbean island, Haiti has duty- and quota-free access to the European sugar 
market from 2009. However, this LDC is already a net-importer and no further investment in the Haitian 
sugar industry is expected (LMC, 2004a: 55). Two other Caribbean countries, Belize (40,349 tonnes) and 
Guyana (159,410 tonnes) also export sugar under the ACP Sugar Protocol. 
 Sugar production costs in the Caribbean Islands (and in Madagascar) are the highest within the ACP 
sugar group and future prospects show the same picture (LMC, 2004a: 11-12). Dependency on the European 
market for sugar exports is relatively high in the Caribbean, compared to the other SP members: 420,000 
tonnes out of total CARICOM sugar production of 710,000 tonnes is exported to the EU under the two ACP 
agreements (McDonald, 2004). Further, sugar is especially important for the economies of Belize and St. 
Kitts (in terms of GDP and export earnings) while Barbados and St. Kitts use a large share of their agricul-
tural land for sugarcane cultivation (LMC, 2003: 48-49). The sugar industry on the Caribbean islands as well 
as in Belize is expected to go through major restructuring, following preference erosion due to EU reform. 
Even a relatively modest EU price reduction of 17% will force the sugar industries on the four islands to 
cease production. Belize is expected to stop production when the price will be reduced by 38%, while Guy-
ana may keep its sugar industry, but will be forced to rationalise with further price cuts (LMC, 2004a: 25).  
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 Economic implications (loss of industry revenue, loss of foreign exchange earnings and loss of jobs) 
of a EU reform will be significant. Jamaica and Guyana will experience significant net losses, estimated more 
than USD25 million, due to their relatively high quotas (Milner et al., 2004: 805). Total industry revenue 
losses will be €181 million annually for the four islands. Belize may lose €38 million, while revenue losses in 
Guyana depend largely on the reform scenario implied (LMC, 2004a: 29). LMC predicts that under certain 
reform scenarios (fixed quotas and price reduction with unlimited access), the industry revenue of the Guy-
anese sugar industry may rise due to expansion, resulting in higher sales to regional and world markets. Due 
to the labour intensive character of Caribbean sugar production the consequences of EU policy reforms for 
employment levels will be significant. The total loss of jobs on the four islands will be 58,000, irrespective of 
the chosen reform scenario (LMC, 2004a: 32-33). Belize may eventually lose slightly more than 10,000 jobs, 
while employment levels in Guyana (currently almost 24,000 jobs) depend on the chosen reform scenario. 
ACP spokesman McDonald estimated that the sugar industry in CARICOM generates 125,000 direct and in-
direct jobs (McDonald, 2004: 4).  
 Barbados, St. Kitts and Trinidad are relatively rich countries, compared to the majority of the African 
members of the SP, but their vulnerability originates in their agricultural mono-economy. There are few agri-
cultural alternatives to sugarcane cultivation and the majority of workers in the agricultural sector is 
employed in the sugar industry (Laurent, 2004:3). LMC (2004a) recommends the four Caribbean islands and 
Belize to focus on diversification of the sugar industry and eventually on an exit strategy. However, sugar-
cane is the only crop that can withstand the hurricanes that frequently ravage the Caribbean islands. 
Alternative crops - bananas, coffee and vegetables - were all destroyed by hurricane Ivan in September 2004, 
but sugarcane was resilient.  
 The most important problem for the Caribbean countries is attracting investors to invest in value-
adding activities. For instance, Barbados would like to export higher priced branded sugar to the EU instead 
of bulk raw sugar, but commercial banks are unwilling to extend long-term loans to the sugar sector. Guyana 
is currently implementing a USD100 million plan to build an integrated sugar factory, refinery and biogas 
power plant. Furthermore, the country wants to use an extra 100,000 ha for sugarcane cultivation. At the end 
of the restructuring process Guyana claims to be able to compete with world market exporters like Australia 
(Bloomberg, 29 October 2004). However, a drastic price reduction in the EU would mean that Guyana would 
not be 'bankable' since the restructuring process would be partly financed by high sugar earnings from the 
Sugar Protocol. Sugar contributes 16% of Guyana's total GDP and it is the backbone of the Guyanese econ-
omy (LMC, 2004a:67).  
 As regards EU assistance to the countries' adjustment processes, the Caribbean countries seem suspi-
cious, because of the disappointing experiences that their banana producers had (Laurent, 2004; Newton, 
2004). The ACP countries state that it is important that the EU sets up a competitiveness fund as soon as pos-
sible in order to help the sugar industries to prepare for change (Jamaica Observer, 8 December 2004). 
Laurent argues that the most important lesson from the banana case is the need for a genuine commitment to 
economic diversification in the Caribbean countries (Laurent, 2004: 5). In this respect Jamaica may prove a 
difficult case, since the regional importance of sugarcane cultivation is significant and there will probably be 
strong demands to provide further support to the sugar industry (LMC, 2004a:68). However, to reduce the 
dependency on preferences and avoid problems on the long term, drastic economic diversification is the only 
solution.  
Box 5.1 Sugar in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
a) Barbados used to have a larger quota (50,000 tonnes), but could not fulfil its supply commitment in 2003, 
due to factory closures and therefore Barbados’ quota was reduced. 
 
 It is especially the issue of overall welfare implications of the EU sugar trade reforms 
in developing countries that is generally underexposed: most impact analyses so far are 
largely partial, focusing on the consequences for the sugar sector only, without taking into 
account the general welfare implications. Such a broader analysis is necessary to get a full 
picture of the impact of EU sugar reforms including the consequences of the EBA agree-
ment for non-sugar activities in the LDCs. Such an analysis provides a basis for discussion 
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about possible financial support to those countries that claim to lose from the changes in 
the EU sugar trade regime.  
 In the following chapters, case studies on Ethiopia, Mauritius and Brazil will further 
complement our earlier findings of and underpin our conclusions about the effects of EU 
policy changes on developing countries. Conclusions are drawn in the final chapter, syn-
thesising our model calculations, literature review and case study findings.  
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6. Impact of EU sugar policy reforms on selected third 
countries: case study Ethiopia1
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Ethiopia is a least developed country with a population of about 69 million and an annual 
per capita GDP of about USD90 (OECD, 2004). Agriculture in Ethiopia is the main eco-
nomic activity, contributing an estimated 45% of GDP with some 84% of the population 
(approximate 58 million people) earning a living directly or indirectly from agricultural ac-
tivities (FAO/WFP, 2004). Agricultural production is predominantly in the hands of 
peasant holdings. The sector is nearly totally dependent on rainfall, while low fertilizer use, 
susceptibility to pest and disease outbreaks and extensive highland soil erosion have meant 
high variability in year-to-year agricultural production. Food shortage is a common phe-
nomenon to a large part of the population. The relatively low performance of agriculture in 
Ethiopia is not the result of just technical constraints: price policies and the institutional 
environment also play a significant role FAO/WFP, 2004:5, 21-22). Indeed, the volatility 
of prices for agricultural products could seriously constrain production and adversely affect 
farm income, particularly when prices collapse in periods of bumper harvest. On the insti-
tutional side, the prevailing land tenure system in Ethiopia and the constraints concerning 
transferability of land rights, coupled with high population growth in the rural areas, will 
continue to induce disincentives for land investment leading to poor agricultural perform-
ance. 
 Ethiopia's main agricultural products for the national diet are cereals and pulses. 
Teff, indigenous to Ethiopia, occupies the largest area and has the largest cereal produc-
tion. Wheat and barley (in the highlands) and corn and sorghum (cultivated mostly at lower 
altitude) are main staple foods for a large part of the population. Major cash crops are cof-
fee, oilseeds and chat. These products are important agricultural export products of 
Ethiopia. Sugar is a relatively small cash crop in Ethiopia both in terms of cultivated area 
and in export revenues. Still, according to the Ministry of Industry in 1998, the share of the 
sugar industry in food and manufacturing industries were 58 and 10% respectively, while 
the share in GDP was only 2% (LMC, 2004b:A17). 
 
 
6.2 Structure of the Ethiopian sugar sector 
 
The Ethiopian sugar production is concentrated in central-Ethiopia, an area with fertile 
soils and good irrigation facilities. It is regarded as the part of Ethiopia that is most suitable 
for water-intensive sugar production and Ethiopian sugarcane yields are among the highest 
in the world, with 11.5 tonnes of sugar per harvested ha (LMC, 2004:9; IF, 2004). Sugar-
cane cultivation in central-Ethiopia occupies some 24,000 ha (LMC, 2004b). Currently 
                                                 
1 This chapter benefits from comments and contributions made by Wolde and Asseged (see reference list). 
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Ethiopia has four state owned sugar factories. The two oldest factories are situated in 
Wonji and Shoa, while two other factories are located in Metahara and in Finchaa. Wonji 
is located 100 km and Metahara 200 km southeast of the capital of Addis Ababa. The Fin-
chaa factory started its operations early 1999 and increased national processing capacity 
with 45% (US Embassy Ethiopia, 1999). All together the four factories produced an annual 
amount of around 270,000 tonnes of raw sugar in recent years (LMC, 2004b:9).  
 The factories are owned and supplied by three sugar estates. In addition to the estates 
and factories the Ethiopian sugar industry owns three confectionery plants producing 
sweets. All the factories, estates and confectionery plants are currently owned by the 
Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, a governmental organisation. Each estate has its own Board 
of Directors, appointed by the government. In 1992 the Ethiopian government started to 
implement macro-economic policy reforms, under which the privatization of public sector 
enterprises (UNCTAD, 2002). The Ethiopian sugar industry is still in the hands of the gov-
ernment. The Ethiopian sugar estates provide additional social services to their employees, 
such as hospitals, schools, housing and recreation facilities (LMC, 2004b:A18). Very few 
social service alternatives are available under state provision, and moreover these facilities 
are of higher standard than state facilities.  
 Large sugarcane cultivation was only introduced in Ethiopia in the 1950s, when the 
need for sugar as a sweetener became apparent. The introduction of sugar factories in 
Ethiopia was accompanied by 'large scale mechanised irrigated cane agriculture based on 
modern agricultural techniques' (Teklemariam, 1991:52). Today, most cane production 
comes from the estates, although the factories in Wonji and Shoa are also supplied by out-
growers. These are independent farmers who supply their own sugarcane on the basis of a 
cooperative arrangement. The total estimated number of jobs in the Ethiopian sugar indus-
try is 25,000 (Wolde and Asseged, 2005), including field workers, outgrowers, factory 
workers and Ethiopia Sugar Industry Support Center staff/30,000 (LMC, 2004b), which 
makes the sugar industry the main source of employment, with the beverages industry at 
the second place (AEFJN, 2004). 
 The Wonji/Shoa outgrowers account for some 1,115 ha of the total cultivated area of 
7,020 ha (Wolde and Asseged, 2005). Seven cooperatives / holdings have been established, 
with an average size of 160 ha. These cooperatives represent some 1,250 outgrowers 
(8,000 including family members). Sugarcane is the main source of income for these small 
farms with holdings between one and eight ha, although alternatives are the cultivation of 
rain-fed crops (wheat, maize, teff, barley, haricot beans, lentils and peas) and grazing of 
livestock. Nevertheless, sugar is by far the most profitable crop, with an average annual in-
come of ETB13,830 (€1,227) per hectare, which is three to four times higher than income 
from crop like beans or wheat.1
  
Government policies regarding sugar 
The sugar industry is not only state-owned and partly state-managed, the government also 
has considerable influence on price levels and consumption of sugar. The cane price is set 
by the government at ETB83.30/ton (€7.40/ton) and domestic consumption was long re-
stricted to stimulate exports and because domestic production was not sufficient. For this 
                                                 
1 1,00 Ethiopia Birr = 0.0887162 Euro (www.xe.com) viewed on 04/02/2005. 
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reason sugar was distributed on the basis of quotas in order to equate supply with demand 
(Teklemariam, 1991). Such distribution system does not exist anymore (Wolde and As-
seged, 2005). Furthermore, the government owns and allocates the rural land and therefore 
expansion of existing estates and the construction of new estates and factories is regulated 
by the government. Next to the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation the Ethiopia Sugar Industry 
Support Centre (ESISC) in Addis Ababa is the most important government organisation. 
The ESISC deals with all marketing activities, but they lack aggressive marketing strate-
gies and fail to coordinate the activities of the different factories. The factory managers 
complain about the centralised decision-making structures, which limit their capacities to 
decide on resources and marketing (IF, 2004).  
 
 
6.3 Trends in sugar production, domestic demand and exports 
 
Although sources are not fully consistent with each other, the annual production of sugar in 
Ethiopia is estimated around 300,000 tonnes of raw sugar in recent years (see table 6.1).1 
Sugar production stagnated in the beginning of the 1990s due to civil unrest and severe 
droughts. Since the mid-1990s production has shown a steep upward trend, while the 1999 
surge in production is caused by the establishment of the Finchaa Sugar Factory. Whether 
this production increase will continue, remains to be seen. One of the uncertainties is the 
climate, which even plays an important role in the most fertile parts of Ethiopia. However, 
as will be shown later on, the Ethiopian sugar industry has ambitious expansion plans. 
 
Table 6.1 Ethiopian sugar production 1995-2003 
Year ISO a) FO Licht b) FAOSTAT c) 
1995 129,322 182,000 139,000 
1996 171,917 98,000 182,000 
1997 172,217 197,000 186,000 
1998 172,571 272,000 197,000 
1999 234,709 255,000 272,000 
2000 250,869 297,000 255,000 
2001 305,000 323,000 297,000 
2002 286,898 294,000 294,000 
2003 n.a. 296,000 294,000 
a) ISO figures from: ISO Sugar Yearbook 2002; b) FO Licht figures from: International Sugar and Sweetener 
Report, vol. 136, no. 29, 5 October 2004; c) FAOSTAT: http://apps.fao.org/faostat 
 
 
Ethiopia's domestic sugar market 
The Ethiopian sugar production has always primarily been used for domestic consumption; 
for long the country had to import sugar to cover domestic demand, especially when ex-
ports were increasing. Figure 6.1 shows that on average consumption is increasing, but 
there are considerable annual differences. Consumption per capita is relatively low com-
pared to African standards: 4.0 kg against 13.8 kg in Sudan and 21.8 kg in Kenya (Wolde 
                                                 
1 An explanation could be found in the use of different calculation methods. The Ethiopian sugar harvest pe-
riod is between November and June, but when the production is reviewed per calendar year the production 
statistics may differ from the one based on the harvest period.  
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and Asseged, 2005). The reasons for this low level of consumption are twofold: high do-
mestic prices and the quota system that used to equate sugar supply with demand. While 
costs of production are estimated below USD250/ton, domestic prices in Ethiopia are be-
tween USD400-475/ton (LMC, 2004b). Therefore, sugar is considered a luxury good in 
Ethiopia. Consequently, it may be expected that domestic consumption will increase when 
consumer income rise and quotas to restrict demand are abolished. Current annual domes-
tic consumption is 232,000 tonnes (average 2000-2002) and it is predicted that it will rise 
with an annual percentage of 7.4% to 530,000 tonnes in 2015 (LMC, 2004b). Sugar sales 
in Ethiopia are currently made through auction by the factories or the ESISC, representing 
the estates. The base price is fixed at ETB4,110/ton (€365/ton) ex-factory. 
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Figure 6.1 Ethiopian sugar production, consumption and export 1995-2002 
Source: ISO (2003). 
 
 
Export and import of sugar 
In the previous decades Ethiopia has been a net-importer of sugar in most years but the 
country has also been able to export around 30,000 tonnes (15% of total production) to 
neighbouring Djibouti occasionally in the 1980s (Teklemariam, 1991:50). When produc-
tion levels declined because of civil unrest in the beginning of the 1990s and severe 
droughts in the mid-1990s, Ethiopia had to import white sugar. These imports came mainly 
from Brazil (the major supplier), India and Kenya. Next to these countries, the EU supplied 
white sugar at that time, but the EU exports to Ethiopia have been relatively small. Overall, 
in the past fifty years, Ethiopia has been able to meet the demands of domestic consump-
tion - mostly because of the implementation of restrictive consumption quotas - and 
therefore import levels have been low. Ethiopia has imported relatively small amounts of 
refined sugar in the last fifteen years, ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 tonnes annually (primar-
ily from Sudan and Djibouti).  
 After the period of drought in 1995-1996, exports resumed in 1996 according to ISO 
estimates (see figure 6.1). The construction of a new factory in 1999 and the consecutive 
increase in sugar cane production resulted in Ethiopia becoming a regular exporter of raw 
sugar with an average net exportable surplus of 49,000 tonnes between 2000 and 2003 
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(LMC, 2004b). Recent export figures indicate quantities ranging from 50,000 to 80,000 
tonnes (according to FAO), or 15-30% of the annual production. These exports went to the 
EU and to Djibouti, amounting USD20.4 million in 2002 (Ethiopian Export Promotion 
Agency, 2002; FAO, 2004).1
 
New export opportunities for Ethiopia? 
LMC International (2002) has estimated the production costs of sugar in the ACP, MFN 
and EBA countries. These production costs of raw sugar include cost of growing sugarcane 
(including transport to the mill) and the cost of processing sugarcane to produce raw sugar. 
According to these estimated sugar production in Ethiopia has among the lowest costs in 
the world, with variable costs of raw sugar production estimated to be as low as €75/ton 
and fixed costs amounting €134/ton. Full (variable plus fixed) production costs are 
€209/ton. Only Zimbabwe, Sudan and Mozambique are able to produce at lower costs than 
Ethiopia (as these countries have production costs in the range of €165 - 185/ton). This 
compares to €250/ton for Brazil (northeast part of the country) - widely seen as the cheap-
est producer in the world (LMC International, 2002:145). The low production costs should 
allow the Ethiopian sugar production and export to grow, when market opportunities 
would occur. 
 Ethiopia used to have a substantial share of Djibouti's sugar imports, but recently 
Brazil has considerably gained share in that country's sugar imports. Fortunately, Ethiopia 
has good trade relations with Djibouti, as it needs its harbour for exporting Ethiopian agri-
cultural products (and other goods) overseas. Trade with Eritrea came to a halt because of 
the war between the two countries. ISO figures indicate that Eritrea imports its sugar 
mainly from South Africa. Uganda, although a relatively small country, could serve as an-
other export market for Ethiopia, but again South Africa has taken already the largest part 
(two-third) of the country's imports. The southern neighbour Kenya also imports its sugar 
from South Africa (38% of its import needs in 2002). Sudan is not a potential export mar-
ket for Ethiopian sugar as that country is also a low-cost producer and a net exporter. 
However, the instable political situation in the southern and western parts of Sudan is not 
favourable to the Sudanese sugar export. Further, trade with the eastern neighbour Somalia 
is modest due to the instable political and economic situation in that country. ISO figures 
show that Brazil accounts for most of the sugar import in Somalia (58% in 2002), while no 
sugar is bought from Ethiopia. Other potential nearby markets for Ethiopia could be 
Yemen and Egypt, but according 2002 ISO trade data these countries took near 80% of 
their import needs from Brazil. Until now, Ethiopia has not benefited much from the fact 
that its sugar production costs are among the lowest in the world, for Brazil (North and 
West Africa) and South Africa (South and East Africa) already dominate the African mar-
ket.  
 
                                                 
1 According to ISO the Ethiopian sugar export in 2002 has been entirely diverted to Djibouti. However, in 
2002 Ethiopia was also allowed to export sugar to the European Union under the EBA agreement, but the 
ISO 2002 export figures for Ethiopia do not take these exports to the EU into account, while the ISO records 
EU import of 15,618 tonnes of Ethiopian raw sugar. This volume has been exported to Portugal for refining. 
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6.4 Consequences of EU sugar reform for Ethiopia's export opportunities under the 
EBA agreement 
  
Given the tough competition in the nearby regional African markets, the opening of the EU 
market for Ethiopian sugar under the EBA agreement is considered to create a significant 
new outlet for Ethiopian raw sugar. Starting with duty-free imports of around 15,000 ton-
nes of raw sugar in 2001/2002, the EU has promised to increase that volume by 15% every 
following year to 41,342 tonnes in 2009, while from July 2009 onwards Ethiopian raw 
sugar can enter the EU duty-free and without quota restrictions. Because of its low produc-
tion costs Ethiopia is expected to export increasing volumes of raw sugar to the European 
Union under the EBA agreement. Projected costs of supplying raw sugar to the EU in 2009 
are estimated €287/ton, including freight and fobbing (LMC, 2002:150). With that cost 
level Ethiopia remains one of the most competitive countries with free access to the EU 
sugar market.  
 The Commission's July 2004 proposal to reform the Union's sugar policy includes an 
intervention price reduction for raw sugar to €329/ton. This will subsequently mean an ero-
sion of preferences under the EBA agreement and in 2009, with an export quota under 
EBA of 41,342 tonnes, Ethiopia would have €8 million less export revenues than it would 
have under unchanged EU price conditions. On the other hand, the European reform pack-
age also includes the reduction of EU subsidised exports to the Middle East and North 
Africa, while world sugar prices may rise after EU reform (in the short-run. This may lead 
to better market opportunities at regional and world markets, although other low-cost pro-
ducers such as Brazil and Sudan will also try to benefit from those opportunities. 
Moreover, (some) EBA countries may find increasing opportunities at the EU market as, 
despite their SP export quota to the Union, inefficient ACP sugar producers will not be 
able to export to the EU at profitable rates. Ethiopia is believed to be one of the countries 
that could benefit from this development as an EU intervention price of €329/ton of raw 
sugar is expected to leave a sufficient margin for the sugar industry, since the production 
costs of Ethiopian sugar are estimated below USD250/ton (f.o.b.). LMC and Ethiopian ex-
perts evaluate Ethiopian export prospects on the European as well as on the regional 
market positive, but very different. 
 Clearly the benefits of the EBA agreement depend on the difference between the EU 
intervention price for raw sugar and the import price (including c.i.f. and duties) of Ethio-
pian raw sugar, but the key determinant for the development impact of the EBA 
agreements is the future expansion of the sugar industry. LMC (2002; 2004b:33) explains 
that the level of investment in the Ethiopian sugar industry is influenced by the internal 
rate of return (IRR) required by investors on their investments. Whereas an internal rate of 
return of 20% is assumed to be required by most investors in LDCs, LMC argues that the 
Ethiopian government, which is the main investor in the Ethiopian sugar industry, will ac-
cept an internal rate of return of 10% (LMC, 2004b:34). Under that condition, and at 33% 
EU price reduction, projected investments in production capacity are estimated USD443 
million, which results in a production level of 938,000 tonnes over a period of seven to 
eight years (LMC, 2004b:39,42). In this scenario, Ethiopia would be able to export 
464,000 tonnes to the EU. As a result, consequences are significant for industry revenue (+ 
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€308 million), net export earnings (+ €70 million), employment (54,000 extra jobs) and 
land utilisation (44,000 more ha).  
 Ethiopian analysts project an even stronger increase of the country's sugar produc-
tion, but these projections lack a sound study of possible markets for Ethiopian sugar. 
Wolde and Asseged (2005) indicate that the prospect of external markets opportunities and 
growing domestic sugar demand are major motives of the Ethiopian sugar industry's ex-
pansion programmes for the existing as well as for the development of two new sugar 
plants. Expansion and upgrading are also necessary to remain competitive, since Ethiopia's 
sugar factories are relatively small and use outdated equipment (LMC, 2004b12; IF, 2004). 
The milling capacity of the four existing factories are planned to increase from 12,500 to 
33,000 tonnes cane/day. This expansion will require an additional 33,800 ha and provides 
extra employment for almost 29,000 people (Wolde and Asseged, 2005). The ESISC will 
further be responsible for the development of two new estates / factories in the middle and 
lower Awash basin (Wolde and Asseged, 2005), which will require about 70,000 ha of 
land and provide an additional 19,000 jobs. When these latter plants are in operation, total 
employment in the sugar industry will be 72,000, while land utilisation will be 127,800 ha. 
The total investment costs of the expansion program are estimated ETB8.123 billion or 
€721 million, which figure is about the same as the country's total GDP (!). This for the 
country enormous investment will have to be covered by the industry, the government and 
bank loans. Production is estimated to increase to 1.66 million tonnes in 2012, five times 
the production level in 2002. Wolde and Asseged (2005) are not very clear about the mar-
kets for all this produce. They expect the domestic consumption levels to (almost) double 
to around 500,000 tonnes. The rest - 1.15 million tonnes - should be exported to regional 
and the EU market. The authors, however, do not go into any details about market poten-
tials: they refer to interviews with the sugar industry staff stating that Ethiopia could serve 
EU and regional markets.  
 
 
6.5 Alternatives and outlook for sugar production and export 
 
The increase in production can create new export opportunities for Ethiopia, but it is still 
unclear whether there are sufficient markets available for the export of Ethiopian sugar. 
There are no details about the country's future export markets, besides LMC's indication 
that Ethiopia's future access to regional markets is estimated 51,000 tonnes (LMC, 
2004b:22). Therefore, Ethiopia could also look for alternatives to sugar exports. For in-
stance, expansion of sugar production may be more profitable when the Ethiopian 
government uses the sugarcane molasses to produce anhydrous ethanol that can be blended 
with petrol (at a ratio of 10%). Ethiopia has an annual oil import of USD220 million, so the 
ethanol-blending could save USD22 million (Ethiopian Reporter, 2003). In 2002, the Fin-
chaa sugar factory already inaugurated an ethanol factory, which produces 8 million litres 
of ethanol that can be blended with kerosene and can be used as household cooking fuel 
(Addis Tribune, 2002). Whether ethanol production would be a spearhead of government 
policy and/or would be economically attractive, is unknown. 
 Next to diversification within the sugar chain, diversification away from sugar 
should also be considered. However, diversification and expansion of the sugar sector in 
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Ethiopia was originally intended to reduce the dependence on coffee exports, Ethiopia's 
most important export commodity, which had also experienced a considerable decrease in 
profitability, due to instable market prices. Ethiopia was indeed successful to diversify its 
agricultural exports by increasing the exports of sugar, crude organic material, sesame 
seed, beans and cereals; the relative contribution of coffee to agricultural exports decreased 
from 79% in 1999 to 46% in 2002 (FAO, 2004). It remains to be seen whether sugar is a 
viable alternative on the long term, with eroding EU preferences and increasing competi-
tion in East and South Africa. 
 In any case, when the expansion plans of the Ethiopian sugar industry are imple-
mented this will enhance development in the regions where new factories are built. The 
Lower and Mid Awash basins, possible locations for two new factories, are currently rela-
tively underdeveloped (low incomes and poor social services) (LMC, 2004b:A19). There 
may also be opportunities for expansion of outgrowers' production, but this remains un-
clear.  
 
 
6.6 Conclusions  
 
The EU sugar trade reform offers increased market access to the Ethiopian sugar industry. 
Seen the low costs of production, the sugar industry may very well benefit from unlimited 
access after 2009 under the EBA agreement. LMC estimates that this export volume may 
increase to 464,000 tonnes (which is 45% of the 1 million tonnes expected from all LDCs 
under this scenario, LMC, 2004b:49). Expansion of production and exports of this size re-
quires huge investments in existing and new sugar plants and is thus conditional to the 
availability of financial means. The government may accept relatively modest rates of re-
turn on its investment, but if expansion of the industry would need private (foreign) 
investors who would calculate with rates of return of 20%, supply effects may be much 
lower than simulated by LMC. Ethiopian analysts point at expansion and upgrading pro-
grammes that will result in production levels five times as high as in 2002. Domestic 
consumption may double, leaving about 1.1 million tonnes available for exports. Unclear 
in these projections is whether all this sugar production will find enough foreign markets. 
Especially when other regional low-cost producers such as Malawi, Sudan and Zambia will 
expand and increase their exports, competition at the regional markets will be tough. As for 
the EU market, Ethiopia is expected to become one of the larger exporters, but it seems 
very unlikely that Ethiopia will be able to export over 1 million tonnes of raw sugar to the 
EU. 
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7. Impact of EU sugar policy reforms on selected third 
countries: case study Mauritius 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the 17th century the Dutch introduced the cultivation of sugar on the small island of 
Mauritius. Ever since, sugar cane cultivation has been the backbone of the island's agricul-
tural economy. In 2003, sugar cane covered more than 74,000 ha, which is 70% of total 
arable land of 106,000 ha (Central Statistics Office, 2004; FAO, 2004). In 2003 sugar pro-
duction contributed 3.3% to GDP, or 53% of total agricultural GDP. Furthermore, sugar is 
among the country's most important export commodities, accounting for 20% of total ex-
ports. This is due to the country's lucrative trade agreements with the EU and the USA, in 
which it benefits from high preferential prices. Under the ACP Sugar Protocol, Mauritius is 
allowed to export an annual amount of 491,000 tonnes of raw sugar or 38% of the total 
ACP export quota to the EU. Mauritius may export an additional 42,000 tonnes under the 
SPS agreement with the EU. The country may use a TRQ to export 12,600 tonnes raw 
sugar annually to the US. The country's annual sugar production normally amounts around 
600,000 tonnes of raw sugar.  
 Mauritius is a small island with 1.2 million inhabitants and has the second highest 
GDP per capita in Africa. The country has a rather well diversified economy, partly the re-
sult of an intended government policy to reduce the dependency on sugar. Mauritius 
achieved 6% annual economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s (WTO, 2001). In the 
same period, the contribution of agriculture to the GDP declined to 6%, whereas manufac-
turing increased to 24% of GDP in 2001 (World Bank, 2004). This indicates the success 
the country had in its attempt to diversify the economy and reduce its dependency on 
sugar. At present, exports of textiles (mainly clothing) and other manufactured products 
account for a large part of foreign currency income, next to sugar. However, since the 
sugar industry is vastly linked to the country's history, the agricultural economy and land 
use, what will be the future for the sugar production in Mauritius when the sugar trade 
preferences erode because of the EU policy reforms? This chapter is to shed light on that 
question taking into account the country's possibilities to further diversify its (agricultural) 
economy from sugar.  
 
 
7.2 Structure of the Mauritian sugar sector and government policies 
 
Agriculture (production and land use) in Mauritius is dominated by sugar cane cultivation. 
Regarding the structure of the primary sugar sector a distinction can be made between the 
large sugar estates, accounting for about 45% of the 74,000 ha of sugar cane, and the small 
sugar planters owning the remaining 55% of the cultivated sugar cane land. The large 
planters own estates that range in size from roughly 750 to 5,500 ha, while the small farm-
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ers grow sugar on plots ranging from less than one to 400 ha.1 LMC estimates the number 
of workers in the Mauritian sugar industry (land and factory workers plus employees at the 
large sugar estates) at 28,000 in 2001 (LMC, 2004a: 46). More recent figures point out that 
the employment in the sugar cane sector in 2003 was 19,870, while the number of owner 
and tenant planters numbered 28,171 (Central Statistics Office, 2004). It is also noted that 
due to a Voluntary Retirement Scheme the number of workers had been reduced with al-
most 8,000 between 2001 and 2002 (Central Statistics Office, 2004). 
 The primary sector (sugar cane growers and estates) and the processing sector (sugar 
mills/factories) in Mauritius are strongly interlinked, for every large planter has his own 
factory. Sugar cane harvested at estates is processed in the factories of the large estates. 
The small farmers can send their harvest to these factories too. Ten years ago the govern-
ment owned one estate and the British multinational Lonrho owned two estates and 
controlled another (US), but now the sugar sector in Mauritius is completely privatised and 
managed by domestic firms. In 2001, 14 sugar mills/factories were in operation (LMC, 
2004a). However, restructuring plans have been made and are already being executed in 
part to reduce the number of mills substantially to 7 or 8. 
 
Government policy 
Since the 1990s the sugar industry has been subject to restructuring plans in order to in-
crease its competitiveness. The Sugar Industry Efficiency Act of 1988 was aimed at both 
increasing the efficiency of sugar production and stimulating diversification within and 
away from the sugar industry, while the 1997 Blue Print on the Centralisation of Sugar 
Milling Operations in Mauritius set out a framework for the rationalisation of sugar milling 
operations, thereby reducing the number of mills from seventeen in 1996 to eleven in 2003. 
Actual restructuring started in 2001 when the Mauritius Sugar Authority presented the 
Sugar Sector Strategic Plan 2001-2005. The Mauritius Sugar Authority operates under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food Technology and Natural Resources and acts as an intermedi-
ary between government and organisations involved in sugar production (processors, sugar 
cane growers, research institutes, etc.). The sugar industry realised the need for further re-
structuring in order to improve its competitiveness.  
 Sugar production in Mauritius faces serious bottlenecks. Climatic conditions are not 
very suitable for growing sugar cane, while the hilly and rocky land limits possibilities for 
mechanical harvesting and for irrigation. Overall, sugar production costs in Mauritius are 
twice as high as in several other (East) African countries. Within the framework of the Plan 
the government supports investments in cultivation mechanisation and irrigation, facilitates 
a smooth labour outflow (through retirement schemes and adapting labour and pension 
laws), and assists the industry (through research) to increase the industry's value added 
through the expansion of production and export of speciality sugars (Ministry of Agricul-
ture of Mauritius, 2001). The Plan aims at reducing the number of sugar mills, as well as 
the number of sugar workers, while the remaining mills should produce more efficient and 
ensure that export commitments such as under the ACP Sugar Protocol are fulfilled. To 
reach the latter, an average annual production of 620,000 tonnes of sugar is considered 
necessary. Mauritius is currently taking steps within the context of a new accelerated Stra-
                                                 
1 U.S. Library of Congress Country Studies: http://countrystudies.us/mauritius/16.htm (01-02-2005).  
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tegic Plan 2005-2015 to be competitive in the context of the EU sugar reform (Roy, 2005). 
Details of this Plan are, however, not yet published.  
 
 
7.3 Sugar production and export trends in Mauritius 
 
For decades sugar production levels in Mauritius have been rather stable between 600,000 
and 700,000 tonnes, with the exception of periods with cyclones, droughts or excessive 
rainfall. In the 1960s and 1970s the production level sometimes exceeded 700,000 tonnes 
(ISO, 1976: 7) and Mauritius was among the ten largest exporters of the world. figure 7.1 
shows production levels over the period 1994-2003. In this decade production levels 
ranged between 500,000 and 650,000 tonnes per year.  
 
Mauritius' domestic sugar market 
Annual average domestic consumption of sugar amounts between 40,000 and 43,000 ton-
nes in recent years, which is less than 10% of the country's sugar production. The domestic 
sugar demand is almost entirely provided for by imports from South Africa (and recently 
also from Mozambique). South African sugar is much cheaper than Mauritian sugar and 
cheap imports thus benefit the Mauritian consumers. But the most important reason for im-
porting sugar is that this allows Mauritius to export its domestic produced sugar to the 
attractive markets in the EU and the USA as part of preferential trade agreements. Exports 
to these two markets are bound by quota, but may reach 545,000 tonnes, which is very near 
to the country's normal level of production. When there is an abundant harvest, like in 
2001, imports decline and Mauritian sugar is consumed domestically as well. Contrary to 
some other developing countries, it is expected that the level of domestic sugar consump-
tion in Mauritius will not rise significantly in the next five years. Domestic consumption in 
2010 is projected to be between 44,000 and 45,000 tonnes (LMC, 2004a: 18), which im-
plies an annual per capita intake of 27 kg sugar.  
 
Export of sugar 
Mauritian sugar export levels show the same development as production levels (figure 7.1). 
The country produces mainly raw sugar for exports, as well as small quantities of white 
speciality sugar, mainly for the European market. Between 1994 and 2003 the export levels 
fluctuated but were on average in the range of 550,000 to 600,000 tonnes. With this export 
level, Mauritius is among the largest sugar exporters of the world (see also table 2.1 in 
chapter 2). Most of the sugar is exported to the EU under the ACP Sugar Protocol and the 
Special Preferential Sugar agreement. According to figures of the Mauritius Sugar Syndi-
cate, between 2000-2003 Mauritius exported between 95-98% of its raw sugar exports to 
the EU (Central Statistics Office, 2004). The country thus greatly benefits from these trade 
agreements with the Union, which can be traced back to the 1950s when Mauritius was 
also a large supplier of sugar under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Small quantities 
of sugar are exported to Israel, Switzerland and the USA (ISO, 2004). Mauritius does not 
export its sugar to other African countries in the Southeast region, due to its relatively high 
production costs (far above the world market price). Indeed, for African standards, Mauri-
tius is a high-cost producer. Since prices received in the EU and the USA are three times 
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higher than the world market prices, sugar production in Mauritius is profitable. Trade in 
speciality sugars does not take place under special trade agreements and its production ap-
pears profitable against world market prices.  
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Figure 7.1 Mauritius: sugar production and export 1994-2003 
Source: Central Statistics Office Mauritius, 2004 (figures of the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate). 
 
 
7.4 Consequences of European sugar reform and the EBA agreement for Mauri-
tius' sugar export  
 
Since 2001, when the EBA agreement came into force, several studies have been under-
taken to estimate the effects of this trade agreement for the ACP producers (LMC, 2002; 
UNCTAD, 2001). These studies indicate that imports under the EBA agreement will 
gradually replace the imports under the SPS agreement (of 217,000 tonnes in 2003/4). Ad-
ditionally, the quota- and duty-free access for LDCs would force down the EU-price, 
which would also affect the ACP producers. Furthermore, the July 2004 policy reform 
proposal by the European Commission is very likely to have significant impact on the 
prices paid for ACP sugar under the SP. Lower prices in its exports to the EU is expected 
to reduce Mauritius export position on the world sugar market importantly as Mauritius 
sugar production is unlikely to be able to compete internationally against world market 
conditions. 
 A study of the European Court of Auditors (2001) reveals that production costs in 
Mauritius are double those of low cost producers Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In it's 
2002 study LMC estimates full costs of raw sugar production in Mauritius at €454/ton. 
Adding costs for insurance and freight (Cif) to it would imply an entrance price at the EU 
market of €506/ton. Projections of LMC point out that Mauritius might be able to reduce 
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its costs of production by around 10% towards an entry price of €464/ton.1 This means that 
the current EU intervention price of raw sugar (€524/ton) could be reduced 11-12% at most 
to keep sugar exports to the EU attractive for the Mauritian sugar industry. 
 Another LMC study on the implications of European sugar reform for developing 
countries focuses primarily on the ACP countries and also discusses the possibilities for 
addressing the negative impact of preference erosion (LMC, 2004a). The report points at 
the wide range of costs among ACP sugar producers. According to LMC Mauritius can be 
classified as a medium-cost producer. LMC estimates that the existing plans for the indus-
try restructuring will not result in a reduction of the sugar production, but will make sugar 
processing more efficient through the rationalisation and concentration of mills.  
 However, assuming a EU intervention price cut towards €329/ton with unlimited ac-
cess to the EU (thus, without preferential quota) LMC indicates that the Mauritian sugar 
industry will need further restructuring, beyond the existing plans, in order to remain fi-
nancially viable following preference erosion. The country would be unable to supply EU 
markets in the event of a 37% fall in prices. Indeed, the high level of dependence of the 
Mauritius industry on the EU market for its sugar sales (some 80-90% of Mauritius sugar 
production is sold to the EU) means that the industry is extremely vulnerable to reductions 
in the EU price. A 37% EU price reduction therefore implies an on average 30-33% lower 
selling prices received by the Mauritian sugar industry. Such a price decline will result in a 
significant fall in the industry's profitability if the sugar industry is not further restructured. 
LMC has good confidence in a successful restructuring process in the Mauritian sugar in-
dustry and, therefore, projects that the country will be able to maintain its exports levels to 
the Union, even at EU prices of €329/ton for raw sugar. Of course, the price cut will have a 
substantial negative impact on the industry's revenue (through a reduction of export earn-
ings) and a negative impact on employment (through restructuring). Moreover, as the sugar 
sector is such an important part of the Mauritian agricultural sector, the impact of a EU 
price cut to €329/ton on the relative contribution of agriculture to GDP would be signifi-
cant too (in this case a reduction of more than 40%). Simulations of a fully liberalised EU 
policy scenario would imply that sugar production in Mauritius would disappear (LMC, 
2004a:26). In any case, a raw sugar price reduction from €524/ton to €329/ton would mean 
an income loss of €96 million (on the basis of the current SP export volume of 491,000 
tonnes) (Laurent, 2004).  
 
 
7.5 Alternatives and outlook for sugar production and export 
 
Alternative export markets 
Having discussed the relatively high costs of production in Mauritius as well as the diffi-
culties of keeping a profitable sugar sector under a reformed European regime, it may be 
clear that the Mauritian sugar industry cannot compete on the world market with its lower 
and unpredictable prices. Mauritius will surely not be able to compete with Brazil, Thai-
land and Australia, which are the dominant players on this residual market. And even if 
                                                 
1 According to Roy (2005) the sugar industry has indeed reduced production costs significantly in recent 
years. 
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there were some export opportunities, prices are probably too low to offer long-terms pros-
pects to the industry to cover full production costs.  
 The gloomy long-term prospects for the Mauritian sugar industry have influenced the 
business strategies of several sugar companies. Recently, the South African based sugar gi-
ant Illovo pulled back from sugar production in Mauritius, due to the absence of expansion 
opportunities. Moreover, the company considers the government-imposed profit-sharing 
quite unfavourable as growers get 80% and the industry the remaining 20% (interview with 
Illovo representatives, 26/11/2004). Next to Illovo's draw back, some Mauritian sugar 
companies have invested in Mozambique and Zambia, two low-cost producers that are ex-
pected to benefit from the EBA agreement (LMC, 2002). The sugar production in 
Mozambique by the Mauritius consortium started in 2001 with a share of 75% in the Sena 
Holding. The Mauritians, with their experience in research and marketing, can surely con-
tribute to the development of the Mozambican sugar industry. Furthermore, the 
Mozambican activities can provide jobs for a number of Mauritians, who deliver the know-
how needed for sugar production.  
 
Diversification within the sugar sector  
Since the opportunities for finding new export markets for raw (or refined) sugar are very 
limited, Mauritius has used its know-how in sugar technology to develop a range of so-
called special sugars. These special sugars 'preserve the goodness of the cane juice through 
its molasses content, its mineral nutrients and distinctive flavour' (Roy, 2004:7). Starting in 
the 1980s, the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate successfully marketed a range of seventeen spe-
cial sugars. Nowadays, about 70,000 tonnes of these special sugars are sold at relatively 
high prices in the EU and the US as well as on the world market. The effective marketing 
strategy helped Mauritius to build the image of a producer of high quality special cane 
sugars. However, the market for special sugars is relatively small and competition is fierce 
and increasing. Fifteen years ago the World Bank (1989) already reported that this would 
constrain the expansion of special sugar production and although Mauritius is still the 
world leader, innovation and good marketing will be very important in the future (Roy, 
2003). Next to the development and marketing of special sugars, Mauritius has been using 
the sugar by-product bagasse for the generation of 20 to 25% of the total electricity de-
mand. This has significantly reduced the country's dependence on imported oil. The 2001-
2005 Sector's Strategic Plan refers to the objective to generate as much electricity from ba-
gasse as possible to relief the country's costs of importing fossil fuel from overseas. 
Furthermore, the industry is encouraged to look at possibilities of using sugar for ethanol 
production (Ministry of Agriculture of Mauritius, 2001). These efforts will need further 
encouragement when EU policy reforms will be applied and affect EU import prices under 
the ACP Sugar Protocol. 
 
Diversification away from sugar 
Since the opportunities for diversification within the sugar chain are not exhaustive, Mauri-
tius has looked at possibilities for diversification outside the sugar sector. Alternative cash 
crops are few; Mauritius produces tea and tobacco but in small quantities. Essentially Mau-
ritius is an agricultural mono-economy, with limited opportunities to grow other big cash 
crops. Further, a political dimension of diversification is self-sufficiency (food security) 
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and this resulted in an increase of food crop production in Mauritius, thereby limiting the 
expansion of cash crops (see e.g. for developments in the 1970s and 1980s: World Bank, 
1989). In recent years the production of flowers, and of fruits and vegetables has increased 
for which overseas markets are found in Europe, Asia, Australia and the US, but these 
crops remain relatively small. More recently, the 2003 Non-Sugar Sector Strategic Plan 
presents a reorientation strategy for achieving a 'modern agriculture'. The central aim is a 
transition from traditional practices towards a more sophisticated, technology-based ap-
proach to agriculture. Some specific objectives in this respect are increasing self-
sufficiency in agricultural sectors, increasing quality levels, optimizing export opportuni-
ties and conforming to the international norms governing food safety (Ministry of 
Agriculture of Mauritius, 2003).  
 Since the early 1960s Mauritius has tried to diversify its economy towards activities 
in industry and services, with noticeable success during the 1980s and 1990s. Especially 
the tertiary sector (tourism, financial services) has gained importance and now delivers 
more than 70% of GDP. At present, the Mauritian exports largely depend on the manufac-
turing industry, mainly textiles and clothing. The diversification process took off after 
some years of economic decline around 1980, caused by natural disasters (cyclones) and 
economic disequilibria (budget deficits, inflation). Economic growth was led by production 
in the export processing zones (EPZ), a competitive exchange rate and by savings and in-
vestment rates exceeding 20% of GDP (World Bank, 2002). Mauritius was the first 
African country to create EPZs. Unlike later investors in other African EPZs, most inves-
tors in Mauritius' EPZs were nationals. Those Mauritian entrepreneurs, whose ancestors 
came from India, France, China and other countries, took advantage of links with their 
countries of origin. Exceptional export performance propelled Mauritius to higher stan-
dards of living. On a per capita basis, Mauritius' manufactured exports are more than 150 
times that of the average Sub-Saharan African country. Today, Mauritian exports exceed 
USD1 billion in industrial and processed products; the median African country exports 
about USD28 million of similar goods. Mauritian investors have also become important 
players in the development of lower end textile production at low labour cost in neighbour-
ing countries. As textile has become an important area in the Mauritian economy, the 
country fears that the end of the Multi Fibre Agreement may have a negative impact on key 
economic parameters (Roy, 2005). Today, Mauritius' GDP per capita is the second highest 
in Africa.  
 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
The Mauritian sugar industry dominates the country's agricultural sector. The sector is 
heavily dependent on the EU market, at which it sells around 90-95% of the annual exports 
under the ACP Sugar Protocol and Special Preferential Sugar agreements. The industry's 
production plus transport costs are estimated around €464/ton, taking into account the im-
pact of present restructuring process in the sector. EU sugar reforms implying an 
intervention price of €329/ton would enforce further restructuring of the Mauritian sugar 
industry, with significant negative effects on the industry's revenues and employment.  
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 Mauritius has anticipated the upcoming EU sugar reforms to some extent, both with 
sugar restructuring plans as well as to encourage further diversification of its economy. 
Still, the agricultural economy mainly relies on sugar export possibilities to the EU. Given 
its level of production costs - even after further restructuring - Mauritius is not expected to 
play an important role on the international sugar market, even when world prices would 
rise considerably. The best EU reform option for Mauritius would be a reduction of EU 
production quotas, whereby the price remains at a remunerative level. Clearly, for Mauri-
tius the price is the most important aspect of the export agreement, while a reduction of the 
quota would be in line with the current process of rationalisation.  
 The ACP countries are now pushing the European Competitiveness Fund to finance 
the restructuring of their sugar industries. Further Mauritius will come up with an Action 
Plan for 2005-2015 for further restructuring as a reaction on the EU sugar reform. One im-
portant aspect that has to be tackled is the indebtedness of the sugar producers (USD200 
million1). Further, the acreage under sugar cane as well as the level production are ex-
pected to be reduced (Li Yuen Fong, 2004). Yet, it remains to be seen whether sugar 
production in Mauritius would be competitive on the long run.  
 
                                                 
1 http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=26607 (viewed on 02/02/2005). 
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8. The impact of the EU sugar policy reform on Brazil's 
sugar industry1
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Brazil is the world's largest sugar producer and exporter. The country accounts for around 
15% of the world sugar production and for some 25-30% of global exports in recent years 
(see table 2.1 and 2.2). Sugar exports have played an import role in the Brazilian economic 
development since the 1970s. In 1999, exports reached a record level of 13 million tonnes, 
mainly thanks to the liberalization in the ethanol sector. The end of the Alcohol Program, 
through which the government stimulated alcohol production out of sugar cane with guar-
anteed prices and subsidies, brought an important shift from ethanol to sugar production 
and exports. Technology was available to support the shift, which enabled Brazil to 
quickly increase its sugar production and exports. 
 This chapter is to analyse the impact of the EU sugar policy reform on sugar produc-
tion and export opportunities in Brazil. The work is organised as follow. Section 2 
describes the structure of the Brazilian sugar sector. Section 3 discusses the sugar produc-
tion and export trends of Brazil. Next, section 4 focuses on the consequences of the 
European policy reforms for the Brazilian sugar export opportunities. Section 5 addresses 
the alternative market opportunities for the Brazilian sugar industry and the possibilities for 
diversification. A final section draws some conclusions. 
 
 
8.2 Structural features of the Brazilian sugar sector and government policies 
 
The sugar industry is an important sector for the Brazilian economy, with a share of 7.0% 
in agricultural exports in 2003 (Ministry of Agriculture, 2004:30). The production of sugar 
cane spreads through the Centre-Southern (state of Sao Paulo) and North-North-eastern re-
gions of the country (Pernambuco and Alagoas), in two crop periods, and occupies 24% 
percent of the Brazilian arable land, i.e., around 5.5 million ha. The state of Sao Paulo is 
the largest producer and accounts for 72% of the total production, followed by the North-
east region with 15%, and other states with 13%. While sugar production used to be con-
centrated in the Northeast, Sao Paulo has now become the centre of the booming Brazilian 
sugar industry. 
 Sugar cane production has increased very rapidly over the last decades, from around 
80 million tonnes in 1970 to 340 million tonnes in 2003 (see table 8.1). Most Brazilian 
sugar cane is cultivated on large estates. Independent producers, widely varying in size, 
cultivate only 20-30 % of the land. In total there are about 60,000 cane growing farms in 
Brazil (OECD, 2001: 25). Recently Brazilian farmers have discovered the advantages of 
                                                 
1 This chapter draws on a background paper by Sylvia M. Saes and Decio Zylbersztajn, PENSA, University 
of São Paulo (see reference list). 
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forming a cooperative that can market their combined sugar and alcohol production. Sugar 
cane is processed into sugar and alcohol on a 50:50 basis in recent years. Brazil's sugar-
alcohol industry generates one million direct jobs. The economy of over 960 municipalities 
(17% of all Brazilian municipalities) is strongly influenced by this activity, in terms of job 
and income generation (ÚNICA, 2004). 
 
Table 8.1 Features of the Brazilian sugar sector (2003) 
Features Data 
Sugar cane production 340 million tonnes 
Sugar production 25 million tonnes 
Alcohol production  15 million m3
Mills  320 units 
Direct jobs  1 million 
Sugar exportation  13 million tonnes (USD2 billion) 
Source: ÚNICA, 2004. 
 
 
 A total of 320 sugar cane-processing units operate in Brazil. Out of this total 226 
units operate in the centre-south region. In this region 83% of the 2003-2004 sugar cane 
harvest has been processed. Factories of average size process 1.5 million tonnes of sugar 
cane a year. The ten biggest sugar plants / distilleries crush between 3.6 and 6.8 million 
tonnes of sugar cane per unit, during the crop season. Each of these large industrial plants 
produces between 300,000 and 450,000 tonnes of sugar and between 175 and 330 million 
litres of ethanol.  
 Sugar cane production has led to alternate production such as hydrated and anhy-
drous alcohol, sugar or even electricity. Sugar cane produces mixed syrup that can be 
applied in the production of both sugar and alcohol. From all sugar plants in Brazil, 27% 
produce only alcohol. The remaining plants have the flexibility to produce sugar and alco-
hol. This flexibility allows the industry to react to changing market conditions for sugar 
and/or alcohol. At the same time, however, companies have contracts with their clients, 
which may prevent the sugar plants to shift from sugar to alcohol production or vice versa. 
Also, large companies are vertically integrated with soft drink or other beverages compa-
nies and supply a large part of their production to associated companies. There are also 
sugar companies investing in diversification, such as diet or light sugar production, which 
may limit their possibilities to shift from sugar to alcohol production. The industry also 
generates many by-products. For instance, sugar bagasse, one of the end products of mill-
ing, can be used to generate power or as a raw material in cellulose production (UNICA, 
2004) The sugar agribusiness system is vertically integrated to benefit from scale econo-
mies and manage coordination needs. Vertically integrated firms that also refine and 
package the product supply about 70% of the sugar cane. Farms are for the most part adja-
cent to the industries: the specificity of the place is required, as sugar cane must not take 
long to be processed. Table 8.2 shows the ranking of the sugar and alcohol mills in the 
state of São Paulo. As can be seen, major sugar producers are also alcohol producers. 
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Regional differences 
There are considerable regional differences in Brazil with regard to efficiency of sugar 
production. The Northeast region is by far less efficient than the Centre-South. Before the 
Pro-alcohol programme, the state of Pernambuco in the North-East was the largest produc-
tion region in Brazil, Now, the sugar sector in Pernambuco and Alagoas is still important 
to the regional economy, but the state of Sao Paulo in the Centre-South is by far the lead-
ing sugar cane producing region. The Centre-South region is characterized by high 
productive soils and excellent growing conditions. It is regarded as one of the lowest cost 
sugar cane growing areas in the world and has great prospects for further expansion. The 
liberalisation process will further enforce the regional shift in sugar production, since pro-
ducers in the Northeast need price support to compensate for their relatively low yields and 
high production costs because of poor growing conditions. Both field and factory costs in 
this region are higher than in the Centre-South. To compensate for its relatively weak 
competitive position, the Brazilian government has allocated the USA TRQ for Brazil to 
producers in the North-eastern region.  
 
Government policy in the sugar and ethanol sector 
For almost a century, the sector operated under governmental regulation. Starting in 1933, 
the policy objectives were to coordinate production and control consumer prices (Farina 
and Zylberstajn, 1998). Prices for farmers as well as for processors of sugar cane were arti-
ficially set by adding a margin to the production costs, with a view to keeping consumer 
prices under control. The Alcohol and Sugar Institute (IAA) managed and controlled the 
sugar and alcohol production, prices and exports.  
 Two years after the oil crisis of 1973, the Brazilian government created the National 
Alcohol Program (PROALCOOL), aimed at increasing the alcohol production to replace 
the expensive oil, particularly in transportation. The gradually developed policy framework 
offered incentives such as: a) a guaranteed price for ethanol; b) the control of the ethanol 
distribution by the state-owned oil company (PETROBRAS); c) incentives for building 
distilleries (guaranteed credit, low interest rate) and; d) direct aids to fuel-alcohol produc-
ers (in 1999 the producers received USD2.50 per hectolitre).1 Further, the government 
obligated the blending of gasoline with a certain percentage of alcohol (anhydrous alcohol) 
while government vehicles and busses had to use pure alcohol (hydrous alcohol).  
 Reform programmes in the 1990s aiming at restructuring Brazils economic imbal-
ances illustrated by high inflation and fiscal deficits marked a decline in federal 
intervention policies. In the mid-1990s several factors put the alcohol programme under 
great pressure. Oil prices declined and the ethanol programme led to overproduction of al-
cohol and a financial burden for the government. Consequently, reform proved to be 
unavoidable, although the sector had a high socio-economic importance. At the end of 
1996 the government presented the first proposals for liberalisation of the ethanol/sugar 
market. The period between 1997 and 1999 coincided with the end of the monopoly of the 
state-owned oil company PETROBRAS, the liberalisation of ethanol prices and production 
quotas and the reduction of (credit) subsidies. Nowadays the only government intervention 
                                                 
1 Loans were limited to 80% of the investments for sugar cane mills. Credit was available also for farming. 
Conditions for credits were more flexible in specific regions like the dry areas of the Northeast. 
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concerns the fixation of the anhydrous ethanol blend ratio between 20 to 25%. That pro-
portion represents around 11.5 billion litres/year of ethanol. The blending is set forth in the 
Brazilian environmental legislation (since 1993), aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emis-
sions. There is no anhydrous alcohol volume allotted among producers in the form of 
individual quotas to be met by companies (Serodio, 2005). 
 The farmers are paid for their sugar cane according to prices received in the sale of 
the sector's end products, the market's supply and demand conditions, and the 
CONSECANA system (Council of Sugar cane, Sugar and Alcohol Producers), which sets 
quality assessment technological criteria. This system is based on a formula that takes into 
consideration both the total content of sugar in the raw material and sugar and alcohol 
prices in the domestic and international market. The value of the sugar cane in Brazil 
represents 60 % of the industry's revenues. In the state of São Paulo, the industry paid 
farmers about USD10.35 per ton of sugar cane supplied to industrial units in the crop year 
2003/2004. 
 While in the early 1990s over 70% of the Brazilian sugar cane was used for alcohol 
production, at the end of 1990s sugar cane production has been almost equally divided into 
alcohol and sugar production. Sugar production increased due to positive perspectives in 
the international sugar market and due to the decline in the production of fuel alcohol for 
cars. However, the world market for sugar is relatively small (because of the prominence 
of preferential trade agreements) and the increase in Brazilian sugar production resulted in 
lower market prices at the end of the 1990s. However, since 2002 there is a significant in-
crease in the production of cars with flexi-fuel engines in Brazil while it is expected that in 
the near future no more exclusive gas engines will be in use (Anfavea, 2004). This will 
again create more opportunities for ethanol production, especially when Brazil will be able 
to attract foreign buyers of ethanol. In the most recent years on average 55% of Brazilian 
sugar cane turned into alcohol and 45% into sugar (UNICA, 2004). 
 
 
8.3 Sugar production and export trends of Brazil 
 
The level of Brazilian sugar production is strongly influenced by the Pro-alcohol pro-
gramme. In the mid 1980s half of the Brazilian cars used hydrous (pure) ethanol as an 
alternative for petrol. In the 1990s, when oil prices declined, the production of hydrous 
ethanol fuelled cars came to a halt. However, new environmental legislation was designed 
aimed at reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) (Serodio, 2003). The new legislation in combina-
tion with declining oil prices boosted the production of anhydrous ethyl alcohol (blended 
fuel). As a result, as figure 8.1 shows, sugar production (relative to ethanol) increased. The 
depreciation of the Brazilian real further stimulated sugar production and export and pro-
duction increased from 11.7 million tonnes in 1995 to 24.8 million tonnes in 2004 
(ÚNICA, 2004).  
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Figure 8.1 Sugar and ethanol production in Brazil, 1994-2004  
Source: ÚNICA, 2004. 
 
 
 Recently, the demand for cane-based ethanol was re-established by the increasing oil 
price and this further stimulates the expansion of sugar cane production. At the moment 
again more than half of the annual sugar cane production is absorbed by Brazil's large 
ethanol sector and this has not led to a reduction of sugar production. Brazil seems to be 
able to increase both its sugar and ethanol production, although the trade-off between sugar 
and ethanol creates a factor of uncertainty with regard to the stability of the world market. 
At times when the oil price is low, sugar cane is mainly processed into sugar and sugar ex-
ports will increase. This in turn will have its influence on world sugar prices. 
Consequently, the future of the Brazilian sugar sector depends on many factors: the world 
sugar price, the value of the real against the dollar and euro, the oil price and the domestic 
demand for ethanol, export opportunities for cane-based ethanol, the outcome of the Euro-
pean sugar reform and the outcome of an WTO panel on European sugar export subsidies.  
 
Brazil's domestic sugar market 
While Brazil is the world's main sugar producer and exporter, it is also the world's fifth 
largest sugar consumer. Moreover, sugar exports are seen as the third alternative for sugar 
cane after production of sugar and ethanol for the large domestic market (Mitchell, 2004). 
Domestic sugar consumption has grown from 8.2 million tonnes in 1995 to 10.0 million 
tonnes in 2002 (ISO, 2003; NDSU, 2004), thereby reflecting an annual per capita con-
sumption of 53 kg - where a world average is 22 kg/capita. Consumption is projected to 
increase slightly towards 10.7 million tonnes in 2013 (NDSU, 2004). Domestic ethanol 
consumption amounted to 12 billion litres in 2004, while exports reached 1.5 billion tonnes 
(FO Licht, 2004).  
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Export of Brazilian sugar 
The dynamics of the Brazilian market has affected the country's share in the international 
market. Sugar production in Brazil has more than doubled in the 1990s to reach a share of 
15% of world's sugar production (see Table 2.2 in Chapter 2). At present, above half of the 
Brazilian domestic production is destined to the international market. Sugar exports have 
developed very rapidly in the 1990s (Figure 8.2). Nowadays, sugar is one of the most im-
portant agricultural export products of Brazil, with an expected export of 16 million tonnes 
in 2004/2005 (FO Licht, 2004). 
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Figure 8.2 The development of the Brazilian sugar export volume, 1977-2004 (1996 = 100) 
Source: IPEADATA (2004). 
 
 
 Table 2.1 (in chapter 2) shows Brazil's export position compared to other major sugar 
exporters in the world. In 2003, from the total exports of raw sugar, Brazil cornered a 33 % 
market share, i.e. 5.2 million tonnes, followed by Australia with 15%. As for refined 
(white) sugar, Brazil has 21% of market share or 7.9 million tonnes. The European Union 
is the largest exporter of white sugar, with 26% of the total internationally traded volume. 
 According to the OECD Brazil increased its share in world net exports from 7% in 
1990 to 37% in 1999 (OECD, 2001: 15). Increased sugar production (diversification away 
from ethanol), the removal in 1998 of a 40% tax on exports of sugar beyond a set quota 
and the 40 % devaluation of the Brazilian currency in January 1999 all contributed to the 
growth in shipments (ABARE, 1999: 56). The Northeast region profits from preferential 
exports to the USA (tariff rate quota of around 150,000 tonnes annually), while the Sao-
Paulo region, next to the ethanol production, has traditionally focused on requirements for 
direct domestic consumption and the manufacture of products containing sugar. Yet, the 
enormous production potential in the Centre-South is increasingly used to expand market 
share in new markets in North and West Africa as well as in the Middle East.  
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 Countries with refining capacity, such as Canada, Egypt, Iran and Russia, import raw 
sugar, while African and Middle Eastern countries are the main buyers of white sugar. Fur-
ther, Brazil has been able to expand in the Southeast Asian markets Malaysia and 
Indonesia in 1998 and 1999, where as a consequence of the Asian crisis the traditional ex-
porters Australia and Thailand (temporarily?) lost markets. However, the latter are 
valuable partners of Brazil in its appeal against European export subsidies. Therefore it is 
not expected that Brazil will pursue aggressive marketing policies in this region, although 
estimations point out that consumption of sugar in Asia may grow considerably in the fu-
ture, thereby creating additional export opportunities for Brazil. Table 8.2 provides an 
overview of the main buyers of Brazilian, whereby Russia has become Brazil's main export 
market since sugar exports of Cuba (the traditional supplier of the Soviet Union) fell dra-
matically in the 1990s.  
 
Table 8.2 Biggest importers of Brazilian sugar (2003) 
Countries Million t Million USD FOB USD FOB/t 
Russian Federation 3.84 597.72 155.59
United Arab Emirates  0.98 152.32 155.46
Nigeria 0.82 144.09 175.51
Canada 0.76 118.09 154.66
Senegal 0.73 115.69 157.43
Algeria 0.52 85.02 163.60
Egypt 0.52 87.23 169.34
Morocco 0.51 82.73 161.09
Saudi Arabia 0.34 51.15 150.63
Ghana 0.32 56.82 177.08
Yemen 0.25 41.41 164.96
Angola 0.20 35.91 183.00
Romania 0.19 31.55 165.03
United States  0.18 72.74 401.20
Source: ÚNICA, 2004. 
 
 
8.4 Consequences of European sugar reform for Brazilian sugar export  
 opportunities 
 
The EU sugar market is protected by high (since the Uruguay Round) fixed import tariffs, 
which are €339/ton for raw sugar and €419/ton for white sugar. A 'special safeguard clause' 
allows the EU to impose an additional duty if the value of imported sugar falls below a 
trigger price of €531 per ton. These duties make imports of sugar outside of preferential ar-
rangements largely uneconomic. Preferential sugar trade arrangements are mainly with 
developing countries (ACP countries, India and the EBA countries, see section 3.3). At 
present, Brazil is allowed to export an amount of 29,960 tonnes of raw sugar to the EU un-
der the MFN commitment (export agreement with Finland before Finland joined the EU). 
These features of the EU import regime explain why the EU is not one of Brazil's main ex-
port markets despite Brazilian competitiveness on the international sugar markets (see also 
table 8.4). Furthermore, a significant part of the EU's surplus 'A' and 'B' production is ex-
ported outside of the EU market, using export refunds to cover the difference between the 
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EU and world market price. This limits Brazil's export opportunities to third countries. EU 
(and countries with similar protectionist) policies force Brazil to stimulate efficiency in or-
der to remain competitive and to keep its market position.  
 Costa and Burnquist (2004) show that the effect of the elimination of sugar market 
regulation in the USA and the EU may lead to a 'considerable increase' in Brazil's sugar 
exports to these two markets. With regard to the EU, their estimates consider the average 
Brazilian exports over the period 1996-2002 and look at the effects of an elimination of the 
import quotas and price support policy. The authors estimate that Brazil's exports (of raw 
sugar) increase with USD13.5 million, which is a 55% increase of Brazil's average annual 
export value over the period 1996-2002. This may be significant in percentage terms, yet 
the effects are minor in terms of total imports of the EU as well as in terms of total exports 
of Brazil. The study does not make clear why Brazil would not gain more from such a 
drastic policy reform in the EU. The focus of the study is more on domestic and regional 
impacts of liberalisation in the two protected markets. The study indicates that the low-cost 
producers in the centre-south region would benefit most from the increased market access 
to EU and USA markets, while the north-northeast region would benefit less than propor-
tional. There are no other quantitative analyses known that focus on the impact of EU 
sugar trade reforms on the Brazilian sugar exports. There are several (qualitative) analyses 
of the possible impact of EU sugar trade reforms on Brazilian export opportunities and 
these are rather sceptical (Icone, 2004; Zylbersztajn, Jank and Nasser, 2004). Furthermore, 
the increase of exports will not necessarily lead to higher sector profit gains. Since 1995, 
prices have been decreasing, which has resulted in the decrease of the export profitability 
of the Brazilian sugar industry (figure 8.3). 
 Next to the unilateral reforms in the EU and US sugar markets, the outcome of the 
developments within the WTO is also very important for Brazil. Firstly, the current Doha 
Round aims at increasing multilateral liberalization by reducing export subsidies and re-
moving trade barriers. Secondly, a WTO panel recently concluded that the EU is exporting 
sugar above its WTO commitments. In principle the EU is eligible to subsidize exports up 
to 1.273 million tonnes, but according to the WTO the EU is illegally exporting C sugar 
above this level by means of cross-subsidisation, lifting the total level of export in 2002 to 
4.707 million tonnes.1 According to its July 2004 proposal the EU wants to reduce subsi-
dised exports to 400,000 tonnes, but there will be no limit on the export of C sugar. 
However, when the judgment of the WTO panel will be confirmed, it is expected that EU 
sugar exports will decrease significantly, providing Brazil the opportunity to take over EU 
export markets. Currently, the five largest importers of EU sugar are Algeria, Syria, Israel, 
United Arab Emirates and Egypt (European Commission, 2003a). According to table 8.2 
three of these countries are already large importers of Brazilian sugar, which makes it 
likely that Brazil will expand on these export markets.  
 An interesting observation is that the European sugar industry has already taken a 
strategic position by buying shares in Brazilian sugar mills. This implicates that many 
European sugar companies acknowledge the good perspectives of the Brazilian sugar in-
dustry and anticipate an international market situation with lower trade barriers. For 
example, several French sugar beet companies have acquired Brazilian companies in the 
                                                 
1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2003/table_en/4331.pdf . 
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last 4 years. Cosan (a Brazilian company) coordinated three of them and the other three 
were coordinated by a joint venture among Cosan, the French company Union SDA (Un-
ion Sucreries et Destilleries de l'Aisne - important producer of beet root and derivatives in 
France and in the Czech Republic) and Sudden (an international sugar trade), as the FDA 
Group (Franco Brasileira Açúcar e Álcool). The FDA Group is now the biggest producer 
of sugar and alcohol in Brazil with 10% of the total mill capacity of sugar cane. The Group 
has become the largest individual producers, with over 22 million tonnes of ground sugar 
cane, sugar exports amounting to 1.6 million tonnes and 80 million litres of alcohol. Like 
other companies in this industry, the FDA Group is directing their operations towards the 
international market of traditional commodity products (sugar) and towards developing 
new products and distribution channels for international clients (Zylbersztajn, Jank and 
Nasser, 2004). Other examples of European investments in the Brazilian sugar industry are 
the Louis Dreyfus group and Europe´s largest sugar/alcohol company Eridania Béghin-
Say. The latter operates 26 sugar plants in France, Italy and Hungary, and is part of the 
French consortium Origny-Naples (Pinazza and Alimandro, 2004). 
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Figure 8.3 Sugar export profitability in Brazil (1994-III = 100) 
Source: Funcex apud IPEA (2004). 
 
 
8.5 Alternatives and outlook for sugar production and export 
 
Due to the current developments in the EU and the WTO the market prospect of Brazilian 
sugar is bright. Next to that, individual countries' commitments to increase the use of envi-
ronmental friendly energy sources could lead to a growing export market for ethanol. 
Therefore market, analysts think Brazil will continue to increase both its ethanol and sugar 
production. The industry has already announced investment plans up to USD6 billion until 
2010, with area planted with sugar cane expanding to 7.5 million hectare and increasing 
the number of mills with 40 in 2007 (FO Licht, 2004).  
 As regards sugar, it is expected that the focus in the future will lie more on raw 
sugar. On the one hand price difference between raw and white sugar decline and thus 
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processing margins get smaller and on the other hand some major importing countries 
(Saudi Arabia, Dubai and Algeria) have increased their refining capacity, which creates 
opportunities for raw cane sugar exporters (Rabobank, 2004: 70). However, Russia intends 
to increase its domestic beet production so that Brazil will have to continue searching for 
new sugar markets.  
 As regards ethanol, several countries (e.g. Japan and Germany) have already indi-
cated that they want to increase the use of ethanol as an alternative fuel. Because of its 
flexibility to diversify between raw sugar, white sugar, anhydrous ethanol and hydrous 
ethanol Brazil could easily anticipate changes in the respective markets. Moreover, the po-
tential for expansion of sugar cane production in Brazil is enormous: there are large 
reserves of agricultural land, and research into and development of new technologies will 
help to improve the average yields per hectare and lower production costs significantly. 
About 45% of the Brazilian cultivated area is suitable for mechanization and the sugar 
companies are very rapidly adopting new technology. The period of strong governmental 
intervention clearly left a tradition of research, both on the industry and on farm agricul-
tural production with visible effects in terms of efficiency gains. For instance, production 
costs are low, averaging around USD170 per ton among the most efficient mills in Sao 
Paulo, considering the exchange rate of BRL2.30 per dollar. Even in the less efficient areas 
in the Northeast, sugar cane is produced against relatively low costs: in Australia produc-
tion costs average USD270 per ton, in Thailand USD310 and in Europe USD500 per ton 
(Schouchana and Widonsck, 2001).1 Figure 8.4 below summarises the competitive factors 
for sugar production in Brazil. 
 
 
Agriculture Industry 
Soils Multipurpose plants 
Rain and water availability Low cost and co-generation of energy. 
No need of irrigation Full use of sugar cane  
Re-utilisation of the by-product (vinhoto) Local knowledge centres in sugar-alcohol 
High yields Technology and management up-dated industry 
Genetic technology  
Figure 8.4 Brazilian competitive factors for sugar production 
Source: MAPA, 2004. 
 
 
8.6 Conclusions 
 
The sugar and fuel ethanol industry is one of the most important sectors for Brazilian agri-
business exports. Brazil is the world's largest and most competitive producer of sugar and 
ethanol, and the leading sugar and ethanol exporter. Sugar production in Brazil has in-
creased strongly since the 1970s when the Pro-alcohol programme encouraged the 
production of sugar cane for fuel ethanol as alternative source for car petrol. At present 
government intervention in the sugar market in Brazil is very modest: market forces de-
termine prices for sugar and fuel ethanol, and thus sugar cane production. The EU sugar 
                                                 
1 LMC data on the 2001/2002 crop showed an average world production cost for the raw sugar of 
USD243.4/t, as against the average price in the Brazilian centre-southern region of USD126.3/t. 
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trade reform is expected to allow Brazil to expand on third country markets, although Bra-
zilian analysts are rather sceptical about the opportunities that might come from this 
unilateral policy reform. EU-based sugar companies, on the other hand, have already 
bought shares in Brazilian sugar mills, indicating their trust in the country's advantages as 
sugar producer and as producer of (fuel) ethanol in a world with less trade barriers. Further 
restructuring and expansion of the Brazilian sugar industry will enhance the competitive-
ness of Brazilian sugar industry.  
 The output levels of sugar and ethanol will be determined by different factors: the in-
ternational prices of sugar and oil; the exchange rate; the efficiency of producing both 
sugar and fuel alcohol, and world demand for environmentally friendly bio-fuels (also in-
fluenced by government policy). Estimations about future levels of Brazilian sugar 
production are therefore difficult to make. The OECD foresees a sugar production growth 
towards 29.8 million tonnes (in 2008) and an export growth towards 18.5 million tonnes 
(OECD, 2003). However, analysts of the American agribusiness giant Cargill expect that 
in 2014 Brazil will provide 60% of the world market with production increasing to 49 mil-
lion tonnes and exports to 37.1 million tonnes (Agra Europe, 2004). Such projections 
indicate that Brazil is expected to increasingly dominate the international sugar market.  
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Appendix 1 An overview of the Computational Model 
 
 
 
A1.1 Introduction 
 
This appendix provides an overview of the basic structure of the global CGE model em-
ployed for our assessment of the sugar reforms. The GULA1 model is implemented in 
GEMPACK - a software package designed for solving large applied general equilibrium 
models. The model is solved as an explicit non-linear system of equations, through tech-
niques described by Harrison and Pearson (1994). More information can be obtained at the 
following URL - http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm. The reader is referred to 
Hertel (1996: http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/model/Chap2.pdf) for a detailed discus-
sion of the basic algebraic model structure represented by the GEMPACK code. While this 
appendix provides a broad overview of the model, detailed discussion of mathematical 
structure is limited to added features, beyond the standard GTAP structure. 
 The model is a standard multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 
See Van Tongeren et al., (2001) for a review and assessment of the features of applied ag-
ricultural trade models. Social accounting data are based on Version 6 (pre-release 5) of 
the GTAP dataset (McDougall 2001). 
 
 
A1.2 General structure 
 
The general conceptual structure of a regional economy in the model is represented in ap-
pendix 2. Within each region, firms produce output, employing land, labour, capital, and 
natural resources and combining these with intermediate inputs. Firm output is purchased 
by consumers, government, the investment sector, and by other firms. Firm output can also 
be sold for export. Land is only employed in the agricultural sectors, while capital and la-
bour (both skilled and unskilled) are mobile between all production sectors. Capital is fully 
mobile within regions.  
 All demand sources combine imports with domestic goods to produce a composite 
good, as indicated in the figure, following the well-known Armington approach.  
 
 
A1.3 Modelling of agricultural supply and land markets 
 
The standard version of GTAP represents land allocation that assumes various types of 
land are imperfectly substitutable. That is, land is imperfectly mobile across alternative 
uses. In order to model the agricultural supply response in such a way that it is consistent 
                                                 
1 Gula is the Bahasa Indonesia word for sugar.  
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with existing econometric evidence, we have made some specific enhancements to the 
model, following the work on the OECD GTAPEM model (see Huang et al., 2004) 
 The revised model covers several types of land more or less suited to various crops. 
The crops include sugar, grains, oilseeds and other crops. The model distinguishes differ-
ent types of land in a nested 3-level CET structure.1 In this way the degree of 
substitutability of types of land can be varied between the nests. It captures to some extent 
agronomic features. In general it is assumed that it is relatively easier to change the alloca-
tion of land within the Cereal, Oilseed and Protein group, while it is more difficult to move 
land out of this group into a lower nest, such as into vegetables. 
 
A 1.3.1 Factor Substitution 
 
Factor demand in the standard GTAP model is modelled as a two level process. Primary 
factors are a CES aggregate of labour, capital, land and natural resources which are com-
bined in fixed proportions with intermediate inputs (Leontief). That is, there is no 
substitution between intermediate inputs and primary factors of production, while substitu-
tion between primary factors is possible. This assumption, common in many computable 
general equilibrium models, is often used because it reduces considerably the number of 
parameters required. However, in the context of this analysis, we explicitly model substi-
tutability between purchased farm input intermediates, and between the aggregate 
intermediates and farm-owned inputs.. The parameters are calibrated to elasticities of sub-
stitution taken from the OECD PEM model (Hertel and Keeney 2003). 
 
A 1.3.2 Segmented factor markets: agriculture/non-agriculture 
 
If labour were perfectly mobile across domestic sectors, we would observe equalized 
wages throughout the economy for workers with comparable endowments. This is clearly 
not supported by evidence. Wage differentials between agriculture and non-agriculture can 
be sustained in many countries (especially developing countries) through limited off-farm 
labour migration (Harris and Todaro 1970). Returns to assets invested in agriculture also 
tend to diverge from returns to investment in other activities.  
 To capture these stylized facts, we incorporate segmented factor markets for labour 
and capital by specifying a CET structure that transforms agricultural labour (and capital) 
into non-agricultural labour (and capital). This specification has the advantage that it can 
be calibrated to available estimates of agricultural labour supply response.  
 We separate market clearing conditions for agriculture and non-agriculture and thus 
have separate market prices for each of these sets of endowments. The economy-wide en-
dowment of labour (and capital) remains fixed, so that any increase in supply of labour to 
manufacturing has to be withdrawn from agriculture, and the economy-wide resources 
constraint remains satisfied. The parameters of this function are calibrated to fit estimates 
of the elasticity of labour supply reported in OECD (2001). The same procedure is applied 
to capital. 
 
                                                 
1 This is a relatively recent feature of PEM. Earlier versions had a 2-level structure. 
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A1.4 Taxes and policy variables 
 
Taxes are included in the theory of the model at several levels. Production taxes are placed 
on intermediate or primary inputs, or on output. Some trade taxes are modelled at the bor-
der. Additional internal taxes can be placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, 
and may be applied at differential rates that discriminate against imports. Where relevant, 
taxes are also placed on exports, and on primary factor income. Finally, where relevant (as 
indicated by social accounting data) taxes are placed on final consumption, and can be ap-
plied differentially to consumption of domestic and imported goods. 
 Trade policy instruments outside sugar are represented as import or export 
taxes/subsidies. The data on tariffs are taken from the WTO's integrated database, with 
supplemental information from the World Bank's recent assessment of detailed pre- and 
post-Uruguay Round tariff schedules and from the UNCTAD/World Bank WITS dataset. 
The mapping of these protection data to bilateral trade data has been a joint effort by the 
Centre d'études Prospectives et d'information Internationales (CEPII) and the International 
Trade Centre (WTO/ITC). This database is used to convert tariffs applying to trade in 
products measured at a very disaggregate level (HS6) into their ad valorem equivalent. The 
underlying import protection measures include ad valorem tariffs, specific tariffs, quota, 
tariff rate quota regimes, and anti-dumping duties. An important feature of the dataset is 
the inclusion of existing trade preferences. See Bouët et al. (2004) for a comprehensive 
documentation. 
 
 
A1.5 Agricultural quotas 
 
In the sugar sector in the EU we are dealing with a combination of output quota, which 
constrain production of sugar beets, bilaterally allocated import quota and ordinary import 
tariffs. An output quota places a restriction on the volume of production. If such a supply 
restriction is binding, it implies that consumers will pay a higher price than they would pay 
in case of an unrestricted interplay of demand and supply. We formulate output quota as a 
complementarity problem. This formulation allows for endogenous regime switches from a 
state when the output quota is binding to a state when the quota becomes non-binding. In 
addition, changes in the value of the quota rent are endogenously determined. Similarly, 
we model sugar import quota for sugar as a complementarity problem. The modelling of 
this class of non-continuous policy instruments has been greatly facilitated by the latest re-
lease of GEMPACK.  
 
 
A1.6 Trade and transportation costs 
 
International trade is modeled as a process that explicitly involves trading costs, which in-
clude both trade and transportation services. These trading costs reflect the transaction 
costs involved in international trade, as well as the physical activity of transportation itself. 
Those trading costs related to international movement of goods and related logistic services 
are met by composite services purchased from a global trade services sector, where the 
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composite 'international trade services' activity is produced as a Cobb-Douglas composite 
of regional exports of trade and transport service exports. Trade-cost margins are based on 
reconciled f.o.b. and c.i.f. trade data, as reported in version 6 of the GTAP dataset. 
 
A1.7 The composite household and final demand structure  
 
Final demand is determined by an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas preference function, which al-
locates income in fixed shares to current consumption, investment, and government 
services. This yields a fixed savings rate. Government services are produced by a Leontief 
technology, with household/government transfers being endogenous. The lower-tier nest 
for current consumption is also specified as a Cobb-Douglas. The regional capital markets 
adjust so that changes in savings match changes in regional investment expenditures. (Note 
that the Cobb-Douglas demand function is a special case of the CDE demand function em-
ployed in the standard GTAP model code. It is implemented through GEMPACK 
parameter files.) 
 
 
A1.8 Trade 
 
The basic structure of demand in constant returns sectors is Armington preferences. In 
Armington sectors, goods are differentiated by country of origin, and the similarity of 
goods from different regions is measured by the elasticity of substitution.  
 
 
A1.9 Regions in the model 
 
The GULA model divides the world into distinguishes 12 regions, which are aggregated 
from the 87 GTAP regions. These are in turn built up from statistics on 226 individual 
countries or composite regions. The database does not allow us to distinguish all individual 
countries in the various grouping such as EBA and ACP. The mapping between regions 
and countries is provided in Appendix 4. We have treated the EU as one regional block and 
have chosen to concentrate on the enlarged EU27, i.e. a European Union including Bul-
garia and Romania.  
 
 
A1.10 Sectors in the model 
 
Each regional economy in the model distinguishes 7 activities or sectors, focusing on crops 
and livestock. These are aggregated from the 57 original GTAP sectors. Appendix 3 pro-
vides details.  
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A1.11 Additional data 
 
We have supplemented the database with data on sugar production, consumption and trade 
in physical units (tonnes) from the ISO Sugar Yearbook 2002 databases. This source pro-
vides data for the 63 ISO member countries as well as data for other countries. The ISO 
statistics have been mapped to the GTAP regional classification.  
 
 
A1.12 Closure 
 
A model needs to be 'closed' by specifying the variable a as either endogenous, i.e. values 
are determined by the model, or exogenous, i.e. predetermined outside the model. The 
macroeconomic closure of the GULA model is such that investments accommodate any 
change in regional savings. Regional savings include domestic savings and inflow of capi-
tal from abroad. The latter is captured by allowing the regional trade balances (and hence 
the savings-investment balance) to adjust. A global bank assures that global savings equal 
investments and the regional allocation of funds is governed by the movement of expected 
relative returns to capital.  
 It is important to realise that the closure specifies as exogenous the regional endow-
ments of capital, land and labour. Exogenous amounts of arable land at the regional level 
means that additional production of one specific crop can only be realised from reallocat-
ing land from other crops. This assumption can be relaxed by introducing an explicit lad-
supply function, which relates the amount of supplied arable land to the overall returns to 
land. Such a long-term structure is, however, not endeavoured in this study.  
 The model's numeraire is a global factor price index, which is set to unity. All prices 
are expressed relative to this numeraire.  
 
 96
Appendix 2 The Flow of Production 
 
 
 
 
 
Output
Value
Added
Composite
Goods
Imports
Capital, Land,
Labor, and
Natural Resources
Exports Consumption
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Appendix 3 Sector 
 
 
 
GULA Sector (7) GTAP sector (57) 
 
Sugar cane, sugar beet: sugar cane; sugar beet. 
 
Sugar:  sugar. 
 
Grains: paddy rice; wheat; cereal grains nec. 
 
Oil Seeds: oil seeds. 
 
Other crops: vegetables; fruit, nuts; plant based fibers; crops nec. 
 
Livestock and- products: cattle, sheep, goats, horses; animal products nec; raw milk. Meat: cattle, 
 sheep, goats, horses; meat products nec; dairy products.  
 
Other Food and Agriculture: wool, silk; worm cocoons; Vegetable oils and fats; processed rice; 
 food products nec; beverages and tobacco products.  
 
Rest of the economy: forestry; fishing; coal; oil; gas; minerals nec; textiles; wearing apparel; 
leather products; wood products; paper products; publishing petroleum; 
coal products; chemical, rubber, plastic prods; mineral products nec; fer-
rous metals; metals nec; metal products; motor vehicles and parts; 
transport equipment nec; electronic equipment; machinery and equipment 
nec; manufactures nec; electricity; gas manufacture, distribution; water; 
construction; trade; transport nec; sea transport; air transport; communi-
cation; financial services nec; insurance; business services nec; recreation 
and other services; pubAdmin/defence/health/education; dwellings. 
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Appendix 4 Region aggregation scheme 
 
 
 Sugar model regions (12) GTAP regions (87)  Member regions (226) 
 
EU27  European Union 27 Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; 
France; Germany; United Kingdom; 
Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; 
Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; 
Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Hungary; Malta; Poland; Romania; 
Slovakia; Slovenia; Estonia; Latvia; 
Lithuania. 
 
ACP ACP sugar protocol countries Rest of Oceania American Samoa; Cook Islands; Fiji; 
French Polynesia; Guam; Kiribati; 
Marshall Islands; Micronesia, Feder-
ated States of Nauru; New Caledonia; 
Norfolk Island; Northern Mariana Is-
lands; Niue; Palau; Papua New Guinea; 
Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tokelau; 
Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu; Wallis and 
Futuna. 
  India India. 
  Rest of Free Trade  
  Area of the Americas  Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; Bar-
bados; Dominica; Dominican Republic; 
Grenada; Haiti; Jamaica; Puerto Rico 
Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Trinidad and Tobago; Virgin Islands, 
U.S. 
  Rest of the Caribbean Anguilla; Aruba; Cayman Islands; 
Cuba; Guadeloupe; Martinique; Mont-
serrat; Netherlands Antilles; Turks and 
Caicos; Virgin Islands, British . 
  Rest of South African 
  Customs Union  Lesotho; Namibia; Swaziland. 
  Malawi Malawi. 
  Tanzania Tanzania, United Republic of 
  Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe. 
  Rest of Southern African 
  Development Community Angola; Congo, the Democratic Repub-
lic; of the Mauritius; Seychelles. 
  Madagascar Madagascar. 
  Uganda  Uganda 
EBA  EBA (non ACP) countries  Rest of Southeast Asia Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Lao 
People's Democratic Republic; Myan-
mar; Timor Leste. 
  Bangladesh Bangladesh 
  Rest of South Asia Afghanistan; Bhutan; Maldives; Nepal; 
Pakistan 
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  Mozambique  
  Zambia  
  Rest of Sub-Saharan  
  Africa Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Camer-
oon; Cape Verde; Central African 
Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo; 
Cote d'Ivoire; Djibouti; Equatorial 
Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gabon; 
Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Kenya; Liberia; Mali; Maurita-
nia; Mayotte; Niger; Nigeria; Reunion; 
Rwanda; Saint Helena; Sao Tome and 
Principe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Soma-
lia; Sudan; Togo. 
BRA Brazil  Brazil  
DC Sugar dev countries no prefs Botswana  
  South Africa 
  United States of America 
  New Zealand 
  Japan 
  Korea 
  Canada 
  Mexico 
  Switzerland 
  Rest of EFTA Iceland; Liechtenstein; Norway. 
RUS Russian Federation & PR China China China 
CHN  Russian Federation Russian Federation 
MENA  Middle East & North Africa  Turkey Turkey 
  Rest of Middle East Bahrain; Iran, Islamic Republic of; 
Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; 
Palestinian Territory, Occupied; Oman; 
Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Syrian Arab Re-
public; United Arab Emirates; Yemen. 
  Morocco  Morocco 
  Tunisia  Tunisia 
  Rest of North Africa Algeria; Egypt; Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya 
IDN Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia 
THAUS Thailand &Australia  Australia Australia 
  Thailand Thailand 
ROW All other countries Hong Kong Hong Kong 
  Taiwan Taiwan 
  Rest of East Asia Macau; Mongolia; Korea, Democratic 
People's Republic of 
  Malaysia Malaysia 
  Philippines Philippines 
  Singapore Singapore 
  Viet Nam Viet Nam 
  Sri Lanka Sri Lanka 
  Rest of North America Bermuda; Greenland; Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon. 
  Colombia Colombia 
  Peru Peru 
  Venezuela  Venezuela 
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  Rest of Andean Pact Bolivia; Ecuador. 
  Argentina Argentina 
  Chile Chile 
  Uruguay  Uruguay 
  Rest of South America Falkland Islands (Malvinas); French 
Guiana; Guyana; Paraguay; Suriname. 
  Central America Belize; Costa Rica; El Salvador; Gua-
temala; Honduras; Nicaragua; Panama. 
  Rest of Europe Andorra; Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Faroe Islands; Gibraltar; Macedonia, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of; 
Monaco; San Marino; Serbia and Mon-
tenegro. 
  Albania Albania 
  Croatia Croatia 
  Rest of Former Soviet  
  Union Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Georgia; 
Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Moldova, 
Republic of; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; 
Ukraine; Uzbekistan. 
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